Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Tax Law
by
This litigation began when purchasers of computer service contracts filed a putative class action against the sellers. The sellers successfully moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the computer services contracts. The sellers, in the meantime, had applied for tax abatements from the Commissioner of Revenue. The Commissioner denied the applications, and the sellers petitioned the Appellate Tax Board. Appellant, one of the consumers who purchased these service contracts, moved to intervene in the proceedings, which petition the Board allowed. The Board reversed the Commissioner’s decision and allowed the abatements. Taxes were imposed on the service contracts purchased by Appellant. After final judgment was entered in the sellers’ favor in the class action litigation, the sellers withdrew their tax abatement petitions with prejudice. The Board denied Appellant’s motion to strike the withdrawals and terminated the proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the Board did not err as a matter of law in allowing the Sellers’ withdrawals; but (2) the Board’s termination of the proceedings in their entirety, after permitting Appellant to intervene and allowing the abatements, was an error of law. Rather, Appellant should have been allowed to proceed as an intervener on its claim to recover the taxes imposed on the service contracts it purchased. View "WorldWide TechServices, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board, which concluded that, under a provision of the Massachusetts sales tax statute known as the “drop shipment rule,” Taxpayer was responsible for collective and remitting sales tax due on products it sold to out-of-state retailers and then delivered to consumers. Taxpayer sold goods to retailers at wholesale and delivered the goods to Massachusetts consumers and others on behalf of those retailers. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Commissioner of Revenue and the Board did not err in determining that Taxpayer was responsible as the vendor for collecting and remitting the sales tax due on products it sold to the out-of-state retailers and then delivered to consumers where it failed to meet its burden of proving that the retailers were engaged in business in Massachusetts; and (2) the statutory drop shipment rule does not violate the dormant commerce clause of the federal Constitution. View "D & H Distributing Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
In 2012, the assessor for the city of Attleboro determined that Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc. (Shrine) owed property taxes in the amount of $92,292.98. The Shrine filed an application for abatement, which the city’s board of assessors denied. The Shrine appealed, arguing its property was exempt under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 59, 5, Eleventh (Clause Eleventh), the exemption for “houses of religious worship.” The Appellate Tax Board divided the Shrine’s property into eight distinct portions, determined that the first four portions of the property were exempt under Clause Eleventh, that the fifth portion was only partially exempt, and that the last three were fully taxable. The Shrine appealed these latter four determinations. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the board erred when it found that the Shrine’s welcome center and maintenance building were not exempt under Clause Eleventh; and (2) the former convent that the Shrine leased to a nonprofit organization for use as a safe house for battered women and the wildlife sanctuary that was exclusively managed by the Massachusetts Audubon Society in accordance with a conservation easement were not exempt under Clause Eleventh. View "Shrine of Our Lady of La Salette Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Attleboro" on Justia Law

by
Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, corporations that generate business income in the Commonwealth and other states must pay taxes on that income according to an apportionment formula that seeks to tax the corporation’s income generated in Massachusetts. For a “manufacturing corporation,” the statutory formula is based solely on the corporation’s sales. The Appellate Tax Board determined that Genentech, Inc., a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in California that earns business income in the Commonwealth, qualified as a manufacturing corporation for the tax years 1998 through 2004. On appeal, Genentech appealed that determination, among other things. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Genentech qualified in each of the tax years at issue as a “manufacturing corporation” as defined in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, 38(1)(1) and, under section 38(1)(2), was required to apportion its income under the single-factor formula using solely the statute’s sales factor; and (2) the Board properly rejected Genentech’s claim that application of the statute’s single-factor apportionment formula based on sales to the company violated the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution. View "Genentech, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
Two telephone companies (collectively, Taxpayers) paid personal property taxes assessed by the board of assessors of Boston for fiscal year 2012 on certain personal property each company owned. Taxpayers subsequently filed abatement applications, which were denied. The Appellate Tax Board upheld the property tax assessments. Taxpayers appealed, arguing that the tax assessments, which were based on a split tax rate structure authorized by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, 56, constituted a disproportionate tax that violated the Massachusetts Constitution. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the split rate structure authorized by section 56 and related statutes is not unconstitutionally disproportionate. View "Verizon New England, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Boston" on Justia Law

by
Bank of America, N.A., in its capacity as a corporate trustee of several inter vivos trusts, applied for abatement of fiduciary income taxes paid by thirty-four inter vivos trusts. The Commissioner of Revenue denied the applications. The Bank appealed, arguing that, where the Bank was not domiciled in Massachusetts, these trusts did not qualify as “resident inter vivos trusts” and therefore were not subject to fiduciary income tax under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, 10. The Appellate Tax Board upheld the Commissioner’s decision, concluding that the Bank, in its capacity as trustee, was an inhabitant of the Commonwealth within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, 1(f) and 10(c). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not err in ruling that the Bank was subject to the fiduciary income tax imposed by section 10. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
Regency Transportation, Inc. is a Massachusetts S corporation that carries and delivers goods throughout the eastern United States. In 2010, the Commissioner of Revenue imposed a use tax on the full purchase price of each tractor and trailer in Regency’s fleet. The Commissioner subsequently denied Regency’s request for full abatement of the assessment. Regency appealed, arguing that the Commonwealth’s imposition of a use tax on vehicles engaged in interstate commerce violates the commerce and equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. The Appellate Tax Board concluded that the motor vehicle use tax does not violate either the commerce or equal protection clauses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that an unapportioned use tax imposed on Regency’s interstate fleet of vehicles does not violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. View "Regency Transp., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
George and Sandra Schussel filed no tax returns between 1989 and 2007. In 2007, George was convicted of federal conspiracy and tax evasion charges. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Revenue issued the Schussels a notice of failure to file Massachusetts income tax returns for the years 1993 to 1995. The Schussels filed tax returns for those years, but the Commissioner determined that the returns were “false or fraudulent” or to have been filed with an intent to evade taxes. Consequently, the Commissioner imposed a “double assessment” against the Schussels. The Commission denied the Schussels request for abatement of the double assessment. The Appellate Tax Board and the Appeals Court affirmed the Commissioner’s decisions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Schussels’ claim that they were entitled to relief from the double assessment under an amnesty program established by the Commissioner in 2009 was not properly before the Court. View "Schussel v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs in this case were two companies subject to the five percent excise tax on video programming delivered by direct broadcast satellite. Plaintiffs brought a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the tax violates the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution because it disfavors satellite companies as compared with those companies that provide video programming via cable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, the Department of Revenue. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the cable and satellite companies are not similarly situated, and therefore, Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of establishing that the excise tax statute was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. View "DIRECTV, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
At issue in this case was the financial institution excise tax (FIET) liability of GATE Holdings, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of The First Marblehead Corporation (FMC). The Appellate Tax Board concluded (1) Gate qualified as a “financial institution” within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, 1 and was entitled to apportion its income pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, 2A; but (2) in applying the apportionment rules of section 2A, all of Gate’s taxable property, which consisted of securitized student loans, was properly assigned to Massachusetts, rather than States outside the Commonwealth, which resulted in a greater FIET liability than anticipated by Gate. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly concluded that section 2A(e)(vi)(B) creates a rebuttable presumption that where a taxpayer seeks to assign loans to a location that is not a regular place of that taxpayer’s business, the loans should be assigned to its commercial domicile; (2) all of the student loans were properly located at Gate’s commercial domicile in Massachusetts; and (3) the Board’s decisions did not violate the due process or commerce clause. View "First Marblehead Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law