Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the Court did not err or abuse her discretion in denying Father’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. In his petition, Father sought custody of his two minor children, who were in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent Father sought relief from the recent denials in the probate and family court department of his motion to expedite the custody proceedings, the issue was not before the single justice; and (2) Father was not entitled to any additional review of the denial of his petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "In re Children" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the Court did not err or abuse her discretion in denying Father’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. In his petition, Father sought custody of his two minor children, who were in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent Father sought relief from the recent denials in the probate and family court department of his motion to expedite the custody proceedings, the issue was not before the single justice; and (2) Father was not entitled to any additional review of the denial of his petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "In re Children" on Justia Law

The phrase “anything of value” as it appears in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 37E(b), the statute criminalizing identity fraud, does not include avoiding criminal prosecution.Defendant pleaded guilty to identity fraud in connection with providing a false name to a police officer during a traffic stop. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that there were insufficient facts to establish that she attempted to receive, or received, anything of value within the meaning of section 37E(b). The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Defendant attempted to obtain something of value pursuant to the statute because the evasion of criminal prosecution is not something of value within the meaning of the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Escobar" on Justia Law

The phrase “anything of value” as it appears in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 37E(b), the statute criminalizing identity fraud, does not include avoiding criminal prosecution.Defendant pleaded guilty to identity fraud in connection with providing a false name to a police officer during a traffic stop. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that there were insufficient facts to establish that she attempted to receive, or received, anything of value within the meaning of section 37E(b). The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Defendant attempted to obtain something of value pursuant to the statute because the evasion of criminal prosecution is not something of value within the meaning of the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Escobar" on Justia Law

Under the circumstances of this case, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, 46D did not provide Luis Spencer, who resigned under pressure as Commissioner of Correction, a right to revert to a tenured civil service correction officer position in last held in 1992.Spencer brought a complaint against the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Correction, seeking judicial review of the Commission’s decision concluding that the right to revert to a civil service position applies only to involuntary terminations, not voluntary resignations, and because Spencer voluntarily resigned, no “termination of his service” had occurred within the meaning of section 46D. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission’s interpretation of this ambiguous statutory language was reasonable; and (2) the Commission correctly concluded that Spencer’s resignation was voluntary. View "Spencer v. Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

Under the circumstances of this case, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, 46D did not provide Luis Spencer, who resigned under pressure as Commissioner of Correction, a right to revert to a tenured civil service correction officer position in last held in 1992.Spencer brought a complaint against the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Correction, seeking judicial review of the Commission’s decision concluding that the right to revert to a civil service position applies only to involuntary terminations, not voluntary resignations, and because Spencer voluntarily resigned, no “termination of his service” had occurred within the meaning of section 46D. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission’s interpretation of this ambiguous statutory language was reasonable; and (2) the Commission correctly concluded that Spencer’s resignation was voluntary. View "Spencer v. Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the sentencing judge erred in resentencing Defendant, who was convicted of certain sex offenses, to include, approximately ten months after he was originally sentenced, the condition that he be subject to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of his probation.The Supreme Judicial Court held that because Defendant did not receive actual notice from the sentencing judge at the time of sentencing that GPS monitoring was included as a special condition of Defendant's probation, and because resentencing occurred after the statutory sixty-day period in which an illegal sentence may be corrected, the belated imposition of GPS monitoring must be vacated. View "Commonwealth v. Grundman" on Justia Law

In this case where the Commonwealth filed a petition seeking to commit Petitioner as a sexually dangerous person in 2010 but, after three mistrials, Petitioner remained confined without a finding that he was sexually dangerous, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, the statute governing civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons (SDP), permitted a fourth trial under the circumstances of this case; but (2) Petitioner’s nearly seven-year confinement without a finding of sexual dangerousness violated his substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Accordingly, Petitioner must be given the opportunity to seek supervised release prior to his fourth trial. View "Commonwealth v. G.F." on Justia Law

A plaintiff who alleges that he was injured from his use of a generic drug because of a failure to warn of the drug’s side effects cannot bring a common-law general negligence claim against the brand-name manufacturer that created the warning label. The plaintiff, however, may bring a common-law recklessness claim against the brand-name manufacturer if it intentionally failed to update the label on its drug, knowing or having reason to know of an unreasonable risk of death or grave bodily injury associated with its use. Further, a plaintiff who is injured by a generic drug due to a failure to warn cannot bring a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 9 against a brand-name manufacturer that did not advertise, offer to sell, or sell that drug because such failure did not occur in the conduct of “trade or commerce” as defined in section 1(b).In the instant case, the trial judge dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Merck & Co, Inc. asserting negligence for failure to warn and a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 9. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order dismissing Plaintiff’s common-law claim and remanded with instructions that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his complaint and affirmed the order dismissing Plaintiff’s chapter 93A claim. View "Rafferty v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of assault and battery and witness intimidation and imposing a sentence of a one-year commitment to a house of correction, suspended for two years, probation, and restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued in part that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the witness intimidation prosecution because the “witness” at issue was not a “witness” but a “potential witness” at the time of the assault. The Court held (1) the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the prosecution of Defendant for witness intimidation because “witness” in the jurisdictional statute includes “a witness or potential witness at any stage of a criminal investigation, grand jury proceeding, trial or other criminal proceeding of any type,” as protected by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, 13B(1)(c)(i); and (2) the district court did not prejudicially err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial, revocation of bail, and order of payment of restitution. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law