Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendants - Tyshaun McGhee and Sidney McGhee - were convicted of three counts of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 50 (the statute), and related charges. Defendants appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts sex trafficking statute. The Supreme Judicial Court largely affirmed, holding (1) the statute is sufficiently clear and definite and thus did not violate Defendants’ rights to due process; (2) the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; (3) the phrase “commercial sexual activity” as used in the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; (4) the judge did not err in allowing the substantive admission of grand jury testimony from one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses; (5) the judge did not violate Defendants’ right to confrontation by hindering their cross-examination of a certain witness regarding criminal charges pending against her and her history of prostitution; and (6) Tyshaun’s sentences for two counts of deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute were illegal. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. McGhee" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 56, 42, which criminalizes certain false statements about political candidates or questions submitted to voters, after her political action committee published brochures criticizing a candidate for public office. Defendant filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief from the criminal complaint on the ground that section 42 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the requested relief, holding (1) section 42 is inconsistent with the fundamental right of free speech enshrined in article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and is, therefore, invalid; and (2) accordingly, the criminal complaint charging Defendant with violating section 42 must be dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Lucas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the orders denying his motion for a new trial and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) Defendant waived his right to a public trial where his trial counsel was aware that the courtroom was closed to spectators during the jury empanelment process and did not object to the partial closure; (2) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on extreme atrocity or cruelty based on second and third prong malice; and (3) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s strategic decision to forgo a defense of lack of criminal responsibility. View "Commonwealth v. Lang" on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured his knee while warming up in the bullpen of a public park in the Town of Hudson before a varsity game between two high school teams. Plaintiff, a ballplayer with the visiting team, brought this action against the Town under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act alleging negligence and wanton and reckless conduct. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town, concluding that Plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred by the recreational use statute and that the evidence did not support a finding of wanton or reckless conduct. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) despite the recreational use statute, the Town may be found liable for negligence in providing the pitchers from the visiting team with a bullpen that was not reasonably safe; and (2) Plaintiff complied with the Act’s presentment requirement, and it cannot be determined until trial whether liability is barred by the Act’s discretionary function exemption. View "Murray v. Town of Hudson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a male, was a candidate for the December, 2010 police academy class. When Plaintiff was not admitted, he brought a claim of sex discrimination against the Boston Police Department and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, alleging discrimination arising from the Department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the preferential treatment of female candidates was justified because “gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing, holding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper standing on Plaintiff. View "Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a male, was a candidate for the December, 2010 police academy class. When Plaintiff was not admitted, he brought a claim of sex discrimination against the Boston Police Department and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, alleging discrimination arising from the Department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the preferential treatment of female candidates was justified because “gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing, holding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper standing on Plaintiff. View "Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to several sexual offenses, including forcible rape, committed against three children. Neither Defendant’s defense counsel nor the judge who accepted his guilty pleas informed Defendant that his sexual offenses could serve as a predicate for civil confinement as a sexually dangerous person for life. A judge in the superior court allowed Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the ground that the failure of the plea judge to inform Defendant of possible civil commitment violated due process and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3)(B). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order allowing Defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas and remanded, holding (1) the judge’s analogy to Padilla v. Kentucky was inapt in this case; and (2) the defendant may withdraw his guilty plea if he can establish a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had the judge informed him of the possibility of future civil confinement as required by Rule 12. Remanded for further findings and rulings applicable to the correct legal standard. View "Commonwealth v. Roberts" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and the denial of his motions for a new trial and discerned no basis to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object when court officers excluded the public and Defendant’s family from the courtroom during jury empanelment; (2) Defendant waived his right to be present at sidebar discussions during jury empanelment; (3) the trial judge acted within his discretion in deciding not to allow Defendant’s peremptory challenges of three African-American jurors; (4) Defendant’s challenges to the trial judge’s evidentiary rulings were without merit; (5) the prosecutor did not impermissibly bolster the creditability of certain witnesses or commit prejudicial error during closing argument; (6) no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred when the judge instructed the jury; and (7) Defendant’s motion for a new trial was properly denied. View "Commonwealth v. Fritz" on Justia Law

Each plaintiff in these consolidated appeals was licensed as a commercial driver and was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Each plaintiff admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a finding (CWOF) of guilty, and the judge continued the cases without a finding of guilty. The registrar of motor vehicles determined that the admission and CWOF were a “conviction” and suspended the commercial drivers license of each plaintiff. The Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds affirmed each decision of the registrar. The superior court vacated the Board’s decision in each case, determining that a CWOF is not a conviction as that term is defined in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90F. The Board and the registrar appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decisions of the superior court and entered judgment in favor of the Board, holding that an admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty and the judge’s continuance of the case without a finding of guilty is a “conviction” as that term is defined in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90F, 1. View "Tirado v. Bd. of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in allowing multiple prior consistent statements; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the admission of certain evidence and failing to impeach a witness; (3) there was not improper prosecutorial vouching during closing argument that created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) the conviction was viable despite the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness, and newly discovered evidence did not necessitate a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Lessieur" on Justia Law