Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor (OUI), possession with intent to distribute a class B substance, and possession with intent to distribute a class B substance in a school zone. The Appeals Court affirmed. On appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that certain testimony was improperly admitted. Defendant, however, did not object to or move to strike the testimony. Defendant appealed, arguing that improperly admitted testimony violated his confrontation rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, Defendant did not properly preserve his appellate rights; and (2) the error did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Grady" on Justia Law

Bank of America, N.A., in its capacity as a corporate trustee of several inter vivos trusts, applied for abatement of fiduciary income taxes paid by thirty-four inter vivos trusts. The Commissioner of Revenue denied the applications. The Bank appealed, arguing that, where the Bank was not domiciled in Massachusetts, these trusts did not qualify as “resident inter vivos trusts” and therefore were not subject to fiduciary income tax under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, 10. The Appellate Tax Board upheld the Commissioner’s decision, concluding that the Bank, in its capacity as trustee, was an inhabitant of the Commonwealth within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, 1(f) and 10(c). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not err in ruling that the Bank was subject to the fiduciary income tax imposed by section 10. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and declined to exercise its powers under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to admit evidence of the victim’s prior violence against Defendant’s girl friend; (2) even if the prosecutor’s comments in his closing argument were improper, they did not warrant reversal; and (3) the Court need not address Defendant’s argument that the Court should require the defendant’s state of mind to be considered in determining whether a murder is committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. View "Commonwealth v. Lopez" on Justia Law

At issue in these two consolidated appeals was an initiative petition that proposed to legalize, regulate, and tax marijuana and products that contain marijuana concentrate. In the first case (Hensley case) Plaintiffs claimed that the Attorney General erred in certifying the petition for inclusion on the ballot under article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution because it contained two unrelated subjects, because the Attorney General’s summary was not fair, and because the title and one-sentence statements were misleading. In the second case (Allen case) Plaintiffs challenged the title and one-sentence statements but on different grounds from those alleged by the Hensley plaintiffs. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered the Attorney General and Secretary of the Commonwealth to amend the title and statement, holding (1) the Attorney General did not err in certifying the petition for inclusion on the ballot because the petition contains only related subjects and the summary of the petition is fair; but (2) the petition’s title and the one-sentence statement describing the effect of a “yes” vote are misleading, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, 53. View "Hensley v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

On August 5, 2015, sixteen voters submitted Initiative Petition 15-12 to the Attorney General. The petition (1) sought to end the use of the Common Core State Standards in defining the educational curriculum of publicly funded elementary and secondary students in the Commonwealth, and (2) addressed the standardized testing process used in Massachusetts school districts. The Attorney General certified to the Secretary of the Commonwealth that the petition was in the proper form and met the requirements of article 48, The Initiative, II, section 3 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. On January 22, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to quash the certification of the petition and to enjoin the Secretary from including the substance of the proposed measure on the November, 2016 ballot. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the requested relief, holding that the Attorney General’s certification of Initiative Petition 15-12 did not comply with article 48 because it contained provisions that were not related or mutually dependent. View "Gray v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted as a youthful offender on a charge of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant moved in the juvenile court to dismiss the youthful offender indictment, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the return of an indictment for involuntary manslaughter where her conduct did not extend beyond words. The juvenile court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the grand jury were justified in returning an indictment of involuntary manslaughter against Defendant because such a conviction is punishable by imprisonment in state prison and involves the infliction of serious bodily harm. View "Commonwealth v. Carter" on Justia Law

Eugene McCain filed an initiative petition that sought to amend Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K to authorize the Gaming Commission to award one additional license for a slot machine parlor. The Attorney General certified the petition. Plaintiffs, ten registered voters and residents of Suffolk County, brought an action against the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, contending that the petition violated tw restrictions set forth in Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, which sets forth certain standards for initiative petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, holding that the petition did not violate Article 48’s restrictions and was therefore properly certified by the Attorney General. View "Bogertman v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of seven counts of criminal trespass. Before trial, Defendant requested a jury instruction on the defense of necessity, arguing that his conduct of being present in privately-owned buildings where he was the subject of no trespass orders, was justified as the only alternative for a homeless person to avoid exposure to the elements during periods of “extreme outdoor temperatures.” The judge denied the request. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the first six convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge erred in denying Defendant’s request for an instruction on the defense of necessity as to the six charges related to the incidents from February through April 2014; but (2) the judge did not err in denying a necessity defense instruction as to the seventh conviction stemming from Defendant’s June 2014 trespass. View "Commonwealth v. Magadini" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and abuse of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen years of age. The Appeals Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor made an improper closing argument that created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s argument. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the cumulative effect of various improper statements in the prosecutor’s argument created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Dirgo" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was pursued and stopped for traveling at a "speed greater than is reasonable," G. L. c. 90, 17.1 While the vehicle was still in motion, the defendant got out, looked uncertainly toward the officers, and grabbed the side of his waist area. The officers gave chase. When the defendant was apprehended, he was carrying a firearm. Before defendant’s trial for firearms offenses, a Boston judge allowed his motion to suppress the evidence. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Although operating at a "speed greater than is reasonable" provides a basis for a valid stop, an officer's suspicion that a violation has occurred must be supported by articulable facts sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person in the officer's position in forming that conclusion. The testifying officer provided nothing on the subject of speed beyond his conclusion that it was greater than reasonable. He did not estimate the vehicle's speed; compare its speed to other vehicles; provide any measurement from a radar gun or other device; or testify that the vehicle was traveling faster than the posted speed limit. Nor was there evidence regarding traffic on the road, its use at the time by pedestrians or others, or other safety considerations. The Commonwealth failed to prove that the stop was lawful. View "Commonwealth v. Teixeira-Furtado" on Justia Law