Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Stefanidises divided a parcel into Lot A and Lot B. The Stefanidses converted the building on Lot A into three condominium units and applied for a variance to built a two-family house on Lot B. The variance was approved, but the Stefanidses failed to record the variance. Pursuant to a subsequently granted building permit, the Stefanidses began to clear and prepare the site. More than one year after the variance was granted, Plaintiff, who lived in one of the units on Lot A, requested that the building commission revoke the building permit on the ground that the Stefanidses failed to record the variance within one year. The commissioner denied the request, and the zoning board of appeals upheld the commissioner's denial. The land court affirmed, determining that the variance had not lapsed because the Stefanidses had taken substantial steps in reliance upon it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on the facts of this case, the variance had become effective and had not lapsed. View "Grady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Peabody" on Justia Law

Defendants owned two-family and three-family rental properties in the City of Worcester. Defendants leased dwelling units in these properties to groups of four unrelated adult college students. The City determined that, where such a dwelling unit is occupied by four or more unrelated adults not within the second degree of kindred to each other, the dwelling unit is a "lodging" for purposes of the Lodging House Act, and Defendants were therefore operating a lodging house without a license. The trial court found Defendants in contempt and imposed monetary fines. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the dwelling units did not meet the definition of "lodgings" under the Act, and accordingly, the properties were not lodging houses under the Act. View "City of Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Landlord and Tenant entered into a twelve-year lease for commercial space. The lease required a separate guaranty agreement to be executed by Guarantor. Tenant stopped making rent payments a couple of years later, and thereafter, Landlord reentered and took possession of the premises, thereby terminating the lease. Landlord subsequently filed suit against Tenant and Guarantor for damages arising from the breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment to Landlord as to liability and awarded damages in the amount of $1,092,653, for which Tenant and Guarantor were jointly liable. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated the judgment assessing damages and remanded. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the part of the judgment finding Tenant liable for breach of the lease and assessing damages for the period before termination of the lease in the amount of $37,276 plus prejudgment interest; and (2) vacated the part of the judgment assessing damages for the period following termination of the lease and awarding attorney's fees. View "275 Washington St. Corp. v. Hudson River Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased real property after a real estate broker gave him incorrect information about the zoning classification of the property. Plaintiff was thereafter unable to use the property as he intended. Plaintiff sued the broker and the real estate agency that employed her, alleging misrepresentation and violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 2. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) a broker has a duty to exercise reasonable care in making representations as to a property's zoning designation, and where the misrepresentations were based on information provided by the seller, as in this case, the question of whether it was reasonable in the circumstances to rely on such information is to be determined by the trier of fact; and (2) an exculpatory clause in the purchase and sale agreement did not preclude the buyer's reliance on prior written representations as to zoning classification. View "DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd." on Justia Law

This case involved multiple litigations among three parties - Insurer, insured Mortgagee, and Homeowner - arising out of a defect in the title to Homeowner's home. Insurer brought suit in the land court on behalf of Mortgagee seeking to reform the deed to the property or to equitably subrogate Homeowner's interest in the property behind Mortgagee's mortgage. Homeowner initiated suit in the superior court against Mortgagee. Eventually, all claims in both actions became part of a federal court case, which settled. Thereafter, Mortgagee filed a complaint against Insurer in the U.S. district court seeking to recover from Insurer for the costs Mortgagee incurred in defending against Homeowner's claims. The judge determined Insurer had no obligation under its title insurance policy to pay Mortgagee's defense costs but certified two questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The Court answered by holding that, under Massachusetts law (1) a title insurer does not have a duty to defend the insured in the entire lawsuit where one claim is within the scope of the title insurance coverage and other claims are not; and (2) a title insurer that initiates litigation similarly does not have a duty to defend the insured against all reasonably foreseeable counterclaims. View "GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This action arose from the Department of Environmental Protection's (Department) issuance of a waterways license under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 91 (chapter 91 license) to the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) to redevelop a section of land owned by the BRA on the seaward end of Long Wharf (project site). Plaintiffs, ten residents of Boston's North End neighborhood, appealed the issuance of the chapter 91 license, claiming the Department acted unconstitutionally and beyond its statutory authority when it issued the license without obtaining two-thirds vote of the Legislature as required by article 97 of the amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. After the a Department's office of appeals affirmed the issuance of the license, the superior court ordered declaratory relief and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Department to enforce article 97. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that article 97 did not apply to the project site, and therefore, a two-thirds vote of the Legislature was not required to approve the planned development. Remanded. View "Mahajan v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

This appeal involved a dispute over property rights in a beach parcel. Two families, Plaintiffs and Defendants, owned the property upland from the beach. In 2004, Plaintiffs filed an action in the land court to quiet title, claiming they owned a fractional interest in the beach or, in the alternative, enjoyed a prescriptive easement to use it and land leading to it. Defendants claimed that Plaintiffs had no interest in the beach as it was presently located because their title interest dated to an 1841 deed that created the parcel, and the beach no longer existed as it did in 1841. The land court judge granted summary judgment for Defendants on the title claim and determined that Plaintiffs had not met their burden of establishing a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the judgment declaring that Plaintiffs did not have title interest in the beach as it currently existed since their interest was to a beach now submerged in the Atlantic Ocean; and (2) vacated the portion of the judgment relating to the prescriptive easement claim, as the judge's findings of fact were insufficient to permit appellate review of the judgment. Remanded. View "White v. Hartigan" on Justia Law

An LLC filed an application for a comprehensive permit with the zoning board of appeals to build five three-story buildings with 150 rental apartments. The board denied the application. On appeal, the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) vacated the board's decision and directed the board to issue a comprehensive permit. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the HAC did not err in calculating the regional need for low and moderate income housing; (2) substantial evidence supported the HAC's determination that the fire safety concern outweighed the regional need for low and moderate income housing; (3) the HAC did not err in concluding that the town need not acquire a ladder fire truck if the project were built and that other claims of adverse fiscal impact arising from the project may not be considered in evaluating whether the denial of project approval is consistent with local needs; (4) substantial evidence supported the HAC's determination that the development would not adequately protect wetlands; and (5) the HAC did not err in ordering the board to refund the fee it assessed the LLC to pay for the service's of the board's legal counsel. View "Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sunderland v. Sugarbush Meadow, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff bank (Bank) claimed to be the holder of a mortgage given by Defendant. Bank filed a complaint in equity in the land court under the Massachusetts Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to determine if Defendant was entitled to foreclosure protections under the Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). Defendant conceded she was not entitled to protection under the SCRA but moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Bank lacked standing to bring a servicemember proceeding because it was not the clear holder of her note or mortgage. The land court denied Defendant's motion, determining that Bank had standing based on its right to purchase Defendant's mortgage. The court then authorized Bank to make an entry and to sell the property covered by the mortgage. The Supreme Court vacated the land court's judgment, holding (1) because Defendant was not entitled to appear or be heard at the servicemember proceeding, the land court should not have accepted or entertained Defendant's filings; (2) only mortgagees or those acting on behalf of mortgagees having standing to bring servicemember proceedings; and (3) in the present case, the judge used the incorrect standard in making the determination that Bank had standing. Remanded. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt" on Justia Law

Hollis Hills, LLC filed an application for a comprehensive permit with the zoning board of appeals of Lunenberg to build condominium units in townhouses. The board denied the application. The Massachusetts housing appeals committee (HAC) set aside the board's decision and directed the board to issue a comprehensive permit. The superior court affirmed the HAC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the HAC's finding that the existing subsidized housing in the region did not adequately address the regional need for housing; (2) substantial evidence supported the HAC's conclusion that the proposed project was not inconsistent with the town's master planning and would not undermine those plans; (3) the HAC did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the balance of interests under the circumstances favored the regional need for affordable housing rather than the local concern of a zoning noncomformity; and (4) the HAC did not err in not staying the proceedings until the Governor had appointed a fifth member to the HAC. View "Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lunenburg v. Housing Appeals Comm." on Justia Law