Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. In her petition, Petitioner sought review of several interlocutory trial court orders in a civil lawsuit commenced by Respondent to collect on a superior court judgment. In affirming, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Petitioner failed to make a showing that review of the trial court’s decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal. The court then placed Petitioner on notice that any subsequent attempt to seek relief pursuant to a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition that suffers from similar deficiencies may result in restriction of future filings. View "Minkina v. Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner’s petition seeking relief from the district court’s judgment in a summary process proceeding. Petitioner filed the petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 4 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 5. Petitioner also challenged the Appellate Division’s judgment affirming the appeal bond ordered by the trial judge in the same summary process proceeding. In affirming the single justice’s denial of the petition, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing that adequate alternative remedies were not available. View "Wallace v. PNC Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice denying Petitioner’s petition filed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 arguing that when the Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile, the grand jury must be instructed on the basic differences between juvenile and adult brains. Petitioner based his argument on the court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012), which requires that a grand jury be instructed on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses when the Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile for murder. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner’s arguments in support of his petition were unavailing. View "Cepeda v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 arguing that because he had been “lawfully committed to the Department of Youth Services” at the time he committed the crime of murder, he was entitled to a transfer hearing pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 61, which was then in effect. The single justice concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to a transfer hearing because, when the murder occurred in 1995, a seventeen-year-old was an adult in the eyes of the juvenile and criminal law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because a seventeen-year-old was not, at the relevant time, considered a “child,” the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the matter; and (2) the fact that Petitioner had previously been committed to the Department was of no relevance because Petitioner would not have been subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in any event. View "Elliot v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In child custody cases where one parent seeks to remove and relocate a child to another country and no prior custody order exists to guide the trial judge as to whether the “real advantage” standard of Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 (1985), or the “best interests” standard articulated in Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177 (2006), should apply, the judge must first perform a functional analysis and then apply to the corresponding standard. The functional analysis may require a factual inquiry regarding the parties’ respective parenting responsibilities to determine whether the custody arrangement more closely approximates sole or shared custody. Lastly, are consideration of the parties’ and child’s respective interests, the judge must balance those factors to determine whether removal is in the best interests of the child. In the instant case, the Supreme Judicial Court held that there was no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial judge’s consideration and balancing of the interests at stake. View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

The right of an incompetent defendant to raise defenses in a proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, 15, which allows incompetent persons who are unable to stand trial for qualifying sex offenses to be deemed sexually dangerous based on the commission of those offenses, includes that of a lack of criminal responsibility.The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial judge’s denial of Defendant’s motion to admit expert testimony that he was not criminally responsible for his criminal acts and the judge’s allowance of the Commonwealth’s motion to preclude the testimony, holding that the statute allows incompetent defendants to raise any defenses that they could raise in a criminal trial, including that of a lack of criminal responsibility. View "Commonwealth v. Curran" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the trial court’s allowance of Defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective because he was burdened by an actual conflict of interest. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant presented sufficient evidence to establish that his trial counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest. The Supreme Judicial Court held that while Defendant set forth the basis for what may constitute a potential conflict of interest, he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was operating under an actual conflict of interest. The court remanded the case to the superior court for a determination of whether there was a potential conflict causing prejudice that would warrant a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Cousin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce to set aside the verdict. The court held (1) the trial judge did not err by failing to find that the Commonwealth’s peremptory challenges of prospective jurors were improper; (2) the trial judge did not err by allowing evidence of Defendant’s gang affiliation and the victim’s brother’s knowledge of neighborhood gang activity; (3) the trial judge did not err by precluding Defendant from cross-examining a police officer witness on prior misconduct; and (4) there was no reversible error arising from the prosecutor’s closing argument. View "Commonwealth v. Lopes" on Justia Law

Cities and towns may exercise their zoning authority to determine whether land in their communities may be used as a noncommercial private restricted landing area (in this case, a private heliport).Here, the Land Court judge concluded that he was constrained to apply the Appeals Court’s holding in Hanlon v. Sheffield, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 392 (2016), which interpreted Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 39B to provide that a town may not enforce a zoning bylaw that would prohibit a private landowner from creating a noncommercial private restricted landing area on his property unless the bylaw had been approved by the Department of Transportation (division). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the Land Court, holding that there is no clear legislative intent to preempt local zoning enactments with respect to noncommercial private restricted landing areas, and cities and towns do not need the prior approval of the division to enforce a zoning bylaw that requires some form of approval, variance, or special permit for land to be used as a private heliport. View "Roma, III, Ltd. v. Board of Appeals of Rockport" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the district court judge denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, holding that the motion judge correctly determined that Defendant did not satisfy the prejudice requirement of the test set forth in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974). As grounds for his motion, Defendant argued that plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him of the duty to register as a sex offender, and its consequences, or explain that Defendant might have sought a continuance without a finding. The district court found Defendant’s affidavit and assertions not credible and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to satisfy the second prong of the Saferian standard and thus could not prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Commonwealth v. Lastowski" on Justia Law