Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice denying Petitioners’ petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 asking the court to address the issue whether a trustee can appear “pro se” to represent a trust, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief. Specifically, Petitioners asked the court to address the issue whether a “non-lawyer trustee” is “entitled” to “self-representation.” The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that this case did not present the type of exceptional circumstance that requires the exercise of this court’s extraordinary power of general superintendence pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "Eresian v. Scheffer" on Justia Law

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At issue was the lawfulness of allowing a hospital to transfer a patient involuntarily to a skilled nursing facility in the absence of a guardianship. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of a guardian over an incapacitated person is necessary, but not by itself sufficient, to admit an incapacitated person to a nursing facility against his or her will, because such an admission requires an additional order by the court based on a specific finding that the admission is in the incapacitated person’s best interest. Specifically, the Court held that when a hospital patient refuses to consent to be transferred to a nursing facility, a judge may order the patient to be admitted to a nursing facility under the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code only if the judge (1) finds the patient to be an incapacitated person; (2) makes the other findings necessary to appoint a guardian under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 5-306(b); and (3) then grants the guardian specific authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 5-309(g) to admit the incapacitated person to a nursing facility after finding that such admission is in the incapacitated person’s best interest. View "In re Guardianship of D.C." on Justia Law

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The Stored Communications Act (SCA) does not prohibit Yahoo from voluntarily disclosing the contents of a decedent’s e-mail account to the personal representatives of the decedent’s estate. Rather, the SCA permits Yahoo to divulge the contents of the e-mail account where the personal representatives lawfully consent to disclosure on the decedent’s behalf. The decedent in this case died intestate. The personal representatives of the decedent’s estate sought access to the contents of a Yahoo!, Inc. e-mail account that the decedent left behind. Yahoo declined to provide access to the account. The personal representatives commenced an action challenging Yahoo’s refusal. A judge of the probate and family court granted summary judgment for Yahoo. The Supreme Judicial Court set aside the judgment, holding that summary judgment for Yahoo should not have been allowed (1) on the basis that the requested disclosure was prohibited by the SCA, and (2) on the basis of the terms of a service agreement where material issues of fact pertinent to the enforceability of the contract remained in dispute. View "Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc." on Justia Law

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This certified questions in this case arose out of divorce proceedings pending in Connecticut between Wife and Husband, who was the beneficiary of a Massachusetts irrevocable trust. The Connecticut Supreme Court certified three questions to the Supreme Judicial Court concerning the authority of a trustee to distribute substantially all of the assets of an irrevocable trust into another trust. The Supreme Judicial Court did not answer the second question but answered the remaining questions as follows: (1) under Massachusetts law, the terms of the Paul John Ferri, Jr. Trust (1983 Trust) empowered its trustees to distribute substantially all of its assets to the Declaration of Trust for Paul John Ferri, Jr.; and (2) under Massachusetts law, a court, in interpreting whether the 1983 Trust’s settlor intended to permit decanting to another trust, should consider an affidavit of the settler offered to establish what he intended when he created the 1983 Trust. View "Ferri v. Powell-Ferri" on Justia Law

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Bank of America, N.A., in its capacity as a corporate trustee of several inter vivos trusts, applied for abatement of fiduciary income taxes paid by thirty-four inter vivos trusts. The Commissioner of Revenue denied the applications. The Bank appealed, arguing that, where the Bank was not domiciled in Massachusetts, these trusts did not qualify as “resident inter vivos trusts” and therefore were not subject to fiduciary income tax under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, 10. The Appellate Tax Board upheld the Commissioner’s decision, concluding that the Bank, in its capacity as trustee, was an inhabitant of the Commonwealth within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, 1(f) and 10(c). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not err in ruling that the Bank was subject to the fiduciary income tax imposed by section 10. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The trustees of the Hollis W. Plimpton, Jr. Family Trust filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the trust as drafted correctly expressed the intent to the settlor that his estate be eligible to obtain the optimal benefit of allowable federal and state estate tax marital deductions. Alternatively, the trustees sought an order rewording a portion of the trust to ensure that it accomplished the settlor’s intent. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that a judgment enter in the county court declaring that this was not a suitable occasion for the type of relief sought and dismissing the complaint, as the apparent objective of the parties - to insure by declaration or reformation that no person in the future misconstrues the document - is not something that justifies judicial involvement. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Babcock" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates

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George C. Houser established the George C. Houser Trust, which established two trusts for the benefit of Mary R. Houser during her lifetime and gave her a power of appointment over one of the trusts (the marital trust). Upon Mary’s death in 1993, the principal remaining in the George C. Houser Trust was divided into two share trusts, one for each of the Housers’ sons. After George’s death in 1983, Mary established the Mary R. Houser Trust - 1991 and exercised her power of appointment over the marital trust property by appointing it to the trustees of the Mary Houser Trust. The trustees filed a complaint seeking reformation the trust established under Article Fourth of the Mary R. Houser Trust - 1991 to correct a drafting error that they contended frustrated the intent of Mary and George to provide for their descendants in an efficient and tax-advantageous manner. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that the family trust be reformed by correcting the mistake in drafting, which inadvertently frustrated Mary’s estate planning objectives. View "Connell v. Houser" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates

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The City of Quincy (Quincy) served as trustee of the Adams Temple and School Fund and the Charles Francis Adams Fund (together, the Funds) through two boards. The Woodward School for Girls, Inc. (Woodward) has been the sole income beneficiary of the Funds since 1953. In 2007, Woodward filed suit against Quincy seeking an accounting and asserting that Quincy committed a breach of its fiduciary duties in several respects. A probate and family court judge concluded that Quincy committed a breach of its fiduciary duties by failing to invest in growth securities and failing to heed certain investment advice, removed Quincy as trustee, and ordered Quincy to pay a nearly $3 million judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment as to liability, reversed with respect to the calculation of damages on the unrealized gains, and remanded, holding (1) Woodward’s claims were not barred on the grounds of sovereign immunity, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, or laches; (2) the judgment against Quincy for committing a breach of its fiduciary duties to the Funds was proper; (3) the award of damages was erroneous in the calculation of unrealized gains on the investment portfolio; and (4) the judge did not err in including prejudgment interest. View "Woodward School for Girls, Inc. v. City of Quincy" on Justia Law

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In 1982, Plaintiff established the 1982 Trust, and four separate subtrusts therein, for the four sons of the Krafts. In 2012, Plaintiff, who had served as the sole and disinterested trustee of the trust and subtrusts, proposed to transfer all of the property of the subtrusts into new subtrusts established in accordance with the terms of a new master trust for the benefit of the Kraft sons. Plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to interpret the 1982 Trust to determine whether it authorized distributions to the new trust without the consent or approval of any beneficiary or court. The Supreme Court concluded that it did, holding that the terms of the 1982 Trust authorized Plaintiff to distribute the trust property in further trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the 1982 Trust without their consent or court approval. View "Morse v. Kraft" on Justia Law

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John Marino, who died before this action, owned Corporation. Defendant sold equipment to Corporation, which failed to pay Defendant. Defendant obtained a default judgment against Corporation but was unable to enforce the judgment because Corporation had no assets. Defendant brought an action against Marino's estate, the executrix of Marino's estate, and another corporation owned by Marino, asserting claims for breach of contract, remedies under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, unjust enrichment, and fraud. Defendants filed a joint motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that none of the claims survived, as each claim arose from fraudulent acts or misrepresentations made by Marino. A superior court judge dismissed all claims against the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the breach of contract, UFTA, and violations of Chapter 93A claims should not have been dismissed because the claims were contractual in nature; (2) the fraud claim was properly dismissed; and (3) the unjust enrichment claim should not have been dismissed because it was premised on the allegation that the executrix was retaining funds belonging to Defendant. Remanded. View "Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill" on Justia Law