Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of stalking, criminal harassment, restraining order violations, and perjury charges. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant’s act of posting on his Facebook page a photograph of himself holding a gun and the words, “Make no mistake of my will to succeed in bring you two idiots to justice,” constituted a threat within the meaning of the stalking statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 43(a). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction of stalking and otherwise affirmed, holding that the evidence of Defendant’s intent concerning the creation of the Facebook profile was insufficient with respect both to whether the page constituted a threat within the scope of section 43(a)(2) and to the reasonableness of the victim’s fear. View "Commonwealth v. Walters" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the evidence warranted an instruction on reasonable provocation, and counsel should have requested such an instruction; (2) the prosecutor committed error during closing argument; and (3) the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s closing argument and trial counsel’s failure to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on reasonable provocation created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice and required that Defendant be given a new trial. The Court gave the Commonwealth the option of either accepting a reduction of the verdict of manslaughter or having the conviction vacated and proceeding with a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Niemic" on Justia Law

Vittorio and Lydia Gentile were policyholders under a Massachusetts automobile insurance policy issued by Commerce Insurance Company. Their grandson, Vittorio Gentile, Jr. (Junior), an “excluded operator” under the policy, was operating one of the Gentiles’ vehicles covered by the policy when he caused an accident that injured Douglas and Joseph Homsis. Commerce filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Gentiles’ violation of the operator exclusion form relieved it of the duty to pay the Homsises under the optional bodily injury provisions of the insurance contract. A superior court judge concluded that Commerce was relieved of its duty to pay the optional coverage for the Homsis’ injures because the Gentiles had violated their duty of “continuing representation” as to whether Junior was, in fact, operating their vehicles. The Appeals Court affirmed both on that basis and on the basis that the Gentiles had breached the insurance contract. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the ground that, by allowing Junior to operate their vehicle, the Gentiles committed a breach of a material term of the insurance contract. View "Commerce Ins. Co., Inc. v. Gentile" on Justia Law

Joseph and Janice Boyle sued C&N Corporation. C&N held an insurance policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Company requiring that C&N provide notice to Zurich of any lawsuit brought against it. C&N did not notify Zurich about the lawsuit, but the Boyles’ counsel did. Zurich did not defend against the suit. Judgement by default was entered for the Boyles. The Boyles then sued Zurich, asserting the claims of C&N, which had assigned to the Boyles. A superior court judge ruled that Zurich breached its contractual duty to defend C&N. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) an insured’s failure to comply with a notice obligation in an insurance policy does not relieve the insurer of its duties under the policy unless the insurer demonstrates that it suffered prejudice as a result of the breach; and (2) the superior court judge did not err in determining that Zurich committed a breach of its contractual duty to defend C&N, as Zurich failed to show that it was prejudiced as a result of C&N’s failure to comply with the policy’s notice obligation in this case. View "Boyle v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, Plaintiff commenced this wrongful death action as the administrator of the decedent’s estate alleging that Defendant’s medical care and treatment of the decedent was negligent and grossly negligent and that Defendant’s substandard medical care caused the decedent’s death. The jury found Defendant negligent in his medical treatment of the decedent and that his negligence caused the decedent’s death but did not find Defendant to have been grossly negligent. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff met the basic disclosure requirements of Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) to disclose the substance of and grounds for the opinions of an expert witness; and (2) certain materials obtained from the Internet and used during Plaintiff’s examination of Defendant did not qualify under the “learned treatise” exception to the hearsay rule adopted in Commonwealth v. Sneed, but the error did not result in undue prejudice to Defendant; and (3) the trial judge erred in precluding Defendant’s counsel from using one of the decedent’s prior medical records in his cross-examination of Plaintiff’s sole expert witness, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Kace v. Liang" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant was sentenced to the mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction but remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction; (2) the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and was consonant with justice; (3) Defendant’s claim that his right to a public trial was violated by the closure of the court room during jury empanelment was procedurally waived; (4) the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury regarding the risk of honest, but mistaken, eyewitness identification, but the error did not produce a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (5) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing argument, but the prosecutor’s statements did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (6) in accordance with Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., Defendant was entitled to a reduction in sentence to life with the possibility of parole where he was seventeen years old at the time of the killing. View "Commonwealth v. Penn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree and related charges. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) when assessed through the lens of Commonwealth v. Adjutant, the trial judge did not prejudicially err in excluding both evidence of the victim’s and his friends’ prior violent acts and statements Defendant made to his girl friend; (2) the judge did not err in denying Defendant’s postconviction motion for discovery of gang-related evidence; (3) the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter on theories of reasonable provocation and sudden combat; (4) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) certain remarks made during the Commonwealth’s closing argument were improper, but the improper remarks did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (6) there was not basis for exercising the Court’s authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Camacho" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action alleging various constitutional violations with respect to the presidential ballot. Along with his complaint, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of indigence pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 261, 27B requesting a waiver of normal court fees and litigation costs. In his affidavit, Plaintiff claimed indigence on the ground that he received public assistance in the form of veterans’ benefits. The judge concluded that Plaintiff was not indigent because he had the ability to pay the normal and extra fees and costs. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff, who received federal veterans’ benefits and a Massachusetts property tax abatement that were not dependent on his economic circumstances, was considered indigent under Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 261, 27A and therefore entitled to a waiver despite having ample financial resources to pay court fees and costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judge’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request for a waiver of normal and extra court fees and litigation costs, holding that the statute was not intended to provide for a waiver under the circumstances of this case. View "Reade v. Sec’y of Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to committed time on a conviction. Defendant successfully moved to vacate community parole supervision for life and was resentenced to a term of probation. Defendant moved to vacate the condition of probation requiring GPS monitoring. The motion was denied. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Defendant’s application for further appellate review to address the propriety of resentencing Defendant by imposing a term of probation to run from and after committed sentences that either had fully been served at the time of resentencing or will have fully been served before the probationary term was due to begin. The Court affirmed the order denying Defendant’s motion to vacate the GPS condition of probation, holding (1) where a defendant sentenced to committed time on a conviction is resentenced to a term of probation, the new sentence violates double jeopardy where the defendant had already completed the original sentence on that conviction before the resentencing; and (2) where the defendant has yet to complete the original sentence on a conviction, resentencing to a term of probation does not violate double jeopardy provided that the total length of incarceration imposed on the defendant for that conviction is not increased. View "Commonwealth v. Sallop" on Justia Law

The Division of Capital Asset Management and Maintenance (DCAM), the owner of a construction project, entered into a contract with a designer to prepare the project’s designs. DCAM contracted with Gilbane Building Company to be the construction manager at risk (CMAR). Gilbane subcontracted with Coghlin Electrical Contractors, Inc. to perform electrical work. Coghlin later filed a complaint against Gilbane alleging that Gilbane breached the subcontract by causing Coghlin to incur additional costs resulting from design errors. Gilbane filed a third-party complaint against DCAM, asserting that DCAM breached its contract with Gilbane by refusing to pay Gilbane the amounts claimed by Coghlin. The trial court allowed DCAM’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding (1) a public owner of a construction management at risk project gives an implied warranty regarding the designer’s plans and specifications, but the scope of liability arising from that implied warranty is limited; (2) the construction management at risk contract in this case did not disclaim the implied warranty; and (3) the contract's indemnification provision did not prohibit Gilbane from filing a third-party complaint against DCAM seeking reimbursement of additional costs under the implied warranty for damages claimed by Coghlin caused by an insufficient or defective design. Remanded View "Coghlin Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co." on Justia Law