Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the resentencing judge, holding that Defendant’s resentencing scheme was neither illegal nor unconstitutional.Defendant was convicted of stalking, harassment, two counts of restraining order violations, and two counts of perjury. While Defendant was serving his stalking sentence, that conviction was vacated for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant was then resentenced on the remaining convictions. On appeal, Defendant argued that the structure of his resentencing scheme was illegal. The Appeals Court dismissed Defendant’s case as moot. The Supreme Court granted further appellate review and affirmed the decision of the resentencing judge, holding that Defendant’s resentencing scheme was both legal and constitutional. View "Commonwealth v. Walters" on Justia Law

At issue was the definition of “debt collector” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 24, specifically its application to the statute’s licensing requirement.Plaintiffs individually filed suit against Defendant, alleging unlicensed debt collection, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and unjust enrichment. A superior court judge consolidated the cases and certified them as a class action. The judge then concluded (1) Defendant violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 24A because it operated as a debt collector without a license; and (2) Defendant met the exemption from liability in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 3 because the division of banks of the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation had permitted Defendant to operate without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that Defendant was not a debt collector under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 24 because neither of the statute’s two separate definitions of “debt collector” applied to Defendant. View "Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue was the appropriate standards and procedures for requests by the Commonwealth and parties to a care and protection proceeding in the juvenile court for the release of impounded records of the proceeding.Here, Mother and Father were the subjects of a care and protection proceeding, the records from which were impounded, and the defendants in criminal child abuse cases. Father and the Commonwealth sought access to the impounded records in conjunction with the upcoming criminal trials. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) where a party to a care and protection proceeding or the Commonwealth seeks access to impounded records of the proceeding, the requestor must demonstrate that the records should be released under the good cause standard of rule 7 of the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure; and (2) if the good cause standard is met, records may be disclosed for limited, confidential review and use, but the discoverability of the records does not also make them admissible at a subsequent criminal proceeding. View "Care and Protection of M.C." on Justia Law

The procedure the board of selectmen of Wayland followed in conducting the 2012 performance review of the town administrator violated the Massachusetts open meeting law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, 18 and 20(a).In advance of the public meeting where the town administrator’s evaluation was to take place, the chair of the board had circulated to all board members the board members’ individual and composite written evaluations of the town administrator’s performance. After the open meeting, the board made public all written evaluations. A judge of the superior court allowed Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the open meeting law’s exemption to the definition of “deliberation” that allows members of public bodies to distribute to each other “reports or documents that may be discussed at a meeting, provided that no opinion of a member is expressed,” did not apply to the circulation of individual and composite evaluations of the town administrator by the board members prior to the open meeting because the evaluations contained opinions; and (2) thus, the documents constituted a deliberation to which the public did not have access, in violation of the open meeting law. View "Boelter v. Board of Selectmen of Wayland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the Court did not err or abuse her discretion in denying Father’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. In his petition, Father sought custody of his two minor children, who were in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent Father sought relief from the recent denials in the probate and family court department of his motion to expedite the custody proceedings, the issue was not before the single justice; and (2) Father was not entitled to any additional review of the denial of his petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "In re Children" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the Court did not err or abuse her discretion in denying Father’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. In his petition, Father sought custody of his two minor children, who were in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent Father sought relief from the recent denials in the probate and family court department of his motion to expedite the custody proceedings, the issue was not before the single justice; and (2) Father was not entitled to any additional review of the denial of his petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "In re Children" on Justia Law

The phrase “anything of value” as it appears in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 37E(b), the statute criminalizing identity fraud, does not include avoiding criminal prosecution.Defendant pleaded guilty to identity fraud in connection with providing a false name to a police officer during a traffic stop. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that there were insufficient facts to establish that she attempted to receive, or received, anything of value within the meaning of section 37E(b). The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Defendant attempted to obtain something of value pursuant to the statute because the evasion of criminal prosecution is not something of value within the meaning of the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Escobar" on Justia Law

The phrase “anything of value” as it appears in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 37E(b), the statute criminalizing identity fraud, does not include avoiding criminal prosecution.Defendant pleaded guilty to identity fraud in connection with providing a false name to a police officer during a traffic stop. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that there were insufficient facts to establish that she attempted to receive, or received, anything of value within the meaning of section 37E(b). The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Defendant attempted to obtain something of value pursuant to the statute because the evasion of criminal prosecution is not something of value within the meaning of the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Escobar" on Justia Law

Under the circumstances of this case, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, 46D did not provide Luis Spencer, who resigned under pressure as Commissioner of Correction, a right to revert to a tenured civil service correction officer position in last held in 1992.Spencer brought a complaint against the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Correction, seeking judicial review of the Commission’s decision concluding that the right to revert to a civil service position applies only to involuntary terminations, not voluntary resignations, and because Spencer voluntarily resigned, no “termination of his service” had occurred within the meaning of section 46D. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission’s interpretation of this ambiguous statutory language was reasonable; and (2) the Commission correctly concluded that Spencer’s resignation was voluntary. View "Spencer v. Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

Under the circumstances of this case, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, 46D did not provide Luis Spencer, who resigned under pressure as Commissioner of Correction, a right to revert to a tenured civil service correction officer position in last held in 1992.Spencer brought a complaint against the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Correction, seeking judicial review of the Commission’s decision concluding that the right to revert to a civil service position applies only to involuntary terminations, not voluntary resignations, and because Spencer voluntarily resigned, no “termination of his service” had occurred within the meaning of section 46D. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission’s interpretation of this ambiguous statutory language was reasonable; and (2) the Commission correctly concluded that Spencer’s resignation was voluntary. View "Spencer v. Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law