Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Appellate Division erred in summarily dismissing F.C.’s appeal from a terminated commitment and treatment order as moot in reliance on Matter of N.L., 476 Mass. 632, 633 (2017).Following F.C.’s involuntary hospitalization, McLean Hospital filed a petition for F.C.'s commitment. F.C. was involuntarily committed and treated after a hearing. F.C. appealed, and his appeal was staying pending the decision in Matter of N.L. As the appeal was pending, F.C. was discharged from the facility. Citing Matter of N.L., the Appellate Division summarily dismissed the appeal as moot. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Appellate Division’s order and remanded for determination of the appeal on its merits, holding that appeals from expired or terminated commitment and treatment orders under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7, 8, and 8B should not be dismissed as moot where the parties have a continuing interest in the case. View "In re F.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Court held that the trial judge did not err by (1) allowing evidence of Defendant’s prior bad act; (2) permitting the prosecutor to comment in her closing argument on omissions in Defendant’s statement to a police officer; (3) failing to provide sua sponte a jury instruction addressing the omissions; and ($) providing a consciousness of guilt instruction. Further, the Court declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder int he first degree. View "Commonwealth v. Almeida" on Justia Law

For the same reasons stated in Rental Prop. Mgmt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 Mass. __ (2018), also decided today, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Fred Basile, a property manager, had no standing to bring a summary process action in his own name when he was neither the owner nor the lessor of the property.Basile brought this summary process action in the name of his sole proprietorship seeking to evict a tenant from a property for which Basile was neither the owner nor the lessor. The tenant asserted counterclaims for the unauthorized practice of law and violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. The trial judge enjoined Basile from commencing summary process actions such as the one in this case but entered judgment in favor of Basile on the chapter 93A counterclaims. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Basile had no standing to bring the summary process action; (2) to the extent Basile was acting as the agent of the property owner, he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by signing and filing the complaint because he was not an attorney; and (3) Basile’s conduct on its own did not constitute an unfair or deceptive practice in violation of chapter 93A. View "Ahmed-Kagzi v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree, holding that the seating of a certain juror did not violate Defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury.On appeal, Defendant argued that the seating of an alleged biased juror violated his right to a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) the trial judge conducted a sufficient colloquy with the juror to determine that he would not be a biased juror; and (2) the defense that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proof was without merit, and this Court declines to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Lee" on Justia Law

Fred Basile, a property manager, had no standing to bring a summary process action in the name of his sole proprietorship seeking to evict a tenant from a property for which Basile was neither the owner nor the lessor. To the extent that Basile was acting on behalf of the property’s true owner when he filed the complaint, his conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law because Basile was not an attorney.The Supreme Judicial Court further held (1) where the plaintiff in a summary process action is not the property’s owner or lessor, the complaint must be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) where the plaintiff is the true owner or lessor but the complaint has been signed and filed by another non-attorney person, the court may either dismiss the complaint without prejudice based on the unauthorized practice of law or allow the plaintiff to retain counsel or proceed pro se; and (3) where a plaintiff seeks to evict a tenant without the standing to do so, or where a person who is not authorized to practice law signs and files a summary process complaint, and where that conduct is not inadvertent, a court has the inherent authority to impose appropriate sanctions. View "Rental Property Management Services v. Hatcher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of possession of a large capacity firearm and large capacity feeding devices.On appeal, Defendant argued that his convictions should be overturned because the Commonwealth failed to prove that Defendant knew the firearm and feeding devices he possessed qualified as “large capacity” - that they were capable of holding more than ten rounds of ammunition. The Court held that to sustain a conviction of possession of large capacity feeding devices, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant either knew the firearm or feeding device met the legal definition of "large capacity" or knew it was capable of holding more than ten rounds of ammunition.In this case, the judge adequately instructed the jury on the elements necessary to sustain the conviction, and a reasonable jury could have inferred that Defendant knew that the nine millimeter pistol and magazines Defendant possessed were capable of holding more than ten rounds of ammunition.Lastly, Defendant failed to show a violation of his rights under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution or article 17 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Cassidy" on Justia Law

At issue was the lawfulness of allowing a hospital to transfer a patient involuntarily to a skilled nursing facility in the absence of a guardianship. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of a guardian over an incapacitated person is necessary, but not by itself sufficient, to admit an incapacitated person to a nursing facility against his or her will, because such an admission requires an additional order by the court based on a specific finding that the admission is in the incapacitated person’s best interest.Specifically, the Court held that when a hospital patient refuses to consent to be transferred to a nursing facility, a judge may order the patient to be admitted to a nursing facility under the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code only if the judge (1) finds the patient to be an incapacitated person; (2) makes the other findings necessary to appoint a guardian under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 5-306(b); and (3) then grants the guardian specific authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 5-309(g) to admit the incapacitated person to a nursing facility after finding that such admission is in the incapacitated person’s best interest. View "In re Guardianship of D.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s motion for a new trial and remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing, holding that an evidentiary hearing was necessary under the circumstances of this case.Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by pursuing an impracticable third-party culprit defense rather than defenses based on Defendant’s mental health or intoxication. The motion judge denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in order to determine whether trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable in light of Defendant’s particular mental health history. View "Commonwealth v. Velez" on Justia Law

The independent contractor statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B, does not determine whether a claimant is an employee for the purpose of workers’ compensation benefits under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152.Claimant sought review of a decision by the reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents affirming the findings of an administrative judge concluding that the claimant was an independent contractor and therefore not entitled to workers’ compensation. The Supreme Court held (1) the reviewing board properly applied the workers’ compensation statute’s definition of employee to determine whether the claimant in this case was an employee under chapter 152; and (2) therefore, the claimant was properly classified as an independent contractor for workers’ compensation purposes. View "Camargo's Case" on Justia Law

The independent contractor statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B, does not determine whether a claimant is an employee for the purpose of workers’ compensation benefits under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152.Claimant sought review of a decision by the reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents affirming the findings of an administrative judge concluding that the claimant was an independent contractor and therefore not entitled to workers’ compensation. The Supreme Court held (1) the reviewing board properly applied the workers’ compensation statute’s definition of employee to determine whether the claimant in this case was an employee under chapter 152; and (2) therefore, the claimant was properly classified as an independent contractor for workers’ compensation purposes. View "Camargo's Case" on Justia Law