Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his cell site location information (CSLI) relating to his cellular telephone. The Commonwealth had obtained Defendant’s CSLI for a fourteen-day period beginning August 24, 2004 pursuant to the Federal Stored Communications Act under an order of the superior court judge. The superior court allowed the motion to suppress, concluding that obtaining Defendant’s CLSI constituted a search. In Augustine I, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that search a search would be permissible only upon a showing of probable cause. The Court vacated the allowance of the motion to suppress and remanded for consideration of whether the affidavit that the Commonwealth had submitted in support of the order demonstrated probable cause. On remand, the superior court again allowed Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, ruling that the affidavit did not meet the probable cause standard required under Augustine I. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth demonstrated probable cause for obtaining Defendant’s CSLI records for the period from August 24 to August 26, 2004. View "Commonwealth v. Augustine" on Justia Law

Boston police officers stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction. The officers ordered the two rear seat passengers to get out of the vehicle and pat frisked each for weapons. Defendant, the front seat passenger, got out of the vehicle and was ordered to return to his seat. When he did so, he moved the gear shift to the “drive” position. Defendant and the driver were then ordered from the vehicle, and Defendant was pat frisked. Finding no weapon, the officers conducted a protective sweep of the vehicle and discovered a loaded firearm under the front passenger seat. Defendant was charged with unlicensed possession of a firearm and related offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. A superior court judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order allowing the motions to suppress, holding that, even if the pat frisks of the rear seat passengers were invalid, sufficient evidence supported the officers’ suspicion that Douglas might be armed and dangerous and that a limited protective sweep of the vehicle was necessary for officer safety. View "Commonwealth v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Defendant fled when two Boston police officers attempted to stop and question him. When the officers apprehended Defendant, a handgun containing ammunition fell from his pants. Defendant was charged with multiple firearms offenses and resisting arrest. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the encounter. A municipal court judge allowed the motion to suppress. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion judge’s finding regarding the moment Defendant was seized was not erroneous; (2) the judge’s finding that the facts of this case did not support a conclusion of reasonable suspicion was not clearly erroneous; and (3) the Court was not permitted to make additional findings, and reach a different result, based on its own view of the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants - Tyshaun McGhee and Sidney McGhee - were convicted of three counts of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 50 (the statute), and related charges. Defendants appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts sex trafficking statute. The Supreme Judicial Court largely affirmed, holding (1) the statute is sufficiently clear and definite and thus did not violate Defendants’ rights to due process; (2) the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; (3) the phrase “commercial sexual activity” as used in the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; (4) the judge did not err in allowing the substantive admission of grand jury testimony from one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses; (5) the judge did not violate Defendants’ right to confrontation by hindering their cross-examination of a certain witness regarding criminal charges pending against her and her history of prostitution; and (6) Tyshaun’s sentences for two counts of deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute were illegal. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. McGhee" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 56, 42, which criminalizes certain false statements about political candidates or questions submitted to voters, after her political action committee published brochures criticizing a candidate for public office. Defendant filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief from the criminal complaint on the ground that section 42 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the requested relief, holding (1) section 42 is inconsistent with the fundamental right of free speech enshrined in article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and is, therefore, invalid; and (2) accordingly, the criminal complaint charging Defendant with violating section 42 must be dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Lucas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the orders denying his motion for a new trial and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) Defendant waived his right to a public trial where his trial counsel was aware that the courtroom was closed to spectators during the jury empanelment process and did not object to the partial closure; (2) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on extreme atrocity or cruelty based on second and third prong malice; and (3) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s strategic decision to forgo a defense of lack of criminal responsibility. View "Commonwealth v. Lang" on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured his knee while warming up in the bullpen of a public park in the Town of Hudson before a varsity game between two high school teams. Plaintiff, a ballplayer with the visiting team, brought this action against the Town under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act alleging negligence and wanton and reckless conduct. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town, concluding that Plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred by the recreational use statute and that the evidence did not support a finding of wanton or reckless conduct. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) despite the recreational use statute, the Town may be found liable for negligence in providing the pitchers from the visiting team with a bullpen that was not reasonably safe; and (2) Plaintiff complied with the Act’s presentment requirement, and it cannot be determined until trial whether liability is barred by the Act’s discretionary function exemption. View "Murray v. Town of Hudson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a male, was a candidate for the December, 2010 police academy class. When Plaintiff was not admitted, he brought a claim of sex discrimination against the Boston Police Department and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, alleging discrimination arising from the Department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the preferential treatment of female candidates was justified because “gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing, holding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper standing on Plaintiff. View "Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a male, was a candidate for the December, 2010 police academy class. When Plaintiff was not admitted, he brought a claim of sex discrimination against the Boston Police Department and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, alleging discrimination arising from the Department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the preferential treatment of female candidates was justified because “gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing, holding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper standing on Plaintiff. View "Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to several sexual offenses, including forcible rape, committed against three children. Neither Defendant’s defense counsel nor the judge who accepted his guilty pleas informed Defendant that his sexual offenses could serve as a predicate for civil confinement as a sexually dangerous person for life. A judge in the superior court allowed Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the ground that the failure of the plea judge to inform Defendant of possible civil commitment violated due process and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3)(B). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order allowing Defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas and remanded, holding (1) the judge’s analogy to Padilla v. Kentucky was inapt in this case; and (2) the defendant may withdraw his guilty plea if he can establish a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had the judge informed him of the possibility of future civil confinement as required by Rule 12. Remanded for further findings and rulings applicable to the correct legal standard. View "Commonwealth v. Roberts" on Justia Law