Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on three indictments charging conspiracy, attempted larceny, and identity fraud. Defendant appealed his convictions and filed a motion for stay of the execution of his sentence pending appeal. The trial judge denied the motion. Defendant appealed and filed a motion for stay of the execution of the sentence in the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Defendant’s application for direct appellate review of his appeal. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for stay in the Supreme Judicial Court. A single justice denied the motion. Defendant appealed and filed a motion for an expedited ruling. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not err in finding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for stay. View "Commonwealth v. Mattier" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case was killed in a one-car accident when he drove in an intoxicated state after leaving a restaurant owned by Defendants. Plaintiff filed a complaint under the Commonwealth’s wrongful death statute, alleging that Defendants exhibited negligent, willful, wanton, and reckless conduct by selling and serving alcoholic beverages to the decedent prior to the decedent’s fatal motor vehicle accident and that such conduct was the proximate cause of the decedent’s death. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 60J (commonly referred to as the dram shop act) stating that it was based on information and belief gathered from witness statements, a police report, and a medical toxicology report. Defendants moved to strike the affidavit and for partial summary judgment of Plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that a section 60J affidavit must be based upon personal knowledge. The superior court denied Defendants’ motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a section 60J affidavit based on information and belief may be sufficient to satisfy the procedural requirements of the statute; and (2) in this case, the affidavit satisfied the requirements of section 60J. View "Bayless v. TTS Trio Corp." on Justia Law

Landlord brought a summary process action against Tenant for possession of the premises. Tenant counterclaimed, alleging violations of the security deposit statute and other causes of action. The Housing Court found in favor of Landlord on all but the security deposit claim, ruling that Tenant could properly assert a violation of the security deposit statute as a counterclaim for damages but that a counterclaim on this basis was not a defense to Landlord’s claim for possession. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Housing Court judgment granting possession to Landlord, holding that a counterclaim or defense on the basis of a violation of the security deposit statute may be asserted as a defense to a landlord’s possession in a summary process action under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 239, 1A. View "Meikle v. Nurse" on Justia Law

DiMasi, a former Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, resigned from his position in 2009 and began receiving retirement benefits from the State Board of Retirement (board). A federal grand jury subsequently indicted DiMasi for violating several federal laws while in office. Consequently, the board voted to suspend DiMasi’s retirement allowance. DiMasi sought judicial review, and the municipal court entered summary judgment in favor of DiMasi. The board appealed. Thereafter, a federal jury found DiMasi guilty of seven counts of the superseding indictment. On September 9, 2011, DiMasi was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The board again voted to suspend payment of DiMasi’s retirement allowance. A hearing officer concluded that DiMasi’s convictions became “final” for purposes of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(4) when he was sentenced, and therefore, DiMasi forfeited his retirement allowance as of September 9, 2011. On January 14, 2014, all of DiMasi’s direct appeals were exhausted. The municipal court agreed with the board that the term “final” meant the date when DiMasi was sentenced and not the date when all of his direct appeals were exhausted. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that in the context of pension forfeiture, a “final conviction” occurs when an individual is sentenced and not at the conclusion of the appellate process. View "DiMasi v. State Bd. of Retirement" on Justia Law

In the late 1990s, Robert James, acting on behalf of the Robert and Ardis James Foundation, agreed to advance more than $650,000 to Daniel Meyers to purchase shares of stock in a fledgling, privately held company that Meyers had cofounded in exchange for a portion of the proceeds of an eventual sale of those shares. The agreement did not discuss the timing of sale. Beginning in 2004, the foundation sought to bring the agreements to a close, but Meyers did not comply. In 2006, the foundation filed a complaint against Meyers seeking specific performance and damages. The superior court concluded that Meyers had committed a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and awarded damages based on a date of breach of July 31, 2006. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found that Meyers committed a breach of the implied covenant and did not err in setting the date of breach at July 31, 2006. View "Robert & Ardis James Found. v. Meyers" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and multiple firearms-related offenses. Defendant appealed, raising several claims. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the second degree and affirmed Defendant’s remaining convictions, holding (1) portions of the jury instructions concerning excessive force manslaughter were erroneous because they suggested that if Defendant used excessive force, the killing was murder and not manslaughter, and these errors were prejudicial; and (2) Defendant’s remaining arguments were without merit. Remanded for a new trial on the murder in the second degree charge. View "Commonwealth v. Allen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in fourteen grams or more of cocaine. Defendant sought further review, arguing that the search of his genital area during a patfrisk for weapons was an unlawful strip search, and therefore, the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that the search met the criteria for a strip search and did not satisfy the probable cause requirement articulated in Commonwealth v. Morales. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Amado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a 1878 partition of Native American common land in the town of Gay Head, which is located on the western coast of Martha’s Vineyard and is connected to the rest of the island by an isthmus. Two commissioners appointed by the probate court partitioned the common land into hundreds of lots to be held in severalty by members of the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head. The commissioners, however, did not include express easements providing rights of access, leaving the lots landlocked. In 1997, Plaintiffs, owners of several lots created by the partition, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking easements by necessity over the lots of Defendants. Ultimately, a Land Court judge concluded that there was sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed intent of the commissioners to create access easements, and therefore, easements by necessity did not exist. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that Defendants presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the commissioners intended to include rights of access. View "Kitras v. Town of Aquinnah" on Justia Law

Defendants, the principals and owners of Burbank Apartments (Burbank), decided not to renew Burbank’s project-based Section 8 housing assistance payments contract (HAP) with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development when its mortgage subsidy contract expired. Instead of the project-based subsidies, Defendants chose to accept from its tenants Section 8 enhanced vouchers. Plaintiffs, current and potential Burbank tenants, filed a complaint alleging subsidy discrimination in violation of Massachusetts antidiscrimination law and the Federal Fair Housing Act. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants’ decision not to renew the HAP was discriminatory based on both disparate treatment and disparate impact on members of otherwise protected classes of citizens. The motion judge granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss both counts for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) even where the property owner has acted in accord with statute, regulation, and contract, a disparate impact claim can be brought under the fair housing statutes, subject to “rigorous pleading requirements”; but (2) Plaintiffs in this case failed sufficiently to plead a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. View "Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on counts of an indictment charging two sentencing enhancements - one as a second-time offender and one under the Massachusetts armed career criminal (ACC) statute. Both enhancements were premised on an underlying conviction of unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun. Defendant was sentenced to a term of fifteen to seventeen years on the ACC enhancement and was not sentenced on the second offender enhancement. The Appeals Court reversed the ACC conviction and remanded for resentencing. On remand, Defendant sought to be sentenced under the enhancement statute, and the Commonwealth sought the imposition of a longer sentence under the underlying crime. The Commonwealth then entered a nolle prosequi of the second offender enhancement charge, and the judge sentenced Defendant to a term of from twelve to fifteen years on the underlying conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing that the judge erred in allowing the Commonwealth to avail itself of the nolle prosequi procedure after the initial sentencing had already occurred. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Commonwealth was unable to exercise its nolle prosequi authority as to the second offender enhancement because that conviction was no longer available, and therefore, the resentencing judge was left to craft a sentence based only the only remaining charge - the underlying crime. View "Commonwealth v. Boyd" on Justia Law