Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s convictions of involuntary manslaughter and assault and battery and remanded the case for a new trial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to conduct a voir dire after the prosecutor reported that some jurors fell asleep during the trial. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Defendant met his burden to show that the judge’s response to the information about the sleeping jurors was a structural error that could not be considered harmless, and therefore, Defendant’s convictions must be vacated. View "Commonwealth v. Villalobos" on Justia Law

Under the Security Deposit Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 186, 15B, the treble damages provision in section 15B(7) does not apply to a landlord’s violation of the requirements for an itemized list set out in section 15B(4)(iii), second-degree sentence, or to the amount forfeited for violation of section 15B(6)(b).At issue in this certified question was whether a tenant is entitled to treble the amount of his entire security deposit under section 15B(7) where a landlord fails to provide to the tenant a statement of damages that meets the statutory requirements, see section 15B(4)(iii), second sentence, thereby forfeiting the entire security deposit, see section 15B(6)(b), and also fails to return that forfeited deposit within thirty days after the tenancy’s termination. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding (1) a landlord violates section 15B(6)(e) only where she fails to return or account for any portion of the security deposit within thirty days, or where the landlord makes a deduction that does not fall within the categories authorized by section 15B(4)(i), (ii), (iii), first sentence; and (2) a violation of section 15(6)(e) does not apply to any portion of the security deposit that was forfeited under another provision of section 15B(6). View "Phillips v. Equity Residential Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. On direct appeal, the court held (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress certain computer evidence; (2) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to exclude evidence related to Defendant’s computer username and Internet search results, Defendant’s prior bad acts, and the victim’s statements and e-mail messages; (3) any misstatement made by the prosecutor during closing argument was not so great that it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) the trial judge’s instruction to the jury permitting them to infer an intent to kill based on the use of poison properly instructed the jury on the use of dangerous weapons. View "Commonwealth v. Keown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court in this case resolved three legal issues regarding the “reasonable efforts” determination that a juvenile court judge must make under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 29C before certifying that the continuation of a child in his home is contrary to his best efforts and granting custody of the child to the Department of Children and Families. The reasonable efforts determination regards whether the Department has made reasonable efforts prior to the placement of a child with the Department to prevent or eliminate the need for removal from the home. The court held (1) the judge must revisit the reasonable efforts determination at the seventy-two hour hearing if the judge continues the Department’s temporary custody of the child; (2) where none of the our exceptions in section 29C apply, exigent circumstances do not excuse the Department from making reasonable efforts; and (3) where it is found that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts before removing a child from his or her home, the judge or single justice has the equitable authority to order the Department to take reasonable remedial steps to diminish the adverse consequences of the Department’s failure to do so. View "In re Care & Protection of Walt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The court also denied Defendant’s motion for a reduced verdict and declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. The court held (1) there was no error committed by trial counsel, the trial judge or the prosecutor that created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (2) there was no reason to remand Defendant’s case to the superior court for renewed consideration of his motion to reduce the verdict or to grant him relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Kolenovic" on Justia Law

The Stored Communications Act (SCA) does not prohibit Yahoo from voluntarily disclosing the contents of a decedent’s e-mail account to the personal representatives of the decedent’s estate. Rather, the SCA permits Yahoo to divulge the contents of the e-mail account where the personal representatives lawfully consent to disclosure on the decedent’s behalf.The decedent in this case died intestate. The personal representatives of the decedent’s estate sought access to the contents of a Yahoo!, Inc. e-mail account that the decedent left behind. Yahoo declined to provide access to the account. The personal representatives commenced an action challenging Yahoo’s refusal. A judge of the probate and family court granted summary judgment for Yahoo. The Supreme Judicial Court set aside the judgment, holding that summary judgment for Yahoo should not have been allowed (1) on the basis that the requested disclosure was prohibited by the SCA, and (2) on the basis of the terms of a service agreement where material issues of fact pertinent to the enforceability of the contract remained in dispute. View "Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc." on Justia Law

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(b) and (d) both punish possession with intent to distribute a class B substance, but 32A(b) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years while 32A(d) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of three and one-half years. Defendant was charged with and convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, second offense, under section 32A(c) and (d), among other crimes. The judge, however, sentenced Defendant pursuant to section 32A(a) and (b). The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case to the superior court for resentencing, holding (1) the judge’s decision not to sentence Defendant pursuant to the statutes under which he was properly charged and convicted was error; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for assault and battery on a police officer; and (4) the jury instructions on self-defense created no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi" on Justia Law

In a jury trial of an operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OUI) case, a trial judge should not give a jury instruction that specifically mentions the absence of breathalyzer or other alcohol-test evidence unless the defendant requests it.Defendant was convicted of one count of OUI. During trial, the jury was instructed about the absence of alcohol-test evidence in the judge’s final instructions over Defendant’s objection. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) giving the objected-to instruction regarding alcohol-test evidence constituted error; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the error was prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and armed assault with the intent to murder, among other crimes. The court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s expert witness purportedly commented on the credibility of Defendant or Defendant’s expert witness; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying motion to vacate the conviction because of a verdict slip error characterizing the armed assault with intent to murder indictment as assault with intent to murder; (3) the judge’s instruction to the jury describing what would happen if the jury found Defendant not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the effects of drugs on Defendant’s criminal responsibility; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Dunn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and armed assault with the intent to murder, among other crimes. The court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s expert witness purportedly commented on the credibility of Defendant or Defendant’s expert witness; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying motion to vacate the conviction because of a verdict slip error characterizing the armed assault with intent to murder indictment as assault with intent to murder; (3) the judge’s instruction to the jury describing what would happen if the jury found Defendant not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the effects of drugs on Defendant’s criminal responsibility; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Dunn" on Justia Law