Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted on four counts of forcible rape of a child and four counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police officers during the course of two interviews, the first being prearrest and the second following his arrest. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights at the beginning of both interviews, but those rights were not accurately explained. The district court suppressed both statements. The Supreme Court reversed the suppression of the prearrest statement but affirmed the suppression of the postarrest statement, holding (1) the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that Defendant’s prearrest statements were voluntary; and (2) the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving that Defendant waived his right to consult with counsel prior to giving his postarrest statements. View "Commonwealth v. Libby" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of mayhem and resisting arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the judge abused her discretion in denying Defendant’s requested cross-racial and cross-ethnic eyewitness identification jury instruction where two of the three eyewitnesses were Caucasian and Defendant was a “dark-skinned Hispanic of Dominican decent.” This case was tried before the Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in Commonwealth v. Gomes, where the Court prospectively required that a jury instruction on cross-racial eyewitness identification be given in these circumstances. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to give Defendant’s requested cross-racial and cross-ethnic instruction; (2) in criminal trials that commence after the issuance of this opinion, a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification; (3) the admission of the three in-court eyewitness identifications in this case did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) although the judge erred in instructing the jury regarding consciousness of guilt, the error was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Bastaldo" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery for spanking his daughter, who was then almost three years old. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction in light of the parental privilege to use force in disciplining a minor child. The appeals court affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s conduct fell outside of the parental privilege defense. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) a parent or guardian may not be subjected to criminal liability for the use of force against a minor child provided that the force used is reasonable, the force is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, and the force does not create a substantial risk of causing physical harm or severe mental distress; and (2) the evidence adduced at Defendant’s trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction of assault and battery. View "Commonwealth v. Dorvil" on Justia Law

Plaintiff broke her leg after slipping and falling on a wet dance floor at a nightclub owned by Defendant. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff failed as a matter of law to carry her burden under the “traditional” approach to premises liability because she did not show that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the “mode of operation” approach to premises liability, which alleviates the plaintiff’s burden of proving notice, provided the proper legal standard. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) on the facts presented by the case, the mode of operation approach applied; and (2) summary judgment was improperly granted because Defendant had notice of the inherent risks associated with its chosen mode of operating its dance floor. Remanded. View "Sarkisian v. Concept Restaurants, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed. While his appeal was pending, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. The judge granted Defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully investigate, present, and argue evidence of Defendant’s mental condition. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the judge erred in ruling that counsel’s strategic choice to forgo further investigation of Defendant’s mental condition and to present only an intoxication defense was manifestly unreasonable. View "Commonwealth v. Kolenovic" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of mayhem and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury. The Appeals Court affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s convictions were not duplicative. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) while Defendant cannot be convicted of both mayhem and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury unless the convictions rest on separate and distinct acts, Defendants actions here did not form but one act; and (2) therefore, Defendant’s convictions were not duplicative. View "Commonwealth v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

Christopher Kostka’s twin brother, Timothy Kostka, was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree and armed home invasion. The Commonwealth filed a motion to compel Christopher to provide a saliva sample from which it may obtain Christopher’s DNA, arguing that the DNA sample was necessary in order to determine whether Christopher was the identical or fraternal twin of Timothy. The trial judge allowed the motion, concluding that the DNA sample was relevant to establishing whether the DNA found under the victim’s fingernails matched Christopher’s and that a sample of Christopher’s DNA would “probably” provide evidence relevant to the question of Timothy’s guilt. Christopher refused to comply with the order to compel, and a judgment of contempt was entered against him. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Christopher’s DNA was not shown to be sufficiently relevant or important to the question of Timothy’s guilt or innocence so as to outweigh the constitutional rights of Christopher, an uncharged third party in the criminal proceeding. View "Commonwealth v. Kostka" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor (OUI). Before trial, Defendant, along with sixty-one other defendants in other OUI cases, moved to exclude admission of breath test evidence derived from the use of the Alcotest 7110 MK III-C, a particular model of breathalyzer, asserting that errors in the Alcotest’s source code as well as other deficiencies rendered the breath test results produced by the Alcotest unreliable. The judge denied the motion to exclude the breathalyzer evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judge’s order, holding (1) breath test evidence is scientific evidence, and therefore, the reliability of the Alcotest breath test result had to be established before evidence of the test could be admitted, and, in the instant case, a hearing on Defendant’s challenges to that reliability were required; and (2) because no such hearing was held in this case and the Alcotest breath test result was before the jury as evidence, the case must be remanded to the district court for a hearing on Defendant’s motion to exclude. View "Commonwealth v. Camblin" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of liquor (OUI), third offense, resisting arrest, reckless operation of a motor vehicle, failure to stop for police, and a marked lanes violation. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the arresting officer who pursued Defendant to Defendant’s garage, made an unconstitutional search and seizure by entering his garage. The motion judge denied the motion based on the existence of probable cause and several exigent circumstances, including hot pursuit. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of all counts with the exception of reckless operation of a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arresting officer’s actions in entering Defendant’s garage to effectuate the arrest were lawful; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish the underlying OUI charge as well as Defendant’s two prior convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Jewett" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty, felony murder, and armed robbery. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his sneakers and evidence derived from blood found on his sneakers; (2) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on the theory of joint venture liability, over defense counsel’s objection; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter; and (4) the prosecutor did not improperly shift the burden of proof in her closing argument. View "Commonwealth v. Silva" on Justia Law