Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regulations require that those deemed to be liable after a spill of hazardous materials within a specified radius of a public water supply undertake cleanup and monitoring to ensure the spill does not pose a danger to that water supply, 310 Code Mass. Regs. 40.0801, 40.0810, 40.0993(3)(a), 40.1030(2)(e). A 2007 modification exempts "oil" from some requirements when specific conditions are met, 310 Code Mass. Regs. 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a). Peterborough owns a now-vacant Athol property, within a protection area, where it operated a gasoline station for more than 10 years. In 1994, a release of leaded gasoline from a subterranean gasoline storage tank was detected in soil on the site. DEP required Peterborough to undertake supervised cleanup and monitoring activities. In 2008, after the oil exemption was established, Peterborough submitted a revised plan, stating that further remediation was not required because the entirety of the spill fell within the exemption's definition of "oil." DEP responded that the meaning of "oil" in the exemption does not include gasoline additives such as lead, but refers only to petroleum hydrocarbons naturally occurring in oils, so that a spill of leaded gasoline could not be completely excluded from further remediation. The trial court, on summary judgment, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, upheld the DEP interpretation of the regulation as reasonable. View "Peterborough Oil Co., LLC v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Defendant's six-month-old daughter, Jahanna, was rushed to the emergency room, unconscious and unresponsive. She was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. Brain scans showed retinal hemorrhages, subdural hematoma, and brain swelling, symptoms called "the triad" associated with shaken baby syndrome. Defendant, Jahanna's sole caretaker when she became unconscious, claimed that Jahanna accidentally fell from the couch where she was sitting and landed on the wooden floor. After Jahanna's physicians concluded that her injuries could not have been caused by an accidental fall from the couch, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery on a child causing substantial bodily injury (head injury), G. L. c. 265, 13J(b), and assault and battery on a child causing bodily injury (fractured vertebrae), G. L. c. 265, 13J(a), but was found not guilty on allegations concerning a fractured tibia and fractured ribs. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, noting the debate surrounding shaken baby syndrome and that the defense attorney did not retain a medical expert to offer opinion testimony or to assist him in cross-examining the Commonwealth's medical experts. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because, by not providing the jury with the other side of the debate, his attorney "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence." View "Commonwealth v. Millien" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney who worked for the defendant Boston law firm, 2004-2008, complained to her superiors and, later, to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, that she was being subjected to discriminatory treatment on the basis of her gender. After her 2007 demotion, on the advice of her attorney, the plaintiff searched the firm's document management system for items that might prove her assertions of discrimination. After these searches were made known to the firm's chairman, the plaintiff's employment was terminated "for cause." Her suit under G. L. 151B, 4 alleged gender discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, aiding and abetting discrimination, failure to investigate and remedy discrimination, and retaliation. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed dismissal of her claims, in part. Plaintiff presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that both her demotion and her termination were the result of unlawful discrimination, as well as evidence allowing an inference that both were the result of retaliation, so that summary judgment was inappropriate. An employee's accessing, copying, and forwarding of documents may, in certain limited circumstances, constitute "protected activity," but only where her actions are reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. View "Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C." on Justia Law

Stevenson moved to dismiss indictments charging aggravated rape of a child with force, G. L. 265, 22B; and five counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 14, G. L. 265, 13B.1, arguing that the Commonwealth offered only hearsay testimony from the investigating officer. The judge allowed the motion, reasoning that the Commonwealth's exclusive reliance on such testimony in this case constituted "extraordinary circumstances" and that "there was no good reason for [the complainant] not to testify." The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the case does not present an extraordinary circumstance warranting a variance from its general approval of indictments returned on the basis of hearsay testimony. Stevenson was provided with a detailed report of what the complainant told the officer, and of follow-up interviews with potential witnesses. A defendant has no right to require the Commonwealth to call witnesses to testify before the grand jury so that he might have transcripts of their testimony to use at trial. The grand jury heard all the information available to the police at the time; if the members had been uncertain about returning indictments based on the hearsay testimony regarding a 14-year-old case, they could have requested further evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted on a theory of felony-murder in the 2008 shooting death of a Brockton taxicab driver. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before admitting to the shooting during a recorded interview. The defendant subsequently requested that the police stop talking to him, but any error in continuing the interview was harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt, in light of other evidence. The court upheld the introduction of a witness's grand jury testimony after the witness claimed a loss of memory; the court’s failure to strike, upon request, another witness's testimony after learning that he had violated a sequestration order; and the court’s the failure to give a requested instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Denying relief under G. L. 278, 33E, the court reasoned that some of the defendant's statements to police were not made voluntarily and should not have been admitted, but that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Neves" on Justia Law

The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) filed a complaint for summary process in the Housing Court to establish its right to possession of the Rego house, which Fannie Mae purchased at a foreclosure sale. The Regos argued that the foreclosure sale conducted by GMAC, which held the mortgage, was void because GMAC's attorneys had not been authorized by a prior writing to undertake the actions set forth in G. L. 244, 14. They also asserted an equitable defense and counterclaims. The judge granted Fannie Mae summary judgment "as to possession only," and scheduled a bench trial on the counterclaims, but later dismissed the counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated. The foreclosure suffered no defect on the asserted ground that GMAC failed to provide such authorization to its attorneys, but the Housing Court has limited authorization to entertain counterclaims and an equitable defense to the foreclosure sale in the summary process action. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Rego" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. 269, 10(a); unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. 269, 10(h); carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. 269, 10(n); assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, G. L. 265, 15A; and two counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 265, 15B(b), stemming from a shooting at a 2008 Dorchester, Boston cookout. The jury separately found that defendant previously had been convicted of two violent crimes and was subject to enhanced penalties under the armed career criminal act, G. L. 269, 10G (ACCA). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, expressing "serious doubt" whether the jury impermissibly based the convictions of the greater and lesser included offenses on the same act, and concluding that the conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon must be vacated. the conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon. The court also vacated the ACCA conviction, finding its residual clause invalid, that assault and battery is not categorically a "violent crime," and assault and battery upon a public employee does not qualify as a "violent crime" under the force clause. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Beal" on Justia Law

B.V.G., a young woman with intellectual disabilities, has been in the sole custody of her father for many years. He was named her temporary guardian when B.V.G. reached age 18. Her maternal grandfather sought to intervene in B.V.G.'s father's permanent guardianship proceedings, asserting that his relationship with B.V.G. has been restricted by her father, that B.V.G. has indicated expressly her desire to communicate with him and has sought contact with him via social media, and that such a relationship is in B.V.G.'s best interests. Concluding that the grandfather lacked standing because he was not an "interested person" within the meaning of G.L. 190B, 5-306(c), a judge denied the motion. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial, on different grounds. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, first holding that the grandfather had standing. The statute is intended to provide a means by which an individual interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person can advocate on behalf of that person and the Massachusetts implementation of the Uniform Probate Code encourages a broad right of advocacy in favor of an incapacitated person's protected interest in a limited guardianship. Once a judge has concluded that a proposed intervener is an "interested person," nothing more is required to establish that person's entitlement to intervene. View "Guardianship of B.V.G." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in two shooting deaths on theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to introduction in evidence of weapons and related items that he lawfully owned and that were not alleged to have been used in the shooting; the denial of defendant’s request that the jury be instructed on voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of reasonable provocation; to the instruction that was given that the jury must "find" the defendant was intoxicated; and to portions of the prosecutor's closing argument in several respects. View "Commonwealth v. Valentin" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N, 3(d), the Department of Environmental Protection was required to promulgate regulations “establishing a desired level of declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources or categories of sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions” by a certain date. When the Department failed to take action by the statutory deadline, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus, arguing that the Department had failed to fulfill its statutory mandate under section 3(d). The superior court judge entered judgment in the Department’s favor, concluding that the Department substantially complied with the requirements of section 3(d). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the three regulatory initiatives cited by the Department fell short of complying with the requirements of section 3(d). Remanded. View "Kain v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law