Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Payment for accrued, unused sick time (sick pay) does not count as “wages” under the Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sections 148, 150.The superior court allowed Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in this case alleging that Defendant, Plaintiff’s former employer, failed to timely compensate Plaintiff for his accrued, unused sick time under the Act. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the superior court, holding (1) the Act does not encompass sick pay; and (2) therefore, Defendant did not violate the Act by failing to compensate Plaintiff for his accrued, unused sick time within the time frame mandated by the Act. View "Mui v. Massachusetts Port Authority" on Justia Law

A condominium bylaw providing that the condominium trust’s board of trustees cannot bring any litigation involving the common areas and facilities against anyone other than a unit owner unless they first obtain the consent of at least eighty percent of the unit owners is void because it contravenes public policy.The board of trustees in this case filed suit against the condominium’s developers for damages arising from certain design and construction defects in the condominium’s common areas and facilities. The trustees also sought a judgment declaring that a bylaw requiring a percentage of unit owners to consent to litigation before litigation is filed by the trustees was void. A motion judge concluded that the bylaw was not prohibited. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the lower court and held that the provision of the bylaws at issue was void as contravening public policy. View "Trustees of Cambridge Point Condominium Trust v. Cambridge Point, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court rendering judgment on a jury’s verdict finding that Plaintiffs’ claim for damages to Plaintiffs’ property under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, 5(a)(iii) was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, 11A(4). Plaintiffs filed their claims against the city of Lowell for the release of hazardous materials at a condominium site. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) a plaintiff must be on notice that he or she has a claim under section 5(a)(iii) before that claim may be time barred, and such notice is separate from a plaintiff’s notice that environmental contamination has occurred; and (2) Plaintiffs in this case could not know that they had a claim under section 5 before the date the City filed its Phase II/Phase III report pursuant to the Massachusetts Contingency Plan, and therefore, the statute of limitations issues should not have been presented to the jury. View "Grand Manor Condominium Ass’n v. City of Lowell" on Justia Law

A sentencing judge’s consideration of victim impact statements “as to a recommended sentence” is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and a victim’s right to recommend a sentence pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258B, 3(p) satisfies the requirements of due process.A jury convicted Defendant of assault and battery. At the sentencing hearing, the victim gave an impact statement and recommended a sentence. The judge sentenced Defendant to a lesser term of imprisonment than the sentences recommended by both the Commonwealth and the victim, explaining that in deciding the appropriate sentence, he placed great weight on the victim’s injuries and Defendant’s criminal record. On appeal, Defendant challenged the portion of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258B, 3(p) that permits victims to provide an impact statement “as to a recommended sentence.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that “it is neither cruel nor unusual or irrational, nor is it violative of a defendant’s due process guarantees, for a judge to listen with intensity to the perspective of a crime victim.” View "Commonwealth v. McGonagle" on Justia Law

The language in the reverse mortgages at issue in this case incorporated the statutory power of sale as set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, 21 and allowed the Mortgagee to foreclose on the mortgaged property in accordance with the requirements in section 21.Three Homeowners obtained loans from Mortgagee secured by reverse mortgages on their homes. Later, alleging default, Mortgagee sought to foreclose on the mortgages. Mortgagee brought separate actions against each borrower or the executors of their estate seeking a declaratory judgment allowing it to foreclose pursuant to the statutory power of sale. The trial judge granted Mortgagee’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Mortgagee’s reverse mortgage incorporated the statutory power of sale by reference. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the language of Mortgagee’s reverse mortgages incorporated the statutory power of sale as defined in section 21. View "James B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Murphy" on Justia Law

Petitioner obtained a civil harassment prevention order against L.R. While L.R.’s appeal was pending, a series of events occurred in the superior court and Appeals Court. Here, the Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the order of the single justice denying Petitioner’s petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 due to the availability of other remedies; and (2) with respect to Petitioner’s request for declaratory relief, remanded to the county court for entry of a judgment declaring that, because of the available appellate remedy, Petitioner’s action for declaratory relief could not be maintained. View "G.G. v. L.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. In her petition, Petitioner sought review of several interlocutory trial court orders in a civil lawsuit commenced by Respondent to collect on a superior court judgment. In affirming, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Petitioner failed to make a showing that review of the trial court’s decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal. The court then placed Petitioner on notice that any subsequent attempt to seek relief pursuant to a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition that suffers from similar deficiencies may result in restriction of future filings. View "Minkina v. Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner’s petition seeking relief from the district court’s judgment in a summary process proceeding. Petitioner filed the petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 4 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 5. Petitioner also challenged the Appellate Division’s judgment affirming the appeal bond ordered by the trial judge in the same summary process proceeding. In affirming the single justice’s denial of the petition, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing that adequate alternative remedies were not available. View "Wallace v. PNC Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice denying Petitioner’s petition filed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 arguing that when the Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile, the grand jury must be instructed on the basic differences between juvenile and adult brains. Petitioner based his argument on the court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012), which requires that a grand jury be instructed on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses when the Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile for murder. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner’s arguments in support of his petition were unavailing. View "Cepeda v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 arguing that because he had been “lawfully committed to the Department of Youth Services” at the time he committed the crime of murder, he was entitled to a transfer hearing pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 61, which was then in effect. The single justice concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to a transfer hearing because, when the murder occurred in 1995, a seventeen-year-old was an adult in the eyes of the juvenile and criminal law. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because a seventeen-year-old was not, at the relevant time, considered a “child,” the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the matter; and (2) the fact that Petitioner had previously been committed to the Department was of no relevance because Petitioner would not have been subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in any event. View "Elliot v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law