Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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Charles Robinson, the defendant, was convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Edward Figueroa. Following his conviction, Robinson appealed and also filed a motion for a new trial citing multiple errors by trial counsel. Despite his appeal and the motion for a new trial, the conviction was affirmed.Later, Robinson appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that he was not competent to stand trial due to mental health issues and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court upheld the ruling, stating that Robinson had not shown any evidence that his mental health issues had influenced the jury's conclusion or prevented an adequate defense.Robinson's contention that his counsel failed "reasonably to communicate with him" during and after a conversation in the lockup was also dismissed, as the court found no evidence of a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that warranted a new trial.The court concluded that the defendant did not present a substantial issue meriting an evidentiary hearing and dismissed his request for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Robinson" on Justia Law

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This case involved defendant Julie A. Corey who was convicted of first-degree murder on the grounds of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder with the underlying felony of aggravated kidnapping. Following her conviction, Corey filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel due to her attorney's failure to call a cell phone expert to testify about her location on the night of the murder. She also requested that the court enter a required finding of not guilty. The trial judge, who was also the motion judge, denied Corey's motion for a new trial but vacated her conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Corey committed the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Corey’s argument that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that her trial counsel's decision not to call a cell phone expert was not ineffective and would not have likely influenced the jury's conclusions. Furthermore, the court agreed with the Commonwealth that there was sufficient evidence to find Corey guilty of felony-murder with a predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, the court reinstated that conviction. The court also declined to exercise its powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce Corey's conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Corey" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Commonwealth's appeal of a judgment by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which upheld a lower court judge's decision to disqualify a prosecutor, Matthew Green, from a murder case. The defendant, Blake Scanlon, had been indicted on murder charges and was also later charged with soliciting to commit witness intimidation and murder. One of the solicitation targets was Green, the prosecutor for the initial murder indictment. The basis for Green's disqualification was not because he was a victim in the solicitation case, but because he made himself a potential witness at trial. This was due to his interactions with a jailhouse informant, with whom Scanlon was incarcerated and who claimed Scanlon solicited him for a murder-for-hire plot. In exchange for the informant's cooperation, Green advocated for lighter sentences and bail conditions for him in separate legal proceedings. The defendant argued that these actions made Green a potential witness, either to confirm or dispute the informant's claims, or to question the informant's credibility due to bias in favor of the Commonwealth. The lower court judge agreed and disqualified Green from the case. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that Green's disqualification was an error, as he was only a potential witness, and that other means could be used to present the necessary information at trial. The Commonwealth also argued that the disqualification raised separation of powers concerns by interfering in the executive branch's discretion to choose a prosecutor. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, affirming the lower court judge's decision. It found that the level of Green's involvement with the informant's legal proceedings was extensive, making him more than just a potential witness, and that the judge's decision did not constitute an intolerable interference in the executive branch. View "Commonwealth v. Scanlon" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the county court dismissing Petitioner's complaint seeking an order holding the Board of Registration in Medicine in contempt of an order of the Supreme Court, holding that the complaint was properly dismissed.After his license lapsed, Petitioner, who had been the subject of two disciplinary proceedings before the Board, filed a petition seeking immediate reinstatement of his license. Before the case could be heard, the Board agreed to reinstate Petitioner's license, and the parties entered into a voluntary stipulation of dismissal. Thereafter, the Board summarily suspended Petitioner's license because a second disciplinary proceeding had commenced against him. Petitioner then filed a complaint for civil contempt alleging that the temporary suspension was in contempt of the voluntary stipulation of dismissal. The complaint was dismissed without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the third single justice properly dismissed the complaint. View "Bock v. Bd. of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court affirming the decision and order of the Board of Registration in Medicine suspending Petitioner's license to practice medicine, holding that the Board's decision was supported by the evidence and was not legally erroneous, procedurally defective, or arbitrary or capricious.A magistrate concluded that Petitioner was subject to discipline by the Board because his disruptive behavior on two separate occasions amounted to misconduct and demonstrated that Petitioner engaged in conduct that undermined the public confidence in the integrity of the medical profession. The Board adopted the findings and conclusions of the magistrate and concluded that Petitioner's actions warranted an indefinite suspension of his license to practice medicine. The single justice affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board's decision was supported by the evidence, and (2) Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the decision was legally erroneous, procedurally defective, or arbitrary and capricious. View "Schwartz v. Board of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Registration suspending Physician's license to practice medicine on the basis that Physician violated 243 Code Mass. Regs. 2.07(11)(a)(1), holding that the Board's findings that Physician violated the Board's regulations were supported by substantial evidence and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious.The Board initiated a formal adjudicatory proceeding against Physician, after which a magistrate found that Physician had violated 243 Code Mass. Regs. 2.07(11)(a), which prohibits advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading, and also violated 243 Code Mass. Regs. 1.03(5)(a)(10). The Board adopted the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law and issued an indefinite suspension of Physician's license to practice medicine. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board's regulations do not offend due process; (2) the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) neither the findings nor the sanction imposed were arbitrary or capricious. View "Welter v. Bd. of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court affirming a decision of the Board of Registration in Podiatry that revoked Thomas Franchini's license to practice podiatry in Massachusetts, holding that the Board's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, was supported by substantial evidence, and did not suffer from any other defect enumerated under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, 14(7).A hearings officer found that Franchini knowingly made certain false and misleading statements in his licensure application and recommended that the Board impose disciplinary sanctions. The Board largely adopted the hearing officer's decision, finding that Franchini engaged in gross misconduct such as to call into question Franchini's ability to practice podiatry, dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, and knowingly making false statements in his application to the Board. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Franchini should be subject to disciplinary sanctions. View "Franchini v. Bd. of Registration in Podiatry" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court affirming the decision of the Board of Registration in Medicine revoking Joseph Knight's inchoate right to renew his medical license, holding that the Board's decision was amply supported by the evidence and that Knight failed to demonstrate prejudice from any alleged legal or procedural defect.During his career as a physician, Knight was licensed to practice medicine in multiple jurisdictions in the United States. After receiving complaints about his prescription practices, Knight applied for a second renewal of his Massachusetts license. On his application, Knight admitted that he had been the subject of a disciplinary action but denied other allegations. The Board then issued a statement of allegations against Knight, and the disciplinary proceedings proceeded. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no doubt that the Board was justified in reach the result it did. View "Knight v. Board of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court held that the board of registration in medicine may use a sealed criminal record as a basis for discipline but that the board is statutorily prohibited from making the contents of that record available to the public.Petitioner, a physician licensed by the board, was arrested and charged with a misdemeanor count of engaging in sexual conduct for a fee. After the board informed Petitioner that he was under investigation the court dismissed Petitioner's criminal case and Petitioner filed an application to renew his medical license. Thereafter, pursuant to Petitioner's request, a judge in the district court ordered Petitioner's criminal record sealed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 100C. Petitioner notified the board of the sealing order and requested that his disciplinary matter be closed. When the board declined to close the matter Petitioner filed an emergency petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Judicial Court held that section 100C does not prohibit the board from using a record sealed under the section in its disciplinary proceedings, but it does prohibit the board from publicly disclosing any information gleaned directly from a record sealed under section 100C. View "Doe v. Board of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

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In this civil case, the Supreme Court held that, for purposes of measuring fault under the doctrine of in pari delicto, only the conduct of senior management is imputed to the plaintiff organization.Plaintiff in this case was a college acting through its agents. At issue was whether courts in this case should follow the traditional principles of agency law and impute the wrongdoing of those agents to Plaintiff when determining whether it should be barred from recovery under the in pari delicto doctrine. The trial judge granted summary judgment to Defendant under the doctrine of in pari delicto after imputing to Plaintiff the wrongdoing of an employee who was not a member of senior management. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment order, holding that where summary judgment was granted to Defendant on the sole ground that Plaintiff’s claims were barred under the in pari delicto doctrine, the case must be remanded for consideration of Defendant’s other grounds for summary judgment. View "Merrimack College v. KPMG LLP" on Justia Law