Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior and resisting arrest. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the judgment of conviction of resisting arrest; but (2) reversed the judgment of conviction of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, holding that there was insufficient evidence that Defendant’s conduct caused any person to experience “shock” or “alarm,” as required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 16. Because Defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the first four elements of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, the case was remanded for entry of a conviction of the lesser included offense of indecent exposure. View "Commonwealth v. Maguire" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony murder, armed home invasion, and armed assault with intent to rob. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the trial judge should have provided the jury with a felony murder merger instruction. The trial judge granted the motion as to the felony murder conviction but did not disturb Defendant’s remaining convictions. At Defendant’s retrial, a second jury found Defendant not guilty of the single charge of felony murder. In this appeal, Defendant argued, inter alia, that he cannot be guilty of his armed home invasion and armed assault with intent to rob convictions because the second jury acquitted him of felony murder predicated upon the same underlying felonies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the second trial cannot spare Defendant from the consequences of convictions properly decided by a different jury; and (2) Defendant’s claims of error in the first trial were unavailing. View "Commonwealth v. Resende" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action against Nationstar Mortgage, LLC and Fremont Investment and Loan (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Defendants violated his rights under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. The Appeals Court reversed, concluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s chapter 93A claim. Nationstar appealed, arguing that Plaintiff’s claim was barred because he failed to serve a demand letter. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the Appeals Court, holding that, if a defendant keeps assets in the Commonwealth but does not maintain a place of business in the Commonwealth, the plaintiff need not serve a demand letter. View "Moronta v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Christine DeFelice, a part-time employee for the Stoneham school department, sought retroactive membership in the Stoneham retirement system based on a nine-week period during which she worked over thirty hours per week. The municipal retirement board granted DeFelice retroactive membership in the retirement system for the nine-week period but denied her membership for the subsequent time during which she remained a part-time employee. The Contributory Retirement Appeal Board reversed, concluding that the board was statutorily precluded from terminating the membership of individuals who had been granted membership in a retirement system and continued working for the same municipal employer. The superior court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) a municipal retirement board does not possess absolute discretion to terminate a part-time employee’s membership in a retirement system to which that board has granted the employee membership; and (2) a “separation from [an employee’s] service” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 3(1)(a)(i) does not occur when a part-time employee working two jobs for the same municipal employer ceases to work only one of those jobs. View "Retirement Board of Stoneham v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed and declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) Defendant has not shown that the presence of police officers during the grand jury proceedings caused a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for the appointment of a special prosecutor; (3) the trial judge did not commit prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings challenged by Defendant; (4) statements made by the prosecutor during his opening statement and closing argument did not warrant reversal; and (5) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Holley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs contracted with Defendants through small corporations that Plaintiffs apparently formed for this purpose. Plaintiffs, who performed services in Massachusetts as furniture delivery drivers, brought a putative class action against Defendants under the independent contractor statute, claiming that they had been misclassified as independent contractors. The trial judge granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempted the independent contractor statute in its entirety. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) while a portion of the independent contractor statute is preempted by the FAAAA, the remainder is severable and remains applicable to Plaintiffs’ misclassification claim; and (2) summary judgment dismissing the misclassification claim is not warranted on the separately asserted basis that Plaintiffs lack standing as individuals to assert claims for misclassification under the statute. View "Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Mental Health (DMH) submitted a proposal to the Auditor of the Commonwealth that would privatize certain of its state-run mental health services. The Auditor issued a written decision approving the proposed privatization contract, concluding that the privatization proposal met the requirements of the Pacheco Law. The Pacheco Law establishes procedures that agencies must follow when beginning the bidding process for an entering into a privatization contract. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Auditor’s decision, holding that the Auditor did not abuse her discretion in determining that DMH’s privatization proposal met the requirements of the Pacheco Law. View "Service Employees International Union, Local 509 v. Auditor of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In a four-count complaint, Defendant was charged with several criminal offenses. Defendant pleaded guilty as to counts one and four. The municipal court judge dismissed counts two and three for lack of probable cause. The Commonwealth appealed. The Appeals Court reversed the dismissal of these counts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, while Defendant conceded that probable cause existed to support counts two and three, the complaint was also adequate to charge Defendant with each offense and to establish jurisdiction in the municipal court. View "Commonwealth v. Hardin" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a class B substance. Defendant was sentenced to a one-year term of probation and the probation supervision fees and the victim-witness assessment. The Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi on the underlying complaint after a judge granted Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that Annie Dookhan, the discredited analyst at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute at the center of misconduct allegations, performed the analysis of the substances seized during Defendant’s arrest. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for return of property, including probation supervision fees and the victim-witness assessment. The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there is no statutory basis for a refund of victim-witness assessments or probation fees where a defendant’s conviction is vacated after the withdrawal of a guilty plea. View "Commonwealth v. Martin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery on a family or household member in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 13M(a). On appellate review, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under the statute because he was not involved in a “substantive dating relationship” with the person he was charged with assaulting. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the evidence warranted a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was involved in a “substantive dating relationship” with the person he was charged with assaulting, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 13M(c). View "Commonwealth v. Dustin" on Justia Law