Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeal for the First Circuit certified two questions of state law to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The questions arose in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, and concerned the power and effect of an affidavit of an attorney, executed pursuant to G.L. c. 183 section 5B, in relation to a mortgage containing a defective certificate of acknowledgement. The first question centered on whether, pursuant to the statute, a recorded mortgage omitting the name of the mortgagor, a material defect of that mortgage. The second question centered on whether the recording of that allegedly defective mortgages provides constructive notice of the mortgage to a bona fide purchaser, either independently or in combination with the mortgage. The Massachusetts Supreme Court answered both questions "yes." View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Casey" on Justia Law

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regulations require that those deemed to be liable after a spill of hazardous materials within a specified radius of a public water supply undertake cleanup and monitoring to ensure the spill does not pose a danger to that water supply, 310 Code Mass. Regs. 40.0801, 40.0810, 40.0993(3)(a), 40.1030(2)(e). A 2007 modification exempts "oil" from some requirements when specific conditions are met, 310 Code Mass. Regs. 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a). Peterborough owns a now-vacant Athol property, within a protection area, where it operated a gasoline station for more than 10 years. In 1994, a release of leaded gasoline from a subterranean gasoline storage tank was detected in soil on the site. DEP required Peterborough to undertake supervised cleanup and monitoring activities. In 2008, after the oil exemption was established, Peterborough submitted a revised plan, stating that further remediation was not required because the entirety of the spill fell within the exemption's definition of "oil." DEP responded that the meaning of "oil" in the exemption does not include gasoline additives such as lead, but refers only to petroleum hydrocarbons naturally occurring in oils, so that a spill of leaded gasoline could not be completely excluded from further remediation. The trial court, on summary judgment, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, upheld the DEP interpretation of the regulation as reasonable. View "Peterborough Oil Co., LLC v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) filed a complaint for summary process in the Housing Court to establish its right to possession of the Rego house, which Fannie Mae purchased at a foreclosure sale. The Regos argued that the foreclosure sale conducted by GMAC, which held the mortgage, was void because GMAC's attorneys had not been authorized by a prior writing to undertake the actions set forth in G. L. 244, 14. They also asserted an equitable defense and counterclaims. The judge granted Fannie Mae summary judgment "as to possession only," and scheduled a bench trial on the counterclaims, but later dismissed the counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated. The foreclosure suffered no defect on the asserted ground that GMAC failed to provide such authorization to its attorneys, but the Housing Court has limited authorization to entertain counterclaims and an equitable defense to the foreclosure sale in the summary process action. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Rego" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a 1878 partition of Native American common land in the town of Gay Head, which is located on the western coast of Martha’s Vineyard and is connected to the rest of the island by an isthmus. Two commissioners appointed by the probate court partitioned the common land into hundreds of lots to be held in severalty by members of the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head. The commissioners, however, did not include express easements providing rights of access, leaving the lots landlocked. In 1997, Plaintiffs, owners of several lots created by the partition, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking easements by necessity over the lots of Defendants. Ultimately, a Land Court judge concluded that there was sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed intent of the commissioners to create access easements, and therefore, easements by necessity did not exist. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that Defendants presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the commissioners intended to include rights of access. View "Kitras v. Town of Aquinnah" on Justia Law

The Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc. filed suit against Carolyn and Randy Britton, who owned a unit in the Drummer Boy Condomininum II, seeking to recover unpaid common expenses and to enforce a priority lien. When the Brittons continued to withhold payment of their monthly common expenses, the Association commenced a second, and then a third action, to recover the unpaid common expenses that had accrued since the filing of its first action. The actions were subsequently consolidated. The trial judge entered judgment in favor of the Association, concluding (1) the Association was the proper entity to seek recovery of unpaid common expenses; and (2) the Association’s lien priority over the first mortgagee for common expenses was limited to the one six-month period preceding the commencement of the first of the consolidated actions. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in all respects. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding (1) the Association had standing to bring the present action; and (2) the Association may file successive legal actions against the Brittons under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183A, 6 to establish and enforce multiple contemporaneous liens on their condominium unit for the recoupment of successive periods of unpaid common expenses. View "Drummer Boy Homes Ass’n v. Britton" on Justia Law

After Petitioner’s condominium unit was foreclosed upon, Respondent became the new owner. Respondent commenced a summary process action against Petitioner, and the court ruled in Respondent’s favor. The Appellate Division affirmed. Petitioner then filed a petition for relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, arguing that the attorneys who represented her in the foreclosure proceedings committed fraud, and therefore, the judgment against her in the summary process action was void because the underlying foreclosure was void. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice properly denied relief where Petitioner failed to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of other remedies. View "Kim v. Rosenthal" on Justia Law

After a fire broke out at the Beacon Towers Condominium, the board of trustees for the Beacon Towers Condominium Trust, the unit owners’ organization for the condominium, assessed George Alex $62,995 for the two units that he owned. Alex commenced an arbitration action challenging the propriety of the trustees’ conduct regarding the fire damage repairs and the imposition of the assessment. The arbitration panel found in favor of Alex. Although the panel recognized that the arbitration agreement in the trust’s bylaw did not provide for an award of fees, the panel nonetheless awarded fees, reasoning that the American Arbitration Association allowed an award of fees where “substantially all of the defenses were wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not advanced in good faith.” The trust filed suit, claiming that the arbitrators’ award of attorney’s fees exceeded the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement. A superior court judge vacated the award of attorney’s fees, concluding that such an award was not authorized by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 6F when ordered by an arbitrator because section 6F does not authorize an arbitrator to award attorney’s fees. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that an arbitrator lacks the authority to award attorney’s fees under the circumstances of this case. View "Beacon Towers Condo. Trust v. Alex" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case owned beachfront lots in the Town of Dennis, and the defendants owned lots located to the south and west of the plaintiffs’ lots. The parties, who were in the same subdivision, disputed access over a private way to the beach that ran between the plaintiffs’ lots. The plaintiffs filed an action to quiet title and for declaratory relief against the defendants. The trial judge determined that the plaintiffs held the fee in the way. The judge then divided the defendants into three groups and determined, as to the first two groups, the defendants held easements over the way, and that the defendants in the third group did not. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed, holding (1) the plaintiffs did not hold the fee in the way but were easement holders; (2) as to the first and second groups of defendants, the judge correctly determined that the defendants held easements over the way; and (3) the third group of defendants also held easements for access to the waterfront over the way. View "Hickey v. Pathways Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs granted a mortgage on their property to Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. Emigrant later foreclosed on the mortgage by exercise of the power of sale contained in the mortgage. Harold Wilion purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs brought this action against Emigrant and Wilion, seeking a judgment declaring that the sale was void because Emigrant failed to comply with paragraph 22 of the mortgage, which contains the mortgagee’s provision of notice to the mortgagor of default and the right to cure, as well as the remedies available to the mortgagee upon the mortgagor’s failure to cure the default. The superior court allowed Emigrant’s motion to dismiss and Wilion’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Emigrant was not required strictly to comply with the notice of default and right-to-cure provisions of paragraph 22 of the mortgage. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) strict compliance with the notice of default provisions in paragraph 22 was required as a condition of a valid foreclosure sale; and (2) Emigrant failed to meet the strict compliance requirement. Remanded. View "Pinti v. Emigrant Mortgage Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Walter E. Fernald Corporation, a charitable organization, brought this action in the Land Court seeking a declaration that it was the owner of certain parcels of unrecorded land. The Commonwealth had asserted ownership of the parcels. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity. A Land Court judge denied the motion to dismiss and allowed the Corporation’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) sovereign immunity does not apply to the particular type of action brought here; and (2) although a school established by the Corporation became an agency of the Commonwealth in the early 1900s, the Corporation remained independent of the Commonwealth and purchased the parcels on its own behalf. View "Walter E. Fernald Corp. v. The Governor" on Justia Law