Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted as a youthful offender on a charge of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant moved in the juvenile court to dismiss the youthful offender indictment, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the return of an indictment for involuntary manslaughter where her conduct did not extend beyond words. The juvenile court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the grand jury were justified in returning an indictment of involuntary manslaughter against Defendant because such a conviction is punishable by imprisonment in state prison and involves the infliction of serious bodily harm. View "Commonwealth v. Carter" on Justia Law

Eugene McCain filed an initiative petition that sought to amend Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K to authorize the Gaming Commission to award one additional license for a slot machine parlor. The Attorney General certified the petition. Plaintiffs, ten registered voters and residents of Suffolk County, brought an action against the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, contending that the petition violated tw restrictions set forth in Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, which sets forth certain standards for initiative petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, holding that the petition did not violate Article 48’s restrictions and was therefore properly certified by the Attorney General. View "Bogertman v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of seven counts of criminal trespass. Before trial, Defendant requested a jury instruction on the defense of necessity, arguing that his conduct of being present in privately-owned buildings where he was the subject of no trespass orders, was justified as the only alternative for a homeless person to avoid exposure to the elements during periods of “extreme outdoor temperatures.” The judge denied the request. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the first six convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge erred in denying Defendant’s request for an instruction on the defense of necessity as to the six charges related to the incidents from February through April 2014; but (2) the judge did not err in denying a necessity defense instruction as to the seventh conviction stemming from Defendant’s June 2014 trespass. View "Commonwealth v. Magadini" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and abuse of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen years of age. The Appeals Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor made an improper closing argument that created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s argument. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the cumulative effect of various improper statements in the prosecutor’s argument created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Dirgo" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was pursued and stopped for traveling at a "speed greater than is reasonable," G. L. c. 90, 17.1 While the vehicle was still in motion, the defendant got out, looked uncertainly toward the officers, and grabbed the side of his waist area. The officers gave chase. When the defendant was apprehended, he was carrying a firearm. Before defendant’s trial for firearms offenses, a Boston judge allowed his motion to suppress the evidence. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Although operating at a "speed greater than is reasonable" provides a basis for a valid stop, an officer's suspicion that a violation has occurred must be supported by articulable facts sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person in the officer's position in forming that conclusion. The testifying officer provided nothing on the subject of speed beyond his conclusion that it was greater than reasonable. He did not estimate the vehicle's speed; compare its speed to other vehicles; provide any measurement from a radar gun or other device; or testify that the vehicle was traveling faster than the posted speed limit. Nor was there evidence regarding traffic on the road, its use at the time by pedestrians or others, or other safety considerations. The Commonwealth failed to prove that the stop was lawful. View "Commonwealth v. Teixeira-Furtado" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and declined to exercise its powers under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial, holding that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in (1) denying Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the theory of murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty; (2) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) admitting into evidence police accusations during the interrogations of Defendant; (4) admitting a statement of the codefendant under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule; (5) admitting recorded jailhouse telephone calls; and (6) instructing the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner and occupant of certain property. Defendant, the owner of a parcel of land abutting Plaintiff’s property, planned to build a residence on the property and applied for a building permit. The town building commissioner determined that the property had grandfathered status as a nonconforming lot. Plaintiff’s wife applied for a hearing. The zoning board of appeals of Westminster upheld the building commissioner’s determination. Plaintiff, as the personal representative of his wife’s estate, commenced this action claiming injury to his private easement right. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the construction proposed by Defendant would cause him any injury within the scope and concern of the Zoning Act. The appeals court reversed and concluded that Defendant’s property did not enjoy grandfathered status under the Westminster zoning by-law. The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review and affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiff’s injuries to his private easement rights were not within the scope and concern of the Zoning Act. View "Picard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Westminster" on Justia Law

Defendant was tried for first degree murder, home invasion, armed robbery, aggravated assault and battery (by means of a dangerous weapon), carrying an unlicensed firearm and trafficking in cocaine. The jury deadlocked on nine of the charges and found defendant not guilty on the tenth (cocaine). The trial judge declared a mistrial. Defendant was retried, and in the middle of jury deliberations in the second trial, an issue regarding a juror's compliance with the judge's instruction not to consult outside research came up. After an inquiry, the judge dismissed one juror and found that the others were not affected by exposure to the extraneous information. The jury continued to deliberate, and a week later found defendant guilty on four indictments charging first-degree murder, home invasion and armed robbery. The issues raised before the Supreme Court in this case centered on five questions reported by a Superior Court judge to the Appeals Court concerning the effect of an amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1428 (2015) (rule 3.5 [c]), regarding an attorney's ability to communicate, postverdict, with jurors who deliberated on, or were discharged from, the attorney's client's case. The Supreme Court held that Rule 3.5 (c) generally applied to attorneys in their representation of litigants in trials on and after July 1, 2015, but an attorney representing a party in a case that was tried to a jury and concluded before that date may contact jurors on that case pursuant to rule 3.5 (c) if the case was pending on appeal as of July 1, 2015, or the appeal period had not run as of that date. "If an attorney is entitled to initiate contact with jurors who were discharged prior to July 1, 2015, because the case at issue is pending on appeal or the appeal period has not yet run, the attorney is treated the same as an attorney contacting jurors discharged after July 1, 2015; the attorney is not required to seek prior court approval, but is required to adhere to the notice requirements set out in this opinion." View "Massachusetts v. Moore" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeal for the First Circuit certified two questions of state law to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The questions arose in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, and concerned the power and effect of an affidavit of an attorney, executed pursuant to G.L. c. 183 section 5B, in relation to a mortgage containing a defective certificate of acknowledgement. The first question centered on whether, pursuant to the statute, a recorded mortgage omitting the name of the mortgagor, a material defect of that mortgage. The second question centered on whether the recording of that allegedly defective mortgages provides constructive notice of the mortgage to a bona fide purchaser, either independently or in combination with the mortgage. The Massachusetts Supreme Court answered both questions "yes." View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Casey" on Justia Law

Ellen Duff-Kareores and Christopher Kareores were married in 1995 and divorced in 2004. The divorce judgment obligated Christopher to pay Ellen alimony every month. In 2004, Christopher resumed living with Ellen and the parties' children, and in 2012, the parties remarried. In 2013, Ellen filed a complaint for divorce. After a trial, the probate and family court judge concluded that the length of the parties’ marriage for purposes of calculating the durational limits of a general term alimony award to Ellen was eighteen years - the period from the date of the parties’ first marriage through the date that Christopher was served with the complaint in the second divorce. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment establishing the amount and duration of alimony, holding that the alimony award was based on an incorrect calculation of the length of the parties’ marriage, as the judge’s findings did not support a determination that the parties had an economic marital partnership within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, 48 during the period following the service on Christopher of the divorce complaint in the first marriage in 2003 until the parties began cohabiting in 2007. Remanded. View "Duff-Kareores v. Kareores" on Justia Law