Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court’s allowance of the insurers’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the allegations in the underlying complaint were sufficient to trigger the insurers’ duty to defend the insured in the underlying action.The two insurers in this case had issued several general commercial liability policies to the insured. The insured was sued in federal court for improper advertising. The insurers denied coverage on the ground that a provision in the policies covering improper use of another’s advertising idea did not cover the claims raised in the action but, nevertheless, agreed to fund the insured’s defense under a reservation of rights. The insurers then sought a declaration that they were not obligated to defend the insured in the underlying action. The superior court granted summary judgment for the insurers. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the policies that the insured purchased, which provided coverage in the event the insured was sued for alleged advertising injuries, covered the insured for the claims at issue in the underlying action. View "Holyoke Mutual Insurance Co. in Salem v. Vibram USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens because a Massachusetts choice of law provision in a confidentiality, nonsolicitation, and noncompetition agreement between the parties in this case was unenforceable.Defendant was employed in California by Plaintiff, a company headquartered in Massachusetts. Plaintiff signed an agreement as a condition of employment that declared that the agreement would be governed by Massachusetts law and that all lawsuits arising from the agreement would be brought in a Massachusetts court. When Defendant left to work for a California competitor, Plaintiff filed suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, and the trial judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) where California substantive law would apply under choice of law principles and where the application of Massachusetts substantive law would violate California public policy favoring open competition and employee mobility, the Massachusetts choice of law provision was not enforceable; and (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that this action should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. View "Oxford Global Resources, LLC v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court judge’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the director of the Office of Campaign and Political Finance (OCPF) on Plaintiffs’ claim that Massachusetts’s ban on corporate contributions, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 55, 8, imposes an unconstitutional restraint on their rights to free speech and association and denies them their right to equal protection under the law, holding that the challenged statute is constitutional.Plaintiffs, business corporations, brought this action challenging the law limiting political spending of corporations. The superior court granted summary judgment for OCPF. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) section 8 is constitutional under the First Amendment and articles 16 and 19 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) section 8 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Plaintiffs’ entitlement to equal protection under article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "1A Auto, Inc. v. Director of Office of Campaign & Political Finance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion for restoration of his license, holding that the plain language of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 24(1)(f)(1) and the legislative history precluded the relief sought by Defendant.Defendant’s driver’s license was suspended in 2010 because he refused to consent to a breathalyzer after his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI). Defendant’s license was subject to a lifetime suspension because he had three prior convictions of OUI when he refused the breathalyzer. When Defendant was found not guilty of the 2010 OUI charge, he filed several motions to have his license restored. The district court granted Defendant’s 2017 motion for restoration of his license. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the 2017 motion was not authorized by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 24 because it did not satisfy the “immediacy” requirement of the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Richards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court upheld 310 Code Mass. Regs. 7.74 (Cap Regulation), which imposes declining greenhouse gas emissions limits on the in-State electric sector through 2050, holding that none of the arguments raised by Plaintiffs against the Cap Regulation was meritorious.Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that a key provision of the Global Warming Solutions Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N, 3(d), which directs the Department of Environmental Protection to promulgate regulations establishing declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions, does not apply to the electric sector because that sector is regulated by a separate provision, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N, 3(c). The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) the Department and the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs have the authority to promulgate regulations under section 3(d) to establish emission limits on the electric sector; (2) the projected effects of the Cap Regulation do not render section 3(d) arbitrary and capricious or inconsistent with the statutory purpose of reducing emissions; and (3) the Legislature did not intend to render section 3(d) meaningless after December 31, 2020. View "New England Power Generators Ass’n v. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s convictions of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and carrying a firearm without a license, holding that Defendant’s right to a fair trial as provided by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and Commonwealth v. Soares, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), was violated during the trial proceedings.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the Commonwealth improperly excluded black men from the jury. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding no pattern after Defendant’s second objection to the Commonwealth’s use of peremptory challenges on black men. View "Commonwealth v. Robertson" on Justia Law

At issue was whether dredging and beach nourishment projects undertaken by the Town of Dennis requiring that materials dredged from the mouth of a tidal river be deposited on a publicly-owned beach rather than a privately-owned beach violated state environmental regulations.Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment claiming that the Town’s actions violated a regulation of the Department of Environmental Protection designed to protect beaches that are downdraft from jetties from loss of sediments caused by the jetties. The superior court allowed Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and issued an injunction permanently requiring the Town periodically to redredge the river and to deposit the dredged material on Plaintiffs’ private beach.The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of injunction and reversed the judgment allowing summary judgment for Plaintiffs, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to show that the Town’s extension of the jetty violated the requirements of 310 Code Mass. Regs. 10.27(4)(c); and (2) the Town’s subsequent dredging of the river did not trigger the requirements of that regulation. View "Miramar Park Ass’n. v. Town of Dennis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute but reversed Defendant’s conviction of criminal trespass, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for criminal trespassing.Defendant was arrested for selling cocaine in the parking lot of a grocery store. On appeal from his convictions, Defendant challenged his convictions and the denial of his motion to suppress evidence related to his cell phone that was seized during a search incident to his arrest. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding (1) a law enforcement officer’s testimony about the content of one of Defendant’s text massages did not constitute impermissible hearsay and was properly admitted; but (2) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction of criminal trespass. View "Commonwealth v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of this complaint under the statute of repose, holding that a claim alleging that a building contractor committed an unfair or deceptive act under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 2 and 9 by violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 142A, 17(10) is subject to the six-year statute of repose set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, 2B.In 2016, Plaintiff brought this action alleging that renovations performed in 2000 to 2001 by Defendants caused a fire in her home in 2012. A superior court judge dismissed the complaint as untimely under the six-year statute of repose. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s chapter 93A claim was sufficiently tort-like to bring it within the ambit of the statute of repose; and (2) because this action was commenced more than six years after the work was completed, it was barred by chapter 260, section 2B, and therefore properly dismissed. View "Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and possession of a firearm without a license, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error in the proceedings belowSpecifically, the Court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Defendant’s motions for funds for an expert and for a continuance on the eve of trial; (2) there are no grounds for the Court to exercise its extraordinary authority to reduce the verdict from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree or manslaughter; and (3) Defendant did not preserve his claim that his right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment was violated because the courtroom was closed during jury empanelment. The Court, however, remanded the matter for resentencing consistent with Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District., 466 Mass. 655 (2013). View "Commonwealth v. Fernandez" on Justia Law