Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue was whether the sentencing judge erred in resentencing Defendant, who was convicted of certain sex offenses, to include, approximately ten months after he was originally sentenced, the condition that he be subject to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of his probation.The Supreme Judicial Court held that because Defendant did not receive actual notice from the sentencing judge at the time of sentencing that GPS monitoring was included as a special condition of Defendant's probation, and because resentencing occurred after the statutory sixty-day period in which an illegal sentence may be corrected, the belated imposition of GPS monitoring must be vacated. View "Commonwealth v. Grundman" on Justia Law

In this case where the Commonwealth filed a petition seeking to commit Petitioner as a sexually dangerous person in 2010 but, after three mistrials, Petitioner remained confined without a finding that he was sexually dangerous, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, the statute governing civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons (SDP), permitted a fourth trial under the circumstances of this case; but (2) Petitioner’s nearly seven-year confinement without a finding of sexual dangerousness violated his substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Accordingly, Petitioner must be given the opportunity to seek supervised release prior to his fourth trial. View "Commonwealth v. G.F." on Justia Law

A plaintiff who alleges that he was injured from his use of a generic drug because of a failure to warn of the drug’s side effects cannot bring a common-law general negligence claim against the brand-name manufacturer that created the warning label. The plaintiff, however, may bring a common-law recklessness claim against the brand-name manufacturer if it intentionally failed to update the label on its drug, knowing or having reason to know of an unreasonable risk of death or grave bodily injury associated with its use. Further, a plaintiff who is injured by a generic drug due to a failure to warn cannot bring a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 9 against a brand-name manufacturer that did not advertise, offer to sell, or sell that drug because such failure did not occur in the conduct of “trade or commerce” as defined in section 1(b).In the instant case, the trial judge dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Merck & Co, Inc. asserting negligence for failure to warn and a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 9. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order dismissing Plaintiff’s common-law claim and remanded with instructions that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his complaint and affirmed the order dismissing Plaintiff’s chapter 93A claim. View "Rafferty v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of assault and battery and witness intimidation and imposing a sentence of a one-year commitment to a house of correction, suspended for two years, probation, and restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued in part that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the witness intimidation prosecution because the “witness” at issue was not a “witness” but a “potential witness” at the time of the assault. The Court held (1) the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the prosecution of Defendant for witness intimidation because “witness” in the jurisdictional statute includes “a witness or potential witness at any stage of a criminal investigation, grand jury proceeding, trial or other criminal proceeding of any type,” as protected by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, 13B(1)(c)(i); and (2) the district court did not prejudicially err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial, revocation of bail, and order of payment of restitution. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s two convictions of murder in the first degree, holding that none of Defendant’s allegations of error warranted reversal. Specifically, the Court held (1) the pretrial motion judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to Canadian law enforcement officers; (2) the trial judge did not commit reversible error in ordering the pretrial disclosure of Defendant’s mental health expert’s report, which the prosecution had in its possession during its subsequent cross-examination of Defendant; (3) the evidence at trial did not demonstrate Defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility for the murders; (4) defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; and (5) State police investigators did not deny Defendant his right to a complete defense when they failed to collect certain evidence relevant to Defendant’s intoxication at the time of the crimes. View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

The dismissal of the criminal charge pending against Respondent, an incompetent defendant, did not require his release from commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital, where the charge was dismissed after the period of commitment had expired, and a petition to extend the commitment had yet to be decided.After the criminal charge against Respondent was dismissed, Bridgewater moved to file an amended petition to modify its pending Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 16(c) petition to a petition for civil commitment pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7 and 8. The district court concluded that Bridgewater had no authority to hold Respondent pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 16(c), denied Bridgewater’s petition to amend, and ordered Respondent discharged. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the dismissal of the criminal charges did not require Respondent’s immediate release from commitment, and Bridgewater retained the statutory authority to hold Respondent while the Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 16(c) petition was pending; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying Bridgewater’s request to amend its pending petition for an extension under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 16(c) to a petition for civil commitment under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7 and 8. View "In re E.C." on Justia Law

At issue was whether two grants of public funds to renovate an active church that had been identified as a “historic resource” under the Community Preservation Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 44B, are categorically barred by the “anti-aid amendment” (see Article 18 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by articles 46 and 103 of the Amendments), or whether the constitutionality of the grants must be evaluated under the three-factor test the Supreme Judicial Court has applied under Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield, 382 Mass. 665, 675 (1981).The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the constitutionality of the grants in this case must be evaluated under the three-factor test; (2) a grant of public funds to an active church warrants careful scrutiny; and (3) the judge applied this three-factor test incorrectly in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit disbursement of these grants. View "Caplan v. Town of Acton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, denying Appellant relief from prison sentences that Appellant claimed were illegal, holding that Appellant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the absence of other routes by which he may adequately seek relief and also failed to create a record to substantiate his allegations. Specifically, Appellant had other means by which to seek review of his claim that his sentence was illegal and could have raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a postconviction motion and an appeal from any adverse ruling. Appellant also failed to provide a record sufficient to evaluate his claims. View "Sabree v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to allow relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. The Court held (1) the trial judge properly denied Defendant’s motion to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on sudden combat; (2) the judge’s reasonable provocation instruction was not erroneous; (3) there was no error in the judge’s instructions as to lesser included offenses; (4) the trial judge did not err in dismissing a nondeliberating juror toward the end of the trial; and (5) an error in a limiting instruction given after the judge allowed the Commonwealth to introduce prior bad act evidence was harmless. View "Commonwealth v. Howard" on Justia Law

While an appellate court generally may remand a case for resentencing while affirming the underlying conviction, it was nevertheless improper to do so under the particular circumstances of this case.Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal offenses in 2000, and the charges were placed on file at that time. In 2014, a judge brought the filed charges forward and sentenced Defendant on them. The Appeals Court remanded the matter to give the sentencing judge an opportunity to explain the basis for the sentences he imposed. The Appeals Court then affirmed the convictions on the filed charges but vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing due to doubts it had concerning their propriety. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the proper disposition of this case was simply to affirm the district court’s judgments without remand for resentencing because, once the convictions were affirmed, no purpose could be served by remanding the matter for resentencing because, while the case was pending in the Appeals Court, Defendant finished serving his sentences, rendering moot any error. View "Commonwealth v. Padua" on Justia Law