Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, Petitioners' petition for extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.Petitioners obtained an order requiring Ara Eresian, Jr. to identify all real estate in which he held an interest, but Eresian did not comply with that other. The land court judge denied Petitioners' request for an arrest warrant authorizing entry into Eresian's home. Thereafter, Petitioners filed their petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 requesting that the single justice issue an order authorizing the land court judge to issue an order authorizing the arrest warrant. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners failed to make the required showing that they lacked an adequate alternative remedy. View "VonIderstein v. Eresian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that an agreement entered into between Plaintiff Anthony Gattineri and Defendants Wynn MA, LLC and Wynn Resorts, Limited (collectively, Wynn) in San Diego California (the San Diego agreement) was unenforceable for reasons of public policy.Wynn entered into an option contract with FBT Everett Realty, LLC (FBT) to purchase a parcel of property. As Wynn's application for a casino license proceeded, the Massachusetts Gaming Commission discovered that there was a possibility of concealed ownership interests in FBT by a convicted felon with organized crime connections. In response, FBT lowered the purchase price for the parcel. The Commission approved the amended option agreement. Gattineri, a minority owner of FBT, opposed the price reduction and refused to sign the certificate required by the Commission. Gattineri alleged that at the San Diego meeting Wynn had agreed to pay Gattineri an additional $19 million in exchange for Gattineri signing the certificate. After the Commission awarded Wynn a casino license Gattineri brought suit claiming breach of the San Diego agreement because Wynn never paid Gattineri the promised $19 million. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the agreement was deliberately concealed from the Commission and inconsistent with the terms approved by the Commission; and (2) enforcement of such a secret agreement constituted a clear violation of public policy. View "Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed this appeal of the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the appeal was moot.After judgment entered against Petitioner in a summary process action Petitioner appealed, challenging the denial of her motions to stay execution of that judgment on the basis of illness. The Housing Court denied relief. Petitioner then sought a stay on the same ground, which a single justice of the Appeals Court denied. Petitioner subsequently petitioned the single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court seeking a stay of execution on the basis of illness. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the matter, holding that the matter was moot because the eviction Petitioner sought to stay had already occurred. View "Kahyaoglu v. Sillari Enterprises LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 from an order of the housing court requiring him to make use and occupancy payments, holding that the single justice properly denied the petition.Petitioner appealed from the entry of final judgment in favor of Respondent in a summary process action. A housing court judge granted Petitioner's motion to waive the appeal bond and ordered him to make monthly use and occupancy payments during the pendency of the appeal. Petitioner sought interlocutory review, and the single justice affirmed. Petitioner then brought the instant petition seeking a reduction in the monthly use and occupancy payments, without success. After the deadline passed for tendering the outstanding use and occupancy payments Petitioner filed a motion requesting an extension. The single justice denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice properly denied relief. View "Cummins Realty Trust v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter involving the decision of the Planning Board of Monterey to deny Appellant's application to build an RV camp on the grounds of its Monterey property on the basis that the RV camp would not be an exempt religious use under the terms of the Dover Amendment, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, 3, holding that the proposed RV park would be an exempt religious use.Appellant, a nonprofit Christian organization that operated a camp in Monterey providing chapel sessions and religious instruction, applied to build an RV camp on the grounds of its property to house families who attend camp sessions. The Board denied the application, concluding that the RV camp was not a customary religious use and should not fall under the umbrella of the Dover Amendment. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the primary or dominant purpose of the trailer park was a religiously significant goal; and (2) therefore, the proposed RV camp would be an exempt use under the Dover Amendment. View "Hume Lake Christian Camps, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Monterey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was awarded monetary damages after a jury trial on a breach of contract claim against Respondent. The appellate division affirmed. Petitioner later moved for the appointment of a special process server to conduct a sale of Respondent's real property in order to satisfy the amended judgment and execution. Thereafter, Respondent presented a check for the execution amount plus postjudgment interest. Petitioner refused to accept payment and continued to litigate its motion. A judge declined to take action and ordered that further accrual of postjudgment interest would be tolled. Petitioner moved to vacate the judge's tolling ruling, but the trial court declined to rule on the motion. Petitioner then filed this petition requesting relief from the tolling order. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief. View "Suburban Electric Contracting, Inc. v. Ozdemir" on Justia Law

In this case considering whether an easement (2018 easement) taken by eminent domain by the Department of Transportation (MassDOT) exceeded the scope of an easement taken in 1991 by the Department of Public Works (DPW), MassDOT's predecessor in interest, with respect to Plaintiff's land in South Boston (burdened land), the Supreme Judicial Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for MassDOT.DPW's 1991 order of taking created an easement over the burdened land for purposes of constructing a haul road. In 2017, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority began planning the construction of a test track on a portion of Plaintiff's land burdened by the 1991 easement. MassDOT recorded the 2018 confirmatory order of taking and then, contending that the taking merely confirmed that rights it held under the 1991 taking, refused to pay Plaintiff any compensation. Plaintiff responded with this litigation, and the superior court judge entered summary judgment in favor of MassDOT. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) while the intent of the parties should not be considered when an easement is taken by eminent domain, the ordinary rules of interpretation for easements otherwise apply; and (2) because the 1991 easement was more limited in scope than the 2018 easement, summary judgment for MassDOT must be reversed. View "Smiley First, LLC v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief.In the petition at issue, Petitioner argued that the government took her property without due process. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that, throughout the underlying foreclosure process and a summary process action, Petitioner never had an evidentiary hearing or an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The single justice denied the petition without holding a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that extraordinary relief was not warranted. View "Brown v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the scope of rights conveyed by a set of burial certificates, as sold by a church to its parishioners, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the burial certificates' unambiguous language permitted the court to disinter and relocate the cremated remains buried on the church's former property despite objections of the decedents' families.After the church in this case was compelled and close and sell its property, it contacted the families of the at least forty-nine deceased individuals interred in the churchyard and requested their consent for relocation and reinterment of the cremains. Family members representing the cremains of twelve individuals did not consent, and the church brought this complaint seeking a declaration that newly-amended church regulations authorized it to relocate the remains. The family court entered judgment in favor of the church. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that this is the type of situation where relocation of the remains is proper. View "Church of Holy Spirit of Wayland v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that when an otherwise qualifying entity sells an urban redevelopment project during the forty-year tax window set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121A, 18C, the tax concession extends to the capital gain from the sale.The tax exemption at issue provides an incentive for private entities to invest in constructing, operating, and maintaining urban redevelopment projects in deteriorated areas. At issue was whether the sale of an urban redevelopment project during the forty-year tax-exempt window is "on account of" the project, thus extending the tax concession to the capital gain from the sale. In this case, the Commission of Revenue issued notice of assessment to Appellants related to their capital gains from the sales of certain ch. 121A projects. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the capital gain from the sale of the ch. 121A project fell within the tax concession. View "Reagan v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law