Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) filed a complaint for summary process in the Housing Court to establish its right to possession of the Rego house, which Fannie Mae purchased at a foreclosure sale. The Regos argued that the foreclosure sale conducted by GMAC, which held the mortgage, was void because GMAC's attorneys had not been authorized by a prior writing to undertake the actions set forth in G. L. 244, 14. They also asserted an equitable defense and counterclaims. The judge granted Fannie Mae summary judgment "as to possession only," and scheduled a bench trial on the counterclaims, but later dismissed the counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated. The foreclosure suffered no defect on the asserted ground that GMAC failed to provide such authorization to its attorneys, but the Housing Court has limited authorization to entertain counterclaims and an equitable defense to the foreclosure sale in the summary process action. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Rego" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. 269, 10(a); unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. 269, 10(h); carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. 269, 10(n); assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, G. L. 265, 15A; and two counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 265, 15B(b), stemming from a shooting at a 2008 Dorchester, Boston cookout. The jury separately found that defendant previously had been convicted of two violent crimes and was subject to enhanced penalties under the armed career criminal act, G. L. 269, 10G (ACCA). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, expressing "serious doubt" whether the jury impermissibly based the convictions of the greater and lesser included offenses on the same act, and concluding that the conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon must be vacated. the conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon. The court also vacated the ACCA conviction, finding its residual clause invalid, that assault and battery is not categorically a "violent crime," and assault and battery upon a public employee does not qualify as a "violent crime" under the force clause. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Beal" on Justia Law

B.V.G., a young woman with intellectual disabilities, has been in the sole custody of her father for many years. He was named her temporary guardian when B.V.G. reached age 18. Her maternal grandfather sought to intervene in B.V.G.'s father's permanent guardianship proceedings, asserting that his relationship with B.V.G. has been restricted by her father, that B.V.G. has indicated expressly her desire to communicate with him and has sought contact with him via social media, and that such a relationship is in B.V.G.'s best interests. Concluding that the grandfather lacked standing because he was not an "interested person" within the meaning of G.L. 190B, 5-306(c), a judge denied the motion. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial, on different grounds. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, first holding that the grandfather had standing. The statute is intended to provide a means by which an individual interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person can advocate on behalf of that person and the Massachusetts implementation of the Uniform Probate Code encourages a broad right of advocacy in favor of an incapacitated person's protected interest in a limited guardianship. Once a judge has concluded that a proposed intervener is an "interested person," nothing more is required to establish that person's entitlement to intervene. View "Guardianship of B.V.G." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in two shooting deaths on theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to introduction in evidence of weapons and related items that he lawfully owned and that were not alleged to have been used in the shooting; the denial of defendant’s request that the jury be instructed on voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of reasonable provocation; to the instruction that was given that the jury must "find" the defendant was intoxicated; and to portions of the prosecutor's closing argument in several respects. View "Commonwealth v. Valentin" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N, 3(d), the Department of Environmental Protection was required to promulgate regulations “establishing a desired level of declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources or categories of sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions” by a certain date. When the Department failed to take action by the statutory deadline, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus, arguing that the Department had failed to fulfill its statutory mandate under section 3(d). The superior court judge entered judgment in the Department’s favor, concluding that the Department substantially complied with the requirements of section 3(d). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the three regulatory initiatives cited by the Department fell short of complying with the requirements of section 3(d). Remanded. View "Kain v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants Branden Mattier and Domunique Grice were convicted on indictments charging one count each of conspiracy to commit larceny and attempted larceny. Mattier was also convicted on an indictment charging one count of identity fraud. The convictions arose from Defendants’ attempt to defraud The One Fund Boston by claiming that a long-deceased aunt had been injured in the 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Mattier’s identity fraud conviction failed as a matter of law, but Defendants’ remaining convictions were based on sufficient legally obtained evidence; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of Mattier’s warrantless arrest for the identity fraud and attempted larceny charges; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to strike for cause jurors who donated to One Fund; and (4) the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments did not require reversal. View "Commonwealth v. Mattier" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree and other offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for relief from unlawful restraint pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a). The superior court denied the motion. Appellant sought direct appellate review. At issue before the Supreme Judicial Court was whether, on direct appeal, the Court properly applied Commonwealth v. Zanetti to determine that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Appellant’s motion for relief from unlawful restraint, holding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict Appellant, and the application of Zanetti to Appellant’s case did not violate ex post facto principles or Appellant's due process rights. View "Commonwealth v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Justice Ainooson commenced an action in the superior court against several individual defendants. After an extension of time to effect service was allowed, Ainooson moved to waive service or to deem the defendants served. The judge allowed the motion but then vacated her allowance after the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. A different judge then ordered Ainooson to make service by regular mail at his own expense with no further extensions allowed. Ainooson filed a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition challenging the rulings. Before the single justice ruled on the petition, the superior court dismissed the complaint. The single justice denied extraordinary relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying extraordinary relief. View "Ainooson v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on thirty indictments, ten each charging armed robbery while masked, home invasion, and kidnapping. The Appeals Court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding eyewitness identification in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriguez. Defendant, however, neither requested the instruction nor objected to its admission. In the alternative, Defendant claimed that counsel’s failure to request a Rodriguez instruction was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) in the absence of a request, Defendant may not attribute the omission of a Rodriguez eyewitness identification instruction to judicial error and, consequently, Defendant was not entitled to review on that ground; and (2) counsel’s failure to request a Rodriguez instruction in this case was error, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Navarro" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a parent whose minor child is the subject of a guardianship petition has a right to counsel when and if the parent petitions to have the guardian removed or to have the terms of the guardianship modified. Plaintiffs, the mothers of minor children for whom guardians were appointed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 5-206, commenced this action challenging a written policy of the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department concerning the appointment of counsel in cases involving guardianships of minors under chapter 190B. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that by limiting the right to counsel to proceedings for the initial appointment of guardians, the Chief Justice’s policy contravened the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Guardianship of V.V. and violated their due process rights. The Supreme Judicial Court held that an indigent parent who seeks to remove a guardian for a minor child and to regain custody of the child or seeks to modify the terms of a guardianship by substantially changing the terms of visitation with a minor child has a due process right to counsel and to be so informed, provided that the parent presents a meritorious claim for removal or modification. View "L.B. v. Chief Justice of Probate & Family Court Dep’t" on Justia Law