Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A grand jury returned indictments against Defendant on various charges, including three counts of armed assault with intent to murder and murder in the second degree. Defendant moved to suppress the identification of him by an eyewitness, Brianna Johnson, and also moved to suppress Johnson’s identification of a firearm as the one used by Defendant in the commission of the crime. The motion judge denied the motion to suppress the identification of Defendant but allowed the motion to suppress the identification of the firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the failure to detectives showing a photographic array to the eyewitness to use the protocol outlined in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago did not warrant suppression of Defendant’s identification of Defendant; (2) the use of a simultaneous rather than a sequential display of photographs in an array was not unnecessarily suggestive; and (3) the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling the identification of the firearm as inadmissible under the common law of evidence due to suggestive police questioning and subsequent police confirmation. View "Commonwealth v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with disorderly conduct. The charge arose from Defendant’s behavior as a patient in the psychiatric area of the emergency department at a Boston hospital. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s conviction, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the municipal court for entry of a judgment of dismissal, holding that the evidence was not sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant consciously disregarded a “substantial and unjustifiable risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” View "Commonwealth v. Accime" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not err by permitting the Commonwealth’s expert witness to opine that Defendant’s behavior was planned and goal-directed; (2) the trial judge did not erroneously permit the same expert to state the bases of her opinion on direct examination; and (3) the prosecutor did not make statements not supported by the evidence during closing arguments. View "Commonwealth v. Goddard" on Justia Law

Alexander Soto was a juvenile when he was indicted for murder in the first degree and related offenses. The superior court dismissed the non-murder indictments, concluding that the nonmurder charges must first be brought in the juvenile court by a complaint for delinquency or a youthful offender indictment prior to joinder with the murder indictments. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order allowing Soto’s motion to dismiss the non-murder indictments, holding that, when a juvenile is indicted for murder, non-murder offenses that are properly joined with the murder indictment must be brought in the superior court. View "Commonwealth v. Soto" on Justia Law

During the divorce proceedings of Husband and Wife, Wife did not pursue her claim for alimony. Four years after the divorce judgment, Wife sought and obtained an alimony award. Both parties appealed. On appeal, both parties agreed that the judge erred by commencing the durational limit of alimony on the date of the first temporary alimony payment but disagreed on the appropriate commencement date. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case with instructions to reevaluate the alimony judgment, holding (1) under the circumstances, the durational limit of general term alimony under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, 49(b) starts to run on the date that the alimony was awarded, not on the date of the divorce judgment or on the date temporary alimony was awarded; (2) the income earned from overtime pay must be considered in making an initial alimony award determination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, 34, regardless of whether that determination is made before or after the divorce judgment; and (3) where a judge awards alimony under section 34, the judge must specifically address the issue of health insurance coverage for the recipient spouse. View "Snow v. Snow" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of possession of child pornography with the intent to disseminate, one count of dissemination of child pornography, and three counts of possession of child pornography. Defendant appealed on three grounds. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the search warrant for the apartment in which Defendant was living was appropriately particularized; (2) the administrative subpoena that issued under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 271, 17B for Internet service records was valid; and (3) the Commonwealth met the requirement of proving that Defendant had the lascivious intent necessary to support a conviction under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 29B. View "Commonwealth v. Molina" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress computer evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued for the the place searched because the police needed more information to link Defendant to the place searched and the items seized. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was a substantial basis from which to conclude that the evidence of downloading and sharing child pornography via the Internet was probably present at the place to be searched. View "Commonwealth v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Odin Anderson, his wife, and his daughter (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed personal injury action for injuries Odin suffered after being struck by a bus owned by Partners Healthcare Systems that was being driven by one of its employees. Plaintiffs then filed a separate action against Partner’s insurers and claims representatives. A jury awarded Odin $2,961,000 in damages in the personal injury action and awarded Odin’s wife and daughter $110,000 each. At a subsequent jury-waived trial, a judge found that the insurers and claims representatives violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D by their misconduct. The judge awarded Plaintiffs treble damages using as the “amount of the judgment” to be multiplied the combined amount of the underlying tort judgment and the accrued postjudgment interest on that judgment. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that, in a case where the amount of actual damages to be multiplied due to a wilful or knowing violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A or Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D are based on the amount of an underlying judgment, that amount does not include postjudgment interest. View "Anderson v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh Pa." on Justia Law

Defendant was acquitted on a charge of receipt of stolen property and then prosecuted for larceny of the same property. Defendant argues that the subsequent larceny complaint was properly dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy. The court concluded that the same elements test, firmly rooted in the court's history and case law, is the only appropriate test to apply in both single and successive prosecution scenarios. The court explained that, because larceny and receipt are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, dismissal of the larceny complaint on double jeopardy grounds is not warranted. Finally, the court concluded that the successive prosecutions do not violate the equitable principles of due process, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel. Accordingly, the court reversed the allowance of defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Deutsche Bank, seeking a declaratory judgment that the bank's foreclosure of the mortgage on plaintiff's home was invalid and seeking to quiet title to the property. The superior court granted the bank's motion to dismiss. The court concluded, as did the trial court judge, that a foreclosing mortgagee's failure to comply with G. L. c. 244, § 15A, by failing to send the postforeclosure notices required by the statute, does not render the foreclosure void. In this case, where the provision in question does not set forth preforeclosure requirements that are a part of the foreclosure process, the Bank's failure to comply with section 15A's postforeclosure notice provisions did not render the foreclosure void. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Turra v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas" on Justia Law