Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal from the Juvenile Court’s grant of a prearrangement motion to dismiss a delinquency complaint, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) a judge, in weighing whether the information contained within the four corners of the complaint application and attached exhibits establishes probable cause, may not consider whether a juvenile was criminally responsible for the charged offenses or whether the juvenile’s mental impairment rendered the juvenile incapable of having the requisite criminal intent; and (2) where a prosecutor proceeds to arraignment on a delinquency complaint supported by probable cause, the judge may not dismiss the complaint prior to arraignment on the grounds that dismissal of the complaint is in the best interests of the child and in the interests of justice. The Supreme Judicial Court held that, in this case, the dismissal of the delinquency complaint before arraignment was improper because the complaint was supported by probable cause and the prosecutor wished to proceed to arraignment. The court vacated the order of dismissal and remanded the matter to the Juvenile Court. View "Commonwealth v. Newton N." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditated and armed assault with intent to murder, affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief, and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. The court held (1) Defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial was not violated by the trial judge’s order limiting courtroom entry only to attendees whose names were submitted and approved; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of joint venture; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in his closing argument; and (4) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury about cooperating witnesses. View "Commonwealth v. Fernandes" on Justia Law

Where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58 and there is probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime while released on bail, the Commonwealth may seek to revoke bail under either Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58 or Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58B. The judge must then make a determination as to whether the Commonwealth satisfied the requirements of either section 58 or section 58B, under which it sought to revoke bail.Here, the judge found probable cause to believe that a juvenile had committed a crime while released on bail under section 58. The juvenile argued that the judge erred in applying the ninety-day revocation period under section 58B. Specifically, the juvenile argued that the statutes create an ambiguous bit revocation framework, and therefore, the rule of lenity requires the applicable of the sixty-day revocation period under section 58. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) the bail revocation scheme is not ambiguous in its current form, and therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply; and (2) revoking bail under section 58B where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to section 58 and subsequently commits a crime while on release, does not violate due process. View "Josh J. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Payment for accrued, unused sick time (sick pay) does not count as “wages” under the Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sections 148, 150.The superior court allowed Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in this case alleging that Defendant, Plaintiff’s former employer, failed to timely compensate Plaintiff for his accrued, unused sick time under the Act. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the superior court, holding (1) the Act does not encompass sick pay; and (2) therefore, Defendant did not violate the Act by failing to compensate Plaintiff for his accrued, unused sick time within the time frame mandated by the Act. View "Mui v. Massachusetts Port Authority" on Justia Law

Payment for accrued, unused sick time (sick pay) does not count as “wages” under the Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sections 148, 150.The superior court allowed Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in this case alleging that Defendant, Plaintiff’s former employer, failed to timely compensate Plaintiff for his accrued, unused sick time under the Act. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the superior court, holding (1) the Act does not encompass sick pay; and (2) therefore, Defendant did not violate the Act by failing to compensate Plaintiff for his accrued, unused sick time within the time frame mandated by the Act. View "Mui v. Massachusetts Port Authority" on Justia Law

A condominium bylaw providing that the condominium trust’s board of trustees cannot bring any litigation involving the common areas and facilities against anyone other than a unit owner unless they first obtain the consent of at least eighty percent of the unit owners is void because it contravenes public policy.The board of trustees in this case filed suit against the condominium’s developers for damages arising from certain design and construction defects in the condominium’s common areas and facilities. The trustees also sought a judgment declaring that a bylaw requiring a percentage of unit owners to consent to litigation before litigation is filed by the trustees was void. A motion judge concluded that the bylaw was not prohibited. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the lower court and held that the provision of the bylaws at issue was void as contravening public policy. View "Trustees of Cambridge Point Condominium Trust v. Cambridge Point, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court rendering judgment on a jury’s verdict finding that Plaintiffs’ claim for damages to Plaintiffs’ property under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, 5(a)(iii) was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, 11A(4). Plaintiffs filed their claims against the city of Lowell for the release of hazardous materials at a condominium site. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) a plaintiff must be on notice that he or she has a claim under section 5(a)(iii) before that claim may be time barred, and such notice is separate from a plaintiff’s notice that environmental contamination has occurred; and (2) Plaintiffs in this case could not know that they had a claim under section 5 before the date the City filed its Phase II/Phase III report pursuant to the Massachusetts Contingency Plan, and therefore, the statute of limitations issues should not have been presented to the jury. View "Grand Manor Condominium Ass’n v. City of Lowell" on Justia Law

A sentencing judge’s consideration of victim impact statements “as to a recommended sentence” is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and a victim’s right to recommend a sentence pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258B, 3(p) satisfies the requirements of due process.A jury convicted Defendant of assault and battery. At the sentencing hearing, the victim gave an impact statement and recommended a sentence. The judge sentenced Defendant to a lesser term of imprisonment than the sentences recommended by both the Commonwealth and the victim, explaining that in deciding the appropriate sentence, he placed great weight on the victim’s injuries and Defendant’s criminal record. On appeal, Defendant challenged the portion of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258B, 3(p) that permits victims to provide an impact statement “as to a recommended sentence.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that “it is neither cruel nor unusual or irrational, nor is it violative of a defendant’s due process guarantees, for a judge to listen with intensity to the perspective of a crime victim.” View "Commonwealth v. McGonagle" on Justia Law

The language in the reverse mortgages at issue in this case incorporated the statutory power of sale as set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, 21 and allowed the Mortgagee to foreclose on the mortgaged property in accordance with the requirements in section 21.Three Homeowners obtained loans from Mortgagee secured by reverse mortgages on their homes. Later, alleging default, Mortgagee sought to foreclose on the mortgages. Mortgagee brought separate actions against each borrower or the executors of their estate seeking a declaratory judgment allowing it to foreclose pursuant to the statutory power of sale. The trial judge granted Mortgagee’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Mortgagee’s reverse mortgage incorporated the statutory power of sale by reference. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the language of Mortgagee’s reverse mortgages incorporated the statutory power of sale as defined in section 21. View "James B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Murphy" on Justia Law

Petitioner obtained a civil harassment prevention order against L.R. While L.R.’s appeal was pending, a series of events occurred in the superior court and Appeals Court. Here, the Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the order of the single justice denying Petitioner’s petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 due to the availability of other remedies; and (2) with respect to Petitioner’s request for declaratory relief, remanded to the county court for entry of a judgment declaring that, because of the available appellate remedy, Petitioner’s action for declaratory relief could not be maintained. View "G.G. v. L.R." on Justia Law