Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A district court judge ordered Petitioner committed to the Women’s Addiction Treatment Center pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 35, a statute that authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a person, for care and treatment, where there is a likelihood of serious harm that could result from the person’s alcoholism or substance abuse. The Appellate Division dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking to vacate the order. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full Court. The Supreme Judicial court dismissed the petition for relief as moot, holding (1) because Petitioner was no longer committed to the facility, her challenge to the order of commitment was rendered moot; but (2) because this case raised important issues concerning the operation of section 35 as well as the Uniform Trial Court Rules for Civil Commitment Proceedings for Alcohol and Substance Abuse scheduled to go into effect on February 1, 2016, the Court decided the case and concluded that the evidence in this case did not appear to satisfy the requirements of section 35 for an order of commitment. View "In re G.P." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on two indictments charging murder in the first degree and one indictment charging unlawful carrying of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial. The superior court judge denied Defendant’s motion, and, in 2004, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied Defendant’s application for leave to appeal, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. A decade later, Defendant filed a motion in the county court asking the same single justice to reconsider his 2004 ruling and, on reconsideration, to recuse himself and to assign the matter to a different judge. The single justice allowed the motion to reconsider, denied the request for recusal, and denied the application for leave to appeal on reconsideration. The Supreme Judicial Court allowed the appeal to proceed as to the recusal issue only. The Court affirmed the single justice’s order declining to recuse himself and thus dismissed Defendant’s appeal from the single justice’s order denying the application, holding that there was no reasonable basis to question the single justice’s impartiality, and, furthermore, Defendant’s motion was untimely. View "Commonwealth v. Rivera" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on two indictments charging rape. During trial, the Commonwealth offered in evidence a laboratory report regarding the presence of seminal residue on the complainant’s underwear. DNA testing performed before trial indicated the presence of two male sources of the seminal residue, and testing as to the primary source excluded Defendant. A Commonwealth expert described the secondary source as neither including nor excluding Defendant. After Defendant was convicted, he unsuccessfully filed a motion for a new trial. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to amend and reconsider his motion for a new trial, arguing that independent testing revealed that the second source was, in fact, female DNA to which Defendant was conclusively excluded as a possible contributor. A superior court judge denied Defendant’s motion, and the Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Defendant must be given a new trial, as had the new evidence been available at trial, there was a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion. View "Commonwealth v. Cameron" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether settlement agreements between a public school and the parents of a public school student who requires special education are public records subject to disclosure. Plaintiff requested from Defendant school district copies of such agreements where Defendant “limited its contribution to education funding or attached conditions for it for out of district placements” for certain school years. The school district denied the request. The superior court declared that the agreements were public records and were not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded, holding (1) the settlement agreements regarding placement of students in out-of-district private educational institutions are not “public records” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, 7; but (2) the settlement agreements may be redacted to remove personally identifiable information, after which they become subject to disclosure under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 66, 10, the Massachusetts public records law. View "Champa v. Weston Public Schools" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47, which requires a person placed on probation for a sex offense to wear a global positioning system (GPS) device for the length of his probation. Defendant in this case was charged with indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen. The judge continued the case without a finding for a term of five years and imposed several special conditions of probation. The judge also ordered GPS monitoring of Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to remove GPS monitoring as a condition of his probation, arguing that section 47 does not impose mandatory GPS monitoring for persons who are on probation pursuant to a continuance without a finding. The judge denied the motion but reported a question of law to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court and vacated the order imposing mandatory GPS supervision under section 47, holding that section 47 does not apply to cases that are continued without a finding and that a judge is not required in such cases to order that a defendant wear a GPS device that will monitor his whereabouts as a condition of probation. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Doe" on Justia Law

Victoria was born in Mexico in 1997 and later moved to Texas. The Office of Refugee Resettlement designated Victoria as an unaccompanied refugee minor and assigned her for placement in Massachusetts. Three weeks after Victoria’s arrival in Massachusetts, the Department of Children and Families filed a petition for custody of Victoria in the Probate and Family Court. The probate and family court judge concluded that Massachusetts lacked child custody jurisdiction under the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act but that jurisdiction was proper where Massachusetts was an “appropriate court” under federal law governing custody and resettlement of unaccompanied refugee minors. The judge stayed further custody proceedings pending resolution of questions regarding jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Massachusetts has jurisdiction over the custody proceeding under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209B, 2(a)(2) because (1) no other state has home state jurisdiction, and (2) it is in the best interest of Victoria that a Massachusetts court assume jurisdiction of the custody proceeding. View "In re Custody of Victoria" on Justia Law

Defendant, a noncitizen, admitted into the United States as a refugee. Defendant entered a guilty plea to a complaint charging him with, among other counts, assault by means of a dangerous weapon. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon on the basis that his attorney did not make a reasonable inquiry regarding Defendant’s citizenship and therefore did not learn that he was a refugee. The motion judge concluded that counsel’s performance was deficient but that Defendant was not prejudiced by the attorney’s deficient performance. The motion judge denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial and motions for reconsideration, holding (1) constitutionally effective representation of a criminal defendant requires defense counsel to make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether the defendant is a citizen of the United States and, if not, to make a reasonable inquiry into the defendant’s immigration status, including whether the defendant was admitted into this country as a refugee; and (2) in determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance, “special circumstances” regarding immigration consequences, including a defendant’s status as a refugee or asylee, should be given substantial weight in determining whether the defendant suffered prejudice. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. The bulk of the evidence at trial derived from the testimony of a single witness, James Jackson. One and one-half years after Defendant’s conviction, another individual, Debra Bell, came forward, claiming in an affidavit that she was with Jackson using drugs and having sex in a bathroom at the time the shooting took place, and therefore, Jackson could not have seen the shooting. Defendant moved to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence based on Bell’s affidavit. Bell died, however, before the judge acted in it. The judge denied the motion for a new trial, concluding that Bell’s affidavit was inadmissible hearsay. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding that there was a substantial issue as to whether Bell’s affidavit fell within a narrow, constitutionally based exception to the hearsay rule that applies where otherwise inadmissible hearsay is critical to the defense and bears persuasive guarantees of trustworthiness. View "Commonwealth v. Drayton" on Justia Law

Petitioner and two other plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Committee for Public Counsel Services and several associated attorneys alleging violations of their due process rights. The superior court dismissed the complaint. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, but the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that Petitioner had failed to take the necessary steps to perfect it. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal of his appeal. After his efforts to appeal stalled in the superior court Petitioner filed petitions in the county court for relief in the nature of mandamus and pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 asking the single justice to direct the superior court clerk to assemble the record for purposes of his appeal. The single justice denied the petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice was within his discretion in denying the petitions where Petitioner did not first pursue available alternatives before seeking extraordinary relief from the Court. View "Skandha v. Clerk of Superior Court for Civil Bus. in Suffolk County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and four related offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined to grant relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that the trial judge did not err by (1) declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of the murder charge; (2) instructing the jury on the concept of malice in relation to murder under the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty; (3) allowing the jury to consider evidence that, contrary to Defendant’s argument, was not hearsay; and (4) denying Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty on the two charges relating to one of the victims of Defendant’s non-murder-related crimes. View "Commonwealth v. Spinucci" on Justia Law