Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree. The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Defendant’s application for further review to address the issue of the admissibility of two out-of-court statements made by Eric Snow, a purported joint venturer in the murders. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting Snow’s statements; and (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting a third party’s testimony that she heard Snow tell Defendant that Defendant had “made his bones.” View "Commonwealth v. Winquist" on Justia Law

Bryan Corporation (the company) commenced an action against Bryan Abrano (Bryan), who was a shareholder of the company, for breach of fiduciary duty. The company moved to disqualify Bryan’s attorneys, members of the firm of Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. (YSR) as Bryan’s counsel, alleging an impermissible conflict of interest because YSR had represented the company in an action eight months earlier. The superior court granted the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that YSR’s representation of Bryan violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, which prohibits the simultaneous representation of adverse parties. View "Bryan Corp. v. Abrano" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder with aggravated rape as the predicate felony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) the admission of cellular site location information evidence that was obtained without a search warrant did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (2) the search of Defendant’s cellular telephone was not supported by probable cause, and the search warrant was overly broad, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the judge erred in his treatment of a note written to the judge by a juror during trial, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Broom" on Justia Law

Probationer was placed on probation supervision after pleading guilty to one count of possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute. A notice of probation violation later issued alleging that Probationer violated the conditions of his probation by sexually assaulting a seventeen-year-old girl. At the probation violation hearing, Probationer sought to call the alleged victim as a witness. The judge concluded that it was inherently “inconsistent” to allow the alleged victim to be called to testify by Probationer after her hearsay statements were admitted in evidence when offered by the probation department. The judge then found that Probationer violated his probation by committing a new offense. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order revoking Probationer’s probation, holding that the judge erred by determining that where there is good cause to admit an alleged victim’s hearsay, a probationer may not call the witness to stand to challenge the accuracy and veracity of the hearsay account. View "Commonwealth v. Hartfield" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several firearms offenses, each of which had associated with it an armed criminal sentence enhancement charge under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10G, which provides sentence enhancements for designated firearms offenses where a defendant has previously been convicted of one or more “violent crimes” or “serious drug offenses,” or a combination of the two. Defendant was sentenced under section 10G(c) to a mandatory minimum prison term of from fifteen years to fifteen years and one day. Defendant appealed, arguing that his armed career criminal convictions could not stand because his five previous drug convictions were encompassed in a single prosecution and, as such, should be counted as a single predicate offense for purposes of section 10G, and therefore within the scope of level one under 10G(a), rather than level three under 10G(c). The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and vacated the convictions, holding that where the previous convictions of predicate offenses forming the basis of the sentence enhancement charge were all part of a single prosecution, they properly should be treated as a single predicate conviction for purposes of section 10G. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Resende" on Justia Law

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regulations require that those deemed to be liable after a spill of hazardous materials within a specified radius of a public water supply undertake cleanup and monitoring to ensure the spill does not pose a danger to that water supply, 310 Code Mass. Regs. 40.0801, 40.0810, 40.0993(3)(a), 40.1030(2)(e). A 2007 modification exempts "oil" from some requirements when specific conditions are met, 310 Code Mass. Regs. 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a). Peterborough owns a now-vacant Athol property, within a protection area, where it operated a gasoline station for more than 10 years. In 1994, a release of leaded gasoline from a subterranean gasoline storage tank was detected in soil on the site. DEP required Peterborough to undertake supervised cleanup and monitoring activities. In 2008, after the oil exemption was established, Peterborough submitted a revised plan, stating that further remediation was not required because the entirety of the spill fell within the exemption's definition of "oil." DEP responded that the meaning of "oil" in the exemption does not include gasoline additives such as lead, but refers only to petroleum hydrocarbons naturally occurring in oils, so that a spill of leaded gasoline could not be completely excluded from further remediation. The trial court, on summary judgment, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, upheld the DEP interpretation of the regulation as reasonable. View "Peterborough Oil Co., LLC v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Defendant's six-month-old daughter, Jahanna, was rushed to the emergency room, unconscious and unresponsive. She was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. Brain scans showed retinal hemorrhages, subdural hematoma, and brain swelling, symptoms called "the triad" associated with shaken baby syndrome. Defendant, Jahanna's sole caretaker when she became unconscious, claimed that Jahanna accidentally fell from the couch where she was sitting and landed on the wooden floor. After Jahanna's physicians concluded that her injuries could not have been caused by an accidental fall from the couch, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery on a child causing substantial bodily injury (head injury), G. L. c. 265, 13J(b), and assault and battery on a child causing bodily injury (fractured vertebrae), G. L. c. 265, 13J(a), but was found not guilty on allegations concerning a fractured tibia and fractured ribs. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, noting the debate surrounding shaken baby syndrome and that the defense attorney did not retain a medical expert to offer opinion testimony or to assist him in cross-examining the Commonwealth's medical experts. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because, by not providing the jury with the other side of the debate, his attorney "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence." View "Commonwealth v. Millien" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney who worked for the defendant Boston law firm, 2004-2008, complained to her superiors and, later, to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, that she was being subjected to discriminatory treatment on the basis of her gender. After her 2007 demotion, on the advice of her attorney, the plaintiff searched the firm's document management system for items that might prove her assertions of discrimination. After these searches were made known to the firm's chairman, the plaintiff's employment was terminated "for cause." Her suit under G. L. 151B, 4 alleged gender discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, aiding and abetting discrimination, failure to investigate and remedy discrimination, and retaliation. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed dismissal of her claims, in part. Plaintiff presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that both her demotion and her termination were the result of unlawful discrimination, as well as evidence allowing an inference that both were the result of retaliation, so that summary judgment was inappropriate. An employee's accessing, copying, and forwarding of documents may, in certain limited circumstances, constitute "protected activity," but only where her actions are reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. View "Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C." on Justia Law

Stevenson moved to dismiss indictments charging aggravated rape of a child with force, G. L. 265, 22B; and five counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 14, G. L. 265, 13B.1, arguing that the Commonwealth offered only hearsay testimony from the investigating officer. The judge allowed the motion, reasoning that the Commonwealth's exclusive reliance on such testimony in this case constituted "extraordinary circumstances" and that "there was no good reason for [the complainant] not to testify." The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the case does not present an extraordinary circumstance warranting a variance from its general approval of indictments returned on the basis of hearsay testimony. Stevenson was provided with a detailed report of what the complainant told the officer, and of follow-up interviews with potential witnesses. A defendant has no right to require the Commonwealth to call witnesses to testify before the grand jury so that he might have transcripts of their testimony to use at trial. The grand jury heard all the information available to the police at the time; if the members had been uncertain about returning indictments based on the hearsay testimony regarding a 14-year-old case, they could have requested further evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted on a theory of felony-murder in the 2008 shooting death of a Brockton taxicab driver. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before admitting to the shooting during a recorded interview. The defendant subsequently requested that the police stop talking to him, but any error in continuing the interview was harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt, in light of other evidence. The court upheld the introduction of a witness's grand jury testimony after the witness claimed a loss of memory; the court’s failure to strike, upon request, another witness's testimony after learning that he had violated a sequestration order; and the court’s the failure to give a requested instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Denying relief under G. L. 278, 33E, the court reasoned that some of the defendant's statements to police were not made voluntarily and should not have been admitted, but that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Neves" on Justia Law