Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. While his appeal was pending, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The motion was denied. Defendant’s appeal from the denial of the motion was consolidated with his direct appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial, holding (1) the prosecutor at times crossed over the line of propriety in his conduct at trial, including in his cross-examination of Defendant and in his closing argument, but the errors did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (2) there was no reason to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Cadet" on Justia Law

Two weeks before Defendant’s eighteenth birthday, delinquency complaints were filed alleging two counts of rape of a child under sixteen. Defendant appeared in the juvenile court and was duly arraigned. After Defendant turned eighteen, the Commonwealth sought youthful offender indictments against Defendant on the basis of a subset of the acts that were the subject of the complaints. After the indictments were returned, the Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi on all of the delinquency complaints. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictments. In Mogelinski I, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the youthful offender indictments under the facts of this case. Thereafter, the Commonwealth brought a new complaint in the juvenile court against Defendant essentially identical to those where nolle prosequi was previously entered in order to seek a transfer hearing. The juvenile court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court, in fact, had jurisdiction to proceed on the basis of the newly filed complaint. View "Commonwealth v. Mogelinkski" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberately premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to an inmate, as Defendant failed to establish that the inmate was an agent of the Commonwealth; (2) the admission into evidence of statements Defendant’s alleged coconspirator made to the coconspirator’s wife was not in error, as the statutory rule of spousal disqualification did not apply; (3) there was no error in the admission of evidence of Defendant’s prior incarceration; (4) a statement by the prosecutor in closing argument was not an improper comment on Defendant’s failure to testify; and (5) there was no error in the judge’s instruction concerning the judge’s consideration of the testimony of an immunized witness. View "Commonwealth v. Foxworth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, armed home invasion, arson, and violations of an abuse prevention order. The convictions arose from the death of the victim, who died as a result of complications arising from second and third degree burns over ninety percent of her body. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the murder conviction due to errors in the jury instructions and because the arson conviction merged with the murder conviction and remanded. After a second trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) the admission of six photographs of the victim taken while she was being treated in the hospital was not an abuse of discretion; (3) the trial judge did not err in in excluding one of defense counsel’s closing arguments; and (4) there was no reason to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Bell" on Justia Law

A district court judge ordered Petitioner committed to the Women’s Addiction Treatment Center pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 35, a statute that authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a person, for care and treatment, where there is a likelihood of serious harm that could result from the person’s alcoholism or substance abuse. The Appellate Division dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking to vacate the order. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full Court. The Supreme Judicial court dismissed the petition for relief as moot, holding (1) because Petitioner was no longer committed to the facility, her challenge to the order of commitment was rendered moot; but (2) because this case raised important issues concerning the operation of section 35 as well as the Uniform Trial Court Rules for Civil Commitment Proceedings for Alcohol and Substance Abuse scheduled to go into effect on February 1, 2016, the Court decided the case and concluded that the evidence in this case did not appear to satisfy the requirements of section 35 for an order of commitment. View "In re G.P." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on two indictments charging murder in the first degree and one indictment charging unlawful carrying of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial. The superior court judge denied Defendant’s motion, and, in 2004, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied Defendant’s application for leave to appeal, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. A decade later, Defendant filed a motion in the county court asking the same single justice to reconsider his 2004 ruling and, on reconsideration, to recuse himself and to assign the matter to a different judge. The single justice allowed the motion to reconsider, denied the request for recusal, and denied the application for leave to appeal on reconsideration. The Supreme Judicial Court allowed the appeal to proceed as to the recusal issue only. The Court affirmed the single justice’s order declining to recuse himself and thus dismissed Defendant’s appeal from the single justice’s order denying the application, holding that there was no reasonable basis to question the single justice’s impartiality, and, furthermore, Defendant’s motion was untimely. View "Commonwealth v. Rivera" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on two indictments charging rape. During trial, the Commonwealth offered in evidence a laboratory report regarding the presence of seminal residue on the complainant’s underwear. DNA testing performed before trial indicated the presence of two male sources of the seminal residue, and testing as to the primary source excluded Defendant. A Commonwealth expert described the secondary source as neither including nor excluding Defendant. After Defendant was convicted, he unsuccessfully filed a motion for a new trial. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to amend and reconsider his motion for a new trial, arguing that independent testing revealed that the second source was, in fact, female DNA to which Defendant was conclusively excluded as a possible contributor. A superior court judge denied Defendant’s motion, and the Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Defendant must be given a new trial, as had the new evidence been available at trial, there was a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion. View "Commonwealth v. Cameron" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether settlement agreements between a public school and the parents of a public school student who requires special education are public records subject to disclosure. Plaintiff requested from Defendant school district copies of such agreements where Defendant “limited its contribution to education funding or attached conditions for it for out of district placements” for certain school years. The school district denied the request. The superior court declared that the agreements were public records and were not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded, holding (1) the settlement agreements regarding placement of students in out-of-district private educational institutions are not “public records” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, 7; but (2) the settlement agreements may be redacted to remove personally identifiable information, after which they become subject to disclosure under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 66, 10, the Massachusetts public records law. View "Champa v. Weston Public Schools" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47, which requires a person placed on probation for a sex offense to wear a global positioning system (GPS) device for the length of his probation. Defendant in this case was charged with indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen. The judge continued the case without a finding for a term of five years and imposed several special conditions of probation. The judge also ordered GPS monitoring of Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to remove GPS monitoring as a condition of his probation, arguing that section 47 does not impose mandatory GPS monitoring for persons who are on probation pursuant to a continuance without a finding. The judge denied the motion but reported a question of law to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court and vacated the order imposing mandatory GPS supervision under section 47, holding that section 47 does not apply to cases that are continued without a finding and that a judge is not required in such cases to order that a defendant wear a GPS device that will monitor his whereabouts as a condition of probation. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Doe" on Justia Law

Victoria was born in Mexico in 1997 and later moved to Texas. The Office of Refugee Resettlement designated Victoria as an unaccompanied refugee minor and assigned her for placement in Massachusetts. Three weeks after Victoria’s arrival in Massachusetts, the Department of Children and Families filed a petition for custody of Victoria in the Probate and Family Court. The probate and family court judge concluded that Massachusetts lacked child custody jurisdiction under the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act but that jurisdiction was proper where Massachusetts was an “appropriate court” under federal law governing custody and resettlement of unaccompanied refugee minors. The judge stayed further custody proceedings pending resolution of questions regarding jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Massachusetts has jurisdiction over the custody proceeding under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209B, 2(a)(2) because (1) no other state has home state jurisdiction, and (2) it is in the best interest of Victoria that a Massachusetts court assume jurisdiction of the custody proceeding. View "In re Custody of Victoria" on Justia Law