Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Superior Court from a decision of the defendant board of health of Southbridge (board) approving a "minor modification" to the site assignment for an existing landfill and related processing facility in that town under G.L.c. 111, section 150A. At issue was whether plaintiffs had standing to seek judicial review of the Superior Court of the board's decision. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the Superior Court judge had authority to allow plaintiffs' motion to extend the time for filing their notice of appeal. The court concluded, however, that on the record before the court, plaintiffs lacked standing to seek judicial review of the board's decision in the Superior Court as persons "aggrieved" and plaintiffs' substantive challenges to the decision lacked merit. View "Board of Health of Sturbridge & others v. Board of Health of Southbridge & another." on Justia Law

In a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, a question arose concerning the application of the Commonwealth's homestead protection statute, G.L.c. 188, section 1, to a beneficiary of a trust. Finding no controlling precedent in the court's decisions, the Bankruptcy Court judge certified the following question: "May the holder of a beneficial interest in a trust which holds title to real estate and attendant dwelling in which such beneficiary resides acquire an estate of homestead in said land and building under G.L.c. 188, section 1?" The court confined its answer to the 2004 version of the homestead statute and answered the certified question in the negative. The court rejected the debtor's claims and concluded that even though the debtor resided in the Lowell property and used it as her home, as the owner of a fifty percent beneficial interest in the trust that holds to the property but who did not direct or control the trustee, she could not validly claim a homestead exemption for the property under the 2004 act. View "Boyle v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Wayside, owner of a mobile home park in the town of Shirley, sought a special permit from the town's zoning board of appeals in order to expand its mobile home park, a lawfully nonconforming use, from 65 to 75 units. The board refused to grant the special permit, finding that Wayside had failed to establish that the expansion would not be substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood than the existing mobile home park. The court concluded that the expansion complied with the zoning bylaw at issue, which the court interpreted as imposing minimum lot size dimensions on the entire mobile home park and not on individual mobile homes, governed only by the board of health regulations. The court further agreed with the Land Court judge that there was no evidence that either the density within the mobile home park expansion or the modest increase in traffic would be detrimental to the surrounding neighborhood. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Land Court judge. View "Shirley Wayside Limited Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shirley" on Justia Law

This case concerned a family dispute over ownership of what had been the family home in Woburn. At issue was whether a party could establish that she lacked the capacity to contract, thus making the contract voidable by her, in the absence of evidence that she suffered from a medically diagnosed, long-standing mental illness or defect. The court concluded that its evolving standard of contractual incapacity did not in all cases require proof that a party's claimed mental illness or defect was of some significant duration or that it was permanent, progressive, or degenerative; but, without medical evidence or expert testimony that the mental condition interfered with the party's understanding of the transaction, or her ability to act reasonably in relation to it, the evidence would not be sufficient to support a conclusion of incapacity. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to support a determination of incapacity where Susan, among other things, understood at the time that she was participating in a mediation to discuss settlement of the lawsuit, was aware that the subject of the mediation was to resolve the dispute regarding the family home, participated in the mediation, and listened to the arguments of counsel. Therefore, the court vacated the motion judge's order and remanded for entry of an order enforcing the settlement agreement. View "Sparrow v. Demonico & another" on Justia Law

Smaland, together with third-party defendants, appealed from a Superior Court judge's order disqualifying their attorney from representing them in a real property dispute against the Genovas. The judge disqualified the attorney based on his conclusion that the attorney was a necessary witness because his clients had raised an advice of counsel defense and he had assisted various witnesses in submitting errata sheets that substantively changed their deposition testimony. The court concluded that the judge failed to engage a sufficiently searching review of this fact-intensive issue. Consequently, the court vacated the order and remanded the case for a further hearing. The court also considered the scope of disqualification orders under Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7(a), and to clarify the proper use of errata sheets in altering deposition testimony under Mass. R. Civ. P. 30(e). View "Smaland Beach Assoc., Inc. v. Genova & another" on Justia Law

The issue raised by this appeal concerned the threshold administrative remedy or remedies available under the Zoning Act, G.L.c. 40A, to one who was aggrieved by the issuance of a building permit to another person. The court held that where an aggrieved party had adequate notice of the building permit's issuance, he or she was required to appeal the appropriate zoning board of appeals within thirty days of the permit's issue date. In such circumstances, a later appeal to the board from a denial of a request for enforcement was not an available alternative remedy. Accordingly, the court agreed with the Land Court judge that because plaintiffs, who had adequate notice that the challenged building permits had issued to their neighbor, did not file an appeal with the zoning board of appeals within 30 days of issuance, the board, and thereafter the Land Court, lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Connors, Jr. v. Annino" on Justia Law

In this case, the court must determine whether a plaintiff had standing to maintain a try title action under G.L.c. 240, section 1-5, where he was in physical possession of real property but his chain of title rested on a foreclosure sale conducted by someone other than "the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or assigns." On his own motion, a Land Court judge determined that plaintiff held no title to the property at issue and thus lacked standing to bring a try title action. The judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the Land Court judge properly raised the question whether plaintiff had record title to the property such that he had standing to bring a try title action. Plaintiff had identified no basis on which it might be concluded that he had record title to the property such that a try title action could be sustained. As a result, the Land Court was without jurisdiction to hear the try title action. Dismissal of the petition was therefore proper but the dismissal should have been without prejudice. View "Bevilacqua, III v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs commenced an action in the Superior Court, alleging fraud, violation of G.L.c. 93A, and other claims arising from their purchase of a house which, they alleged, contained numerous undisclosed latent defects that rendered the house uninhabitable. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a "Notice of Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct," alleging that the judge was in violation of the Code in several respects. Plaintiffs requested that the single justice remove the judge from the case and the single justice denied relief on the ground that plaintiffs had adequate alternative remedies. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion by denying extraordinary general superintendence relief and affirmed the judgment. View "Culley, et al. v. Cato, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the enactment of St. 2010, c. 258, on August 7, 2010, which prohibited institutional lenders and certain financial institutions who owned foreclosed properties from evicting residential tenants without just cause. At issue was whether the act required dismissal of a no-cause summary process case that was already pending when the act went into effect, or whether the application of the act to such a case was impermissibly retroactive. The court held that the provision of the act that prevented eviction without just cause was properly applied to protect all residential tenants on foreclosed properties who, on or after August 7, 2010, had yet to vacate or be removed from the premises by an eviction, even where the owner purchased the property before the act's effective date, and initiated a summary process action before that date. Because the tenant, in this case, was still residing on the property on August 7, 2010, and the owner was seeking to evict him without just cause, the court held that the Housing Court judge properly applied the act to dismiss the pending claim for possession. View "Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Nunez" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the proposed redevelopement of private property within the Middlesex Fells Reservation. Plaintiffs commenced an action against Fellsway Development LLC; Langwood Commons LLC; the Secretary of the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (Secretary); and the Commissioner of the Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR), seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from alleged violations of the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), G.L.c. 30, section 61-62H, and regulations promulgated thereunder, 301 Code Mass. Regs. 11.00. Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing Counts I, II, and III of plaintiffs' complaint, brought under section 7A and G.L.c. 231A, against the Secretary for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As against the developers and the DCR, the court reversed only the judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under section 7A, and alleging a violation of MEPA's antisegmentation regulation promulgated at 301 Code Mass. Regs. 11.01(2)(c). Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ten Persons of the Commonwealth & another v. Fellsway Development LLC & others" on Justia Law