Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a jury trial of an operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OUI) case, a trial judge should not give a jury instruction that specifically mentions the absence of breathalyzer or other alcohol-test evidence unless the defendant requests it.Defendant was convicted of one count of OUI. During trial, the jury was instructed about the absence of alcohol-test evidence in the judge’s final instructions over Defendant’s objection. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) giving the objected-to instruction regarding alcohol-test evidence constituted error; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the error was prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and armed assault with the intent to murder, among other crimes. The court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s expert witness purportedly commented on the credibility of Defendant or Defendant’s expert witness; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying motion to vacate the conviction because of a verdict slip error characterizing the armed assault with intent to murder indictment as assault with intent to murder; (3) the judge’s instruction to the jury describing what would happen if the jury found Defendant not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the effects of drugs on Defendant’s criminal responsibility; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Dunn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and armed assault with the intent to murder, among other crimes. The court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s expert witness purportedly commented on the credibility of Defendant or Defendant’s expert witness; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying motion to vacate the conviction because of a verdict slip error characterizing the armed assault with intent to murder indictment as assault with intent to murder; (3) the judge’s instruction to the jury describing what would happen if the jury found Defendant not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the effects of drugs on Defendant’s criminal responsibility; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Under the circumstances of this legal malpractice action, a court’s error of law was a concurrent, not a superseding, proximate cause, and therefore, recovery was not barred to the plaintiff client even where the defendant attorney was negligent for failing to prevent or mitigate the legal error.Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, its former law firm, alleging that Defendant was negligent in failing to provide a French appellate court with evidence that the court deemed necessary for Plaintiff to prevail on a claim, which the court denied. The superior court granted summary judgment to Defendant and denied partial summary judgment to Plaintiff, concluding (1) the French court committed an error of law in requiring this evidence, and (2) even if Defendant were negligent in failing to provide the evidence to the court, Plaintiff could not recover damages for Defendant’s negligence because the court’s legal error was a superseding cause of the adverse action. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant and denying partial summary judgment to Plaintiff. View "Kiribati Seafood Co., LLC v. Dechert LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this case to the superior court for a determination as to whether a search exceeded the permissible scope of a warrant authorizing a search of Defendant’s apartment for certain evidence, including a cellular telephone, drug-related records, and a distinctive article of clothing. When the warrant was executed, officers seized, among other things, a large quantity of cocaine. The superior court allowed Defendant’s motion to suppress the seized evidence, concluding that the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause to believe that Defendant sold cocaine or a sufficient nexus between Defendant’s alleged criminal activity and his apartment. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order allowing Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that the affidavit (1) established a sufficient nexus in Defendant’s criminal transaction and his residence to permit a search for the cellular telephone used to arrange the sale of cocaine to a dealer and the sweatshirt he wore while conducting the transaction; but (2) did not provide sufficient particularized information to allow a general search of the apartment for other “drug-related” evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Perkins" on Justia Law

A juvenile, who has been indicted as a youthful offender, is not entitled as of right to interlocutory review of a denial of a motion to dismiss that indictment.The grand jury returned a youthful offender indictment against Juvenile, charging her with rape of a child. Juvenile moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of probable cause. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the juvenile court judge’s order denying the motion to dismiss, holding (1) Juvenile is not entitled to interlocutory review under these circumstances, but, nevertheless, the court exercises its discretion to reach the merits of the petition; and (2) the youthful offender portion of the indictment was not sufficiently supported by probable cause. View "N.M. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue was a purely legal question concerning the correct interpretation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 218, 26. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the plain language of the statute confers jurisdiction in the Boston Municipal Court Department (BMC) and the district court over intimidation of a witness or a juror but not over intimidation of any other person.Defendant was convicted in the BMC of intimidating a person furthering a court proceeding. The alleged victim was opposing counsel in a civil action commenced by Muckle. The intimidation conviction was later vacated and the charge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in the BMC. The Appeals Court reversed the order dismissing the intimidation charge. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Appeals Court and affirmed the order dismissing the intimidation charge, holding that jurisdiction was absent in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Muckle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of unlawful possession of a firearm and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the conviction to murder in the second degree. The court held (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, but Defendant was not prejudiced by the error; (2) the trial judge properly admitted statements of the victim under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule; (3) the Commonwealth’s ballistics expert was competent to testify about the trajectory of the shot that killed the victim; and (4) Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Castano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment convicting Defendant of five charges stemming from the sexual abuse his two daughters. Specifically, the court held (1) the superior court judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to issue summonses pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) regarding the release of the mental health and counseling record of the younger of the daughters; and (2) the judge’s restriction of Defendant’s cross-examination of the younger daughter listing the defense from referencing “bad character” or “bad acts” of the daughter was not an abuse of discretion. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

At issue was whether municipal parkland may be protected by Article 97 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution where the land was not taken by eminent domain and where there is no restriction recorded in the registry of deeds that limits its use to conservation or recreational purposes. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, provided the land has been dedicated as a public park. Further, a municipality dedicates land as a public park where there is a clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the land permanently as a public park and where the public accepts such use by actually using the land as a public park. Given this conclusion, the park in this case was dedicated by the city as a public park such that the transfer of its use from a park to a school would require legislative approval under the prior public use doctrine and, thus, under article 97. View "Smith v. City of Westfield" on Justia Law