Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and declined to exercise its powers under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial, holding that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in (1) denying Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the theory of murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty; (2) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) admitting into evidence police accusations during the interrogations of Defendant; (4) admitting a statement of the codefendant under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule; (5) admitting recorded jailhouse telephone calls; and (6) instructing the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner and occupant of certain property. Defendant, the owner of a parcel of land abutting Plaintiff’s property, planned to build a residence on the property and applied for a building permit. The town building commissioner determined that the property had grandfathered status as a nonconforming lot. Plaintiff’s wife applied for a hearing. The zoning board of appeals of Westminster upheld the building commissioner’s determination. Plaintiff, as the personal representative of his wife’s estate, commenced this action claiming injury to his private easement right. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the construction proposed by Defendant would cause him any injury within the scope and concern of the Zoning Act. The appeals court reversed and concluded that Defendant’s property did not enjoy grandfathered status under the Westminster zoning by-law. The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review and affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiff’s injuries to his private easement rights were not within the scope and concern of the Zoning Act. View "Picard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Westminster" on Justia Law

Defendant was tried for first degree murder, home invasion, armed robbery, aggravated assault and battery (by means of a dangerous weapon), carrying an unlicensed firearm and trafficking in cocaine. The jury deadlocked on nine of the charges and found defendant not guilty on the tenth (cocaine). The trial judge declared a mistrial. Defendant was retried, and in the middle of jury deliberations in the second trial, an issue regarding a juror's compliance with the judge's instruction not to consult outside research came up. After an inquiry, the judge dismissed one juror and found that the others were not affected by exposure to the extraneous information. The jury continued to deliberate, and a week later found defendant guilty on four indictments charging first-degree murder, home invasion and armed robbery. The issues raised before the Supreme Court in this case centered on five questions reported by a Superior Court judge to the Appeals Court concerning the effect of an amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1428 (2015) (rule 3.5 [c]), regarding an attorney's ability to communicate, postverdict, with jurors who deliberated on, or were discharged from, the attorney's client's case. The Supreme Court held that Rule 3.5 (c) generally applied to attorneys in their representation of litigants in trials on and after July 1, 2015, but an attorney representing a party in a case that was tried to a jury and concluded before that date may contact jurors on that case pursuant to rule 3.5 (c) if the case was pending on appeal as of July 1, 2015, or the appeal period had not run as of that date. "If an attorney is entitled to initiate contact with jurors who were discharged prior to July 1, 2015, because the case at issue is pending on appeal or the appeal period has not yet run, the attorney is treated the same as an attorney contacting jurors discharged after July 1, 2015; the attorney is not required to seek prior court approval, but is required to adhere to the notice requirements set out in this opinion." View "Massachusetts v. Moore" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeal for the First Circuit certified two questions of state law to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The questions arose in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, and concerned the power and effect of an affidavit of an attorney, executed pursuant to G.L. c. 183 section 5B, in relation to a mortgage containing a defective certificate of acknowledgement. The first question centered on whether, pursuant to the statute, a recorded mortgage omitting the name of the mortgagor, a material defect of that mortgage. The second question centered on whether the recording of that allegedly defective mortgages provides constructive notice of the mortgage to a bona fide purchaser, either independently or in combination with the mortgage. The Massachusetts Supreme Court answered both questions "yes." View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Casey" on Justia Law

Ellen Duff-Kareores and Christopher Kareores were married in 1995 and divorced in 2004. The divorce judgment obligated Christopher to pay Ellen alimony every month. In 2004, Christopher resumed living with Ellen and the parties' children, and in 2012, the parties remarried. In 2013, Ellen filed a complaint for divorce. After a trial, the probate and family court judge concluded that the length of the parties’ marriage for purposes of calculating the durational limits of a general term alimony award to Ellen was eighteen years - the period from the date of the parties’ first marriage through the date that Christopher was served with the complaint in the second divorce. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment establishing the amount and duration of alimony, holding that the alimony award was based on an incorrect calculation of the length of the parties’ marriage, as the judge’s findings did not support a determination that the parties had an economic marital partnership within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, 48 during the period following the service on Christopher of the divorce complaint in the first marriage in 2003 until the parties began cohabiting in 2007. Remanded. View "Duff-Kareores v. Kareores" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree. The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Defendant’s application for further review to address the issue of the admissibility of two out-of-court statements made by Eric Snow, a purported joint venturer in the murders. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting Snow’s statements; and (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting a third party’s testimony that she heard Snow tell Defendant that Defendant had “made his bones.” View "Commonwealth v. Winquist" on Justia Law

Bryan Corporation (the company) commenced an action against Bryan Abrano (Bryan), who was a shareholder of the company, for breach of fiduciary duty. The company moved to disqualify Bryan’s attorneys, members of the firm of Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. (YSR) as Bryan’s counsel, alleging an impermissible conflict of interest because YSR had represented the company in an action eight months earlier. The superior court granted the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that YSR’s representation of Bryan violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, which prohibits the simultaneous representation of adverse parties. View "Bryan Corp. v. Abrano" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder with aggravated rape as the predicate felony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) the admission of cellular site location information evidence that was obtained without a search warrant did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (2) the search of Defendant’s cellular telephone was not supported by probable cause, and the search warrant was overly broad, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the judge erred in his treatment of a note written to the judge by a juror during trial, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Broom" on Justia Law

Probationer was placed on probation supervision after pleading guilty to one count of possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute. A notice of probation violation later issued alleging that Probationer violated the conditions of his probation by sexually assaulting a seventeen-year-old girl. At the probation violation hearing, Probationer sought to call the alleged victim as a witness. The judge concluded that it was inherently “inconsistent” to allow the alleged victim to be called to testify by Probationer after her hearsay statements were admitted in evidence when offered by the probation department. The judge then found that Probationer violated his probation by committing a new offense. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order revoking Probationer’s probation, holding that the judge erred by determining that where there is good cause to admit an alleged victim’s hearsay, a probationer may not call the witness to stand to challenge the accuracy and veracity of the hearsay account. View "Commonwealth v. Hartfield" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several firearms offenses, each of which had associated with it an armed criminal sentence enhancement charge under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10G, which provides sentence enhancements for designated firearms offenses where a defendant has previously been convicted of one or more “violent crimes” or “serious drug offenses,” or a combination of the two. Defendant was sentenced under section 10G(c) to a mandatory minimum prison term of from fifteen years to fifteen years and one day. Defendant appealed, arguing that his armed career criminal convictions could not stand because his five previous drug convictions were encompassed in a single prosecution and, as such, should be counted as a single predicate offense for purposes of section 10G, and therefore within the scope of level one under 10G(a), rather than level three under 10G(c). The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and vacated the convictions, holding that where the previous convictions of predicate offenses forming the basis of the sentence enhancement charge were all part of a single prosecution, they properly should be treated as a single predicate conviction for purposes of section 10G. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Resende" on Justia Law