Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed an action alleging claims of Medicare or Medicaid fraud and retaliation by his employer when he spoke up about the purported fraud. A federal district court judge allowed a motion to dismiss certain federal defendants and then remanded the case to the superior court. Petitioner appealed. The appeal remained pending when, in the superior court, the remaining defendants filed motions to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion in the county court that the single justice treated as a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, arguing that the state court lacked jurisdiction because his appeal from the remand order remained pending in the federal court and seeking a stay in the superior court. A docket entry indicated that because Petitioner’s appeal remained pending, the status conference would be continued. Thereafter, the single justice denied the petition. Petitioner then filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21 seeking a stay in the trial court. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that this case did not present a situation where extraordinary relief from this Court was required, and the single justice correctly denied relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "Padmanabhan v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services" on Justia Law

Bahig Bishay brought an action bringing various claims arising from Plaintiff’s eviction from his home. Bishay named as defendants National Investigations, Inc. and its principals (collectively, National), Harvard 45 Associates, LLC and its principals (collectively, Harvard), and Allied Finance Adjusters Conference, Inc. (Allied). Allied’s motion to dismiss was allowed. Also allowed was Harvard’s motion for summary judgment as to both the claims against it and a counterclaim it asserted against Bishay. Thereafter, Bishay and National (collectively, Petitioners) settled their dispute and moved for entry of final judgment. The motion was denied. Petitioners then filed a petition seeking relief in the nature of mandamus and requesting that the clerk of the superior court be ordered to enter final judgment as Petitioners proposed. A single justice denied relief without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused her discretion by denying extraordinary relief, as Petitioners had other remedies available to them. View "Bishay v. Clerk of the Superior Court in Norfolk County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm and one count of possession of a firearm without a license. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of his vehicle, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals agreed with Appellant and reversed the judgments of conviction, the verdicts, and the motion to suppress, holding that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop. View "Commonwealth v. Pinto" on Justia Law

Defendant was one of three occupants of a vehicle that was stopped for a traffic violation. When Defendant, the rear seat passenger, exited the vehicle based on an exit order, a police officer observed a handgun underneath his right thigh. At trial, the court ordered that evidence concerning the front seat passenger’s prior conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm was excluded for all purposes. Defense counsel violated this order and proceeded to elicit this testimony anyway. The judge declared a mistrial. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that there had been no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. A superior court judge denied the motion. Defendant then filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The single justice concluded that the trial judge had erred in determining that there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to the county court for entry of an order denying Defendant’s petition, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the judge’s decision to declare a mistrial on the ground of manifest necessity; and (2) the single justice applied a substituted judgment standard in finding otherwise. View "Commonwealth v. Bryan" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for multiple firearms offenses, among other offenses. Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during the search of a motor vehicle he had been driving. A superior court judge allowed the motion, concluding that, at the time a police officer stopped and seized the vehicle, the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the motion judge’s order allowing the motion to suppress, holding (1) the investigatory stop was predicated on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (2) the officer’s actions were “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” View "Commonwealth v. Edwards" on Justia Law

In Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District (Bridgeman I), the Supreme Judicial Court declined to accept a proposed “global remedy” of vacating the thousands of drug convictions affected by the misconduct of Annie Dookhan when she was employed as a chemist at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute despite the claim that the time and expense of case-by-case adjudication had become untenable. Here, the district attorneys provided the single justice with lists identifying more than 20,000 potentially aggrieved defendants based on Dookhan’s misconduct. The single justice issued a reservation and report to the full court inviting it to reconsider its previous ruling. Rather than adopting Petitioners’ request for a global remedy, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted a new protocol for case-by-case adjudication. The adjudication will occur in three phases and be implemented by the single justice in the form of a declaratory judgment. View "Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the jury’s verdict, holding (1) the admission of testimony by a jailhouse informant did not violate Defendant’s confrontation rights; (2) a ballistics expert properly testified to a report prepared by an unavailable expert; (3) the admission of testimony of the Commonwealth’s wire expert created no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) no reversible error occurred in the admission of two types of evidence resulting from searches of Defendant’s computer; and (5) the admission of transcript of the victim’s testimony from earlier proceedings involving both Defendant and the victim was not in error. View "Commonwealth v. Caruso" on Justia Law

Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, corporations that generate business income in the Commonwealth and other states must pay taxes on that income according to an apportionment formula that seeks to tax the corporation’s income generated in Massachusetts. For a “manufacturing corporation,” the statutory formula is based solely on the corporation’s sales. The Appellate Tax Board determined that Genentech, Inc., a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in California that earns business income in the Commonwealth, qualified as a manufacturing corporation for the tax years 1998 through 2004. On appeal, Genentech appealed that determination, among other things. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Genentech qualified in each of the tax years at issue as a “manufacturing corporation” as defined in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, 38(1)(1) and, under section 38(1)(2), was required to apportion its income under the single-factor formula using solely the statute’s sales factor; and (2) the Board properly rejected Genentech’s claim that application of the statute’s single-factor apportionment formula based on sales to the company violated the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution. View "Genentech, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant, an inmate, was charged with falsely reporting a sexual assault to a deputy sheriff employed at the corrections facility. After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of making a false report of a crime to a police officer. Defendant appealed, arguing that a deputy sheriff is not a police officer within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 13A, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that a deputy sheriff is not a “police officer” within the meaning of the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Gernrich" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Boston Municipal Court issued a criminal complaint charging Defendant, who was mentally ill, with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Defendant has been in custody ever since, but each time the scheduled date approached, the trial was continued or else Defendant was found to be incompetent. Defendant unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the charge pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 16(f), under which a defendant who is found incompetent to stand trial is entitled to dismissal of the charge against him corresponding to one-half the maximum sentence the defendant could have received if convicted of the most serious crime with which he was charged. Defendant filed a petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, holding (1) under section 16(f), the basis for the calculation of the date of dismissal is the maximum sentence provided for in the statute, regardless of the court in which the charges are pending; but (2) in this case, dismissal of the charge before the computed date may nevertheless be appropriate in the interest of justice. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Calvaire" on Justia Law