Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A police officer stopped a vehicle based on the officer’s detection of an odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. During the course of the stop, police discovered sixty Percocet pills. Defendant, a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the stop, was charged with several drug-related offenses all in connection with the pills. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the pills. The motion judge denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the stop was justified. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that there was at best reasonable suspicion to believe that a civil marijuana infraction was occurring, but not probable cause, and therefore, the stop was impermissible. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case owned beachfront lots in the Town of Dennis, and the defendants owned lots located to the south and west of the plaintiffs’ lots. The parties, who were in the same subdivision, disputed access over a private way to the beach that ran between the plaintiffs’ lots. The plaintiffs filed an action to quiet title and for declaratory relief against the defendants. The trial judge determined that the plaintiffs held the fee in the way. The judge then divided the defendants into three groups and determined, as to the first two groups, the defendants held easements over the way, and that the defendants in the third group did not. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed, holding (1) the plaintiffs did not hold the fee in the way but were easement holders; (2) as to the first and second groups of defendants, the judge correctly determined that the defendants held easements over the way; and (3) the third group of defendants also held easements for access to the waterfront over the way. View "Hickey v. Pathways Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and furnishing alcohol to a minor. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge erred in permitting an expert witness who was not present when the victim’s “rape kit” examination was performed to testify about how the various swabs she tested had been collected, and the error was prejudicial; and (2) the trial judge erred in closing the rape shield hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence relating to the victim’s prior sexual contact with the individual to whom the victim first reported the alleged rape without conducting the four-prong framework required for court room closures under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Waller v. Georgia. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of stalking, criminal harassment, restraining order violations, and perjury charges. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant’s act of posting on his Facebook page a photograph of himself holding a gun and the words, “Make no mistake of my will to succeed in bring you two idiots to justice,” constituted a threat within the meaning of the stalking statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 43(a). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction of stalking and otherwise affirmed, holding that the evidence of Defendant’s intent concerning the creation of the Facebook profile was insufficient with respect both to whether the page constituted a threat within the scope of section 43(a)(2) and to the reasonableness of the victim’s fear. View "Commonwealth v. Walters" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the evidence warranted an instruction on reasonable provocation, and counsel should have requested such an instruction; (2) the prosecutor committed error during closing argument; and (3) the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s closing argument and trial counsel’s failure to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on reasonable provocation created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice and required that Defendant be given a new trial. The Court gave the Commonwealth the option of either accepting a reduction of the verdict of manslaughter or having the conviction vacated and proceeding with a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Niemic" on Justia Law

Vittorio and Lydia Gentile were policyholders under a Massachusetts automobile insurance policy issued by Commerce Insurance Company. Their grandson, Vittorio Gentile, Jr. (Junior), an “excluded operator” under the policy, was operating one of the Gentiles’ vehicles covered by the policy when he caused an accident that injured Douglas and Joseph Homsis. Commerce filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Gentiles’ violation of the operator exclusion form relieved it of the duty to pay the Homsises under the optional bodily injury provisions of the insurance contract. A superior court judge concluded that Commerce was relieved of its duty to pay the optional coverage for the Homsis’ injures because the Gentiles had violated their duty of “continuing representation” as to whether Junior was, in fact, operating their vehicles. The Appeals Court affirmed both on that basis and on the basis that the Gentiles had breached the insurance contract. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the ground that, by allowing Junior to operate their vehicle, the Gentiles committed a breach of a material term of the insurance contract. View "Commerce Ins. Co., Inc. v. Gentile" on Justia Law

Joseph and Janice Boyle sued C&N Corporation. C&N held an insurance policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Company requiring that C&N provide notice to Zurich of any lawsuit brought against it. C&N did not notify Zurich about the lawsuit, but the Boyles’ counsel did. Zurich did not defend against the suit. Judgement by default was entered for the Boyles. The Boyles then sued Zurich, asserting the claims of C&N, which had assigned to the Boyles. A superior court judge ruled that Zurich breached its contractual duty to defend C&N. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) an insured’s failure to comply with a notice obligation in an insurance policy does not relieve the insurer of its duties under the policy unless the insurer demonstrates that it suffered prejudice as a result of the breach; and (2) the superior court judge did not err in determining that Zurich committed a breach of its contractual duty to defend C&N, as Zurich failed to show that it was prejudiced as a result of C&N’s failure to comply with the policy’s notice obligation in this case. View "Boyle v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, Plaintiff commenced this wrongful death action as the administrator of the decedent’s estate alleging that Defendant’s medical care and treatment of the decedent was negligent and grossly negligent and that Defendant’s substandard medical care caused the decedent’s death. The jury found Defendant negligent in his medical treatment of the decedent and that his negligence caused the decedent’s death but did not find Defendant to have been grossly negligent. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff met the basic disclosure requirements of Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) to disclose the substance of and grounds for the opinions of an expert witness; and (2) certain materials obtained from the Internet and used during Plaintiff’s examination of Defendant did not qualify under the “learned treatise” exception to the hearsay rule adopted in Commonwealth v. Sneed, but the error did not result in undue prejudice to Defendant; and (3) the trial judge erred in precluding Defendant’s counsel from using one of the decedent’s prior medical records in his cross-examination of Plaintiff’s sole expert witness, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Kace v. Liang" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant was sentenced to the mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction but remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction; (2) the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and was consonant with justice; (3) Defendant’s claim that his right to a public trial was violated by the closure of the court room during jury empanelment was procedurally waived; (4) the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury regarding the risk of honest, but mistaken, eyewitness identification, but the error did not produce a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (5) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing argument, but the prosecutor’s statements did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (6) in accordance with Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., Defendant was entitled to a reduction in sentence to life with the possibility of parole where he was seventeen years old at the time of the killing. View "Commonwealth v. Penn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree and related charges. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) when assessed through the lens of Commonwealth v. Adjutant, the trial judge did not prejudicially err in excluding both evidence of the victim’s and his friends’ prior violent acts and statements Defendant made to his girl friend; (2) the judge did not err in denying Defendant’s postconviction motion for discovery of gang-related evidence; (3) the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter on theories of reasonable provocation and sudden combat; (4) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) certain remarks made during the Commonwealth’s closing argument were improper, but the improper remarks did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (6) there was not basis for exercising the Court’s authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Camacho" on Justia Law