Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment to Defendants on some of Plaintiffs' claims and granting judgment for Plaintiffs on their implied warranty of habitability and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A claims, holding that Defendants' motion for directed verdict or motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been allowed on the chapter 93A and warranty of habitability claims.After Plaintiffs purchased a piece of real property from Defendants they discovered various defects in the property. They brought this action against Defendants. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs' fraud and misrepresentation and defective and deficient renovation work claims. After a trial, the jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on the warranty of habitability and chapter 93A claims. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that Defendants' motions for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been allowed on the chapter 93A and warranty of habitability claims. View "Sullivan v. Five Acres Realty Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that should Littleton, Acton, or both towns choose to exercise their rights to take the waters of Nagog Pond and apply for a permit under the Water Management Act (WMA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21G, a special act passed by the Legislature in 1884 - St. 1884, c. 201 (1884 act) - the WMA will not provide the towns with a priority right over Concord's registration.The 1884 act granted Concord the right to use Nagog Pond, located in Littleton and Acton, as a public water supply. The act, however, provided that Littleton, Acton, or both could take the pond waters and that their water needs "shall be first supplied." Because Concord had exercised its rights under the 1884 act but Littleton and Acton had not exercised their rights, at issue was whether those rights still existed after the passage of the WMA. The Supreme Court held (1) the WMA impliedly repealed the provision in the 1884 act that provided that the needs of the residents of Littleton and Acton "shall be first supplied"; but (2) the WMA did not impliedly repeal the provisions of the 1884 act that granted Concord the right to "take and hold" the Nagog Pond waters. View "Concord v. Water Department of Littleton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking an order keeping her approved federal rental voucher under the Massachusetts rental voucher program in active status, holding that, under the circumstances, the single justice was within his authority in declining to grant relief.In her petition, Petitioner contested an order transferring her case against the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to the Housing Court and then appealed that order. Petitioner also sought to restore her federal housing benefits pending her appeal. After the superior court denied relief Petitioner filed this petition seeking the same relief. A single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not err in denying relief. View "Linardon v. Boston Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 79, the so-called "quick take" statute, permits a property owner to both accept a pro tanto payment for an eminent domain taking and simultaneously challenge the validity of the underlying taking.Plaintiff argued that Defendant, the City of Cambridge, must immediately tender him the full amount of the pro tanto payment because the quick take statute does not condition his acceptance of the pro tanto payment on waiving his right to challenge the City's taking of his real property. The superior court denied Plaintiff's motion to compel payment of the pro tanto amount, but a single justice in the Appeals Court vacated that decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the quick take statute does not condition a property owner's acceptance of the pro tanto payment under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 79, 8A on waiving her or his right to contest the validity of the taking under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 79, 18. View "Abuzahra v. City of Cambridge" on Justia Law

In this foreclosure action, the Supreme Judicial Court answered a certified question from the Court of Appeals for the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by concluding that a challenged statement in a default and acceleration notice did not render the notice inaccurate or deceptive in a manner that rendered the subsequent foreclosure sale void under Massachusetts law.After Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage payments, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. foreclosed on Plaintiffs' home and sold it at auction pursuant to the statutory power of sale. Plaintiffs commenced this action to set aside the foreclosure, arguing that the Bank's default and acceleration notice was misleading and potentially deceptive. A federal district court judge granted summary judgment to Chase. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the notice was potentially deceptive and, therefore, void. On petitioner for reconsideration, the First Circuit vacated its decision and certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Court answered the reported question in the negative, holding that the notice was neither inaccurate nor deceptive. View "Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the determination that time of entry into a lot rental agreement does not render the renters dissimilar under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 32L(2), holding that the requirement that renters pay ninety-six dollars per month in additional rent for essentially the same lots was a violation of the statute.Defendants, the new owners of a manufactured home community, charged those who had rented their lots after Defendants purchased the community ninety-six dollars per month more for lot rent than those who had rented their lots before the change in ownership, despite the lots being essentially the same. A group of people brought suit, and a class was certified. A housing court judge determined that Defendants violated section 32L(2). The Supreme Court affirmed but reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration of a different judge's class certification decisions, holding that the judge erred in requiring class members to opt in. The Court further held that the judge who conducted a trial on damages considered improper factors, and therefore, the subclassifications for damages calculations also required reconsideration. View "Blake v. Hometown America Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court responded to a certified question posed by a judge in a federal district court concerning the application of the six-year statute of repose in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, 2B to claims regarding alleged defects in the design and construction of the common areas of a multi-building, multi-phase condominium.The Supreme Judicial Court answered (1) regardless of how many phases of the development there may be or how many buildings are within each phase, where a condominium development is comprised of multiple buildings each building constitutes a discrete improvement for purposes of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, 2B such that the opening of each individual building to its intended use or the substantial completion of the individual building and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner triggers the statute of repose under section 2B with respect to the common areas and limited common areas of that building; and (2) where a particular improvement is integral to, and intended to serve, multiple buildings the statute of repose begins to run when that discrete improvement is substantially complete and open to its intended use. View "D'Allessandro v. Lennar Hingham Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the land court judge dismissing the Town of Sudbury's complaint seeking to prevent the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) from entering into an option agreement with Eversource Energy for an easement to install an electric transmission line underneath nine miles of a disused right of way (ROW), approximately 4.3 miles of which extend through the town, holding that the Town could not prevail on either of its claims.Here, the Town asked the Supreme Court to extend the common-law doctrine of prior public use and to determine that the doctrine barred the diversion of public land devoted to one public use to an inconsistent private use. The Supreme Judicial Court declined to adopt the Town's proposed reworking of the doctrine, holding that the Land Court judge did not err in dismissing the Town's complaint because (1) Eversource's proposed use of the MBTA ROW to construct and operate underground transmission lines is not a public use; and (2) the Town has not demonstrated that the benefits of expanding the prior public use doctrine to encompass subsequent inconsistent private uses outweigh the value of adhering to this Court's longstanding common-law formulation. View "Town of Sudbury v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Land Court judge ruling that the statutory scheme set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 60, 52 did not permit assignees of tax title accounts to include their own subsequent tax payments in the amount required for redemption, holding that the judge did not err.In 2011, City took tax title to Owners' property. Owners did not pay their real estate taxes in 2012 through 2015. In 2016, City assigned Appellant its tax title to the property. Appellant initiated proceedings to foreclose Owners' right to redeem the property. Owners exercised their right of redemption. In 2018, Appellant asked the Land Court to find that the redemption amount include the taxes owed to City at the time Appellant was assigned the tax title account, the taxes that Appellant had paid on the property from 2016 through 2018, and statutory interest on the unpaid real estate taxes and the taxes paid by Appellant. The judge concluded that tax payments made by section 52 assignees subsequent to the assignment of the tax title account could not be included in the redemption amount. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that section 52 assignees of tax title accounts may not include their own subsequent tax payments, and interest thereon, in their redemption demands. View "Tallage Lincoln, LLC v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the Land Court dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint challenging a dimensional zoning requirement, holding that Plaintiffs were not persons aggrieved for purposes of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, 17 and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge the decision of the zoning board of appeals.Plaintiffs' neighbors received a foundation permit to construct a single-family resident on property directly across the street from Plaintiffs' home. After the zoning board of appeals of Sherborn upheld the issuance of the permit Plaintiffs filed this complaint in the Land Court. The Land Court dismissed complaint for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the board's decision within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws 40A, 17. The Appeals Court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered dismissal of the complaint, holding that the Land Court judge did not err in deciding that Plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the board's decision and therefore lacked standing to pursue the appeal. View "Murchison v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Sherborn" on Justia Law