Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and discerned no basis to exercise is authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s three motions to suppress evidence stemming from the search of Defendant's clothing and shoes that were stored in a secured area while he was civilly committed for drug treatment; (2) there was no error in the presentation of DNA evidence; (3) the trial judge’s failure to give a diminished capacity instruction did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in making a juror bias determination. View "Commonwealth v. Cassino" on Justia Law

In Commonwealth v. Sylvain, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed its decision in Commonwealth v. Clarke that defense counsel’s duty to provide noncitizen defendants with accurate advice regarding the deportation consequences of pleading guilty was to be applied retroactively on collateral review. The Court set the date of retroactivity at the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a class A substance. Defendant’s guilty plea was entered after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) but before the effective date of the IIRIRA. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging that his attorney provided ineffective assistance for failing to adequately advise him as to the likely deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The motion judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the denial, holding (1) the retroactivity affirmed in the Sylvain case should extend back to the effective date of AEDPA for certain convictions; and (2) because the motion judge in this case did not explain on what ground he based his denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, the matter is remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Mercado" on Justia Law

In Commonwealth v. Sylvain, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed its decision in Commonwealth v. Clarke that defense counsel’s duty to provide noncitizen defendants with accurate advice regarding the deportation consequences of pleading guilty was to be applied retroactively on collateral review. The Court set the date of retroactivity at the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a class A substance. Defendant’s guilty plea was entered after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) but before the effective date of the IIRIRA. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging that his attorney provided ineffective assistance for failing to adequately advise him as to the likely deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The motion judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the denial, holding (1) the retroactivity affirmed in the Sylvain case should extend back to the effective date of AEDPA for certain convictions; and (2) because the motion judge in this case did not explain on what ground he based his denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, the matter is remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Mercado" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of twenty-one counts of unauthorized access to a computer system. That same day Appellant filed an application for voluntary superannuation retirement. The public employment retirement administration commission concluded that Appellant's criminal convictions related to his office or position and, therefore, Appellant was not entitled to receive a retirement allowance under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(4). On review, a judge in the district court concluded that Appellant's convictions did not trigger forfeiture under section 15(4). The superior court affirmed. The Appeals Court vacated the judgment, concluding that Appellant's convictions were directly linked to his office or position, and remanded for consideration of Appellant's alternative argument that forfeiture of his pension constituted an excessive fine. On remand, the district court concluded that the fine in this case - forfeiture of Appellant's lifetime retirement allowance - was excessive and violated the Eighth Amendment. A superior court judge reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the mandatory forfeiture of a public employee’s retirement allowance upon conviction of a crime “involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position” is a “fine” under the Eighth Amendment; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the mandatory forfeiture of Appellant's public employee’s retirement allowance was “excessive.” View "Pub. Employee Ret. Admin. Comm’n v. Bettencourt" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of forcible rape of a child and other offenses. Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on appeal. Petitioner later filed a motion for a new trial, which a motion judge denied. Petitioner later filed a motion for an extension of time to file a late notice of appeal, but the motion was misplaced in the clerk’s office. When it was found, the motion judge granted the motion and gave Petitioner forty-five days to file his notice of appeal, but Petitioner did not file a new notice of appeal. When Petitioner filed a motion to file his brief late, he was informed that he had no matter pending in the Appeals Court. Petitioner then filed a petition for relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 or for relief in the nature of mandamus. A single justice of the Appeals Court denied all relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice was not obligated to grant extraordinary relief. View "Cooper v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, based on the predicate felony of aggravated rape, and aggravated rape. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction of murder of the first degree and ordered dismissal of the aggravated rape conviction as duplicative, holding (1) there was no error in the denial of Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress two statements Defendant made to police; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony from the victim’s daughter; (4) there was no error in the admission into evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts; (5) the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments; (6) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to reduce the verdicts; and (7) the conviction on the indictment alleging aggravated rape is duplicative of the conviction of felony-murder and must be dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Mazariego" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, based on the predicate felony of aggravated rape, and aggravated rape. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction of murder of the first degree and ordered dismissal of the aggravated rape conviction as duplicative, holding (1) there was no error in the denial of Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress two statements Defendant made to police; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony from the victim’s daughter; (4) there was no error in the admission into evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts; (5) the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments; (6) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to reduce the verdicts; and (7) the conviction on the indictment alleging aggravated rape is duplicative of the conviction of felony-murder and must be dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Mazariego" on Justia Law

Stansfield sought a harassment prevention order against Van Liew alleging four incidents of harassment. The alleged harassment concerned a local municipal election and general issues of local public concern. The District Court judge denied the request. Van Liew then filed this action against Stansfield in the district court, asserting claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Stansfield filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 238, 59H. The District Court judge allowed the special motion after a hearing. Van Liew appealed to the Appellate Division of the District Court Department. The Appellate Division vacated the order of dismissal, concluding that Van Liew had presented sufficient evidence to show that Stansfield lacked any reasonable factual support for her petitioning activity. Stansfield filed an appeal in the Appeals Court from the decision and order of the Appellate Division. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Stansfield’s appeal was properly filed in the Appeals Court; and (2) with one possible exception, the speech at issue in this case did not qualify as either “fighting words” or “true threats,” and therefore, no civil harassment prevention order should have issued. View "Van Liew v. Stansfield" on Justia Law

The Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc. filed suit against Carolyn and Randy Britton, who owned a unit in the Drummer Boy Condomininum II, seeking to recover unpaid common expenses and to enforce a priority lien. When the Brittons continued to withhold payment of their monthly common expenses, the Association commenced a second, and then a third action, to recover the unpaid common expenses that had accrued since the filing of its first action. The actions were subsequently consolidated. The trial judge entered judgment in favor of the Association, concluding (1) the Association was the proper entity to seek recovery of unpaid common expenses; and (2) the Association’s lien priority over the first mortgagee for common expenses was limited to the one six-month period preceding the commencement of the first of the consolidated actions. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in all respects. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding (1) the Association had standing to bring the present action; and (2) the Association may file successive legal actions against the Brittons under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183A, 6 to establish and enforce multiple contemporaneous liens on their condominium unit for the recoupment of successive periods of unpaid common expenses. View "Drummer Boy Homes Ass’n v. Britton" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with shoplifting by concealing merchandise and unlawfully carrying a firearm. Defendants moved to suppress the firearm discovered during the inventory search of the vehicle that they used to travel to the department store. The vehicle was lawfully parked in the department store lot, and, after Defendants were arrested for shoplifting, the driver of the vehicle told the police that the registered owner of the vehicle could pick up the vehicle as an alternative to having it towed. The motion judge allowed Defendants’ motion to suppress, concluding that the seizure of the vehicle that preceded the inventory search was not reasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that it was unreasonable and, thus, unconstitutional to impound the vehicle and conduct an inventory search where the driver offered the police an alternative to impoundment that was lawful and practical under the circumstances. View "Commonwealth v. Oliveira" on Justia Law