Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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George and Sandra Schussel filed no tax returns between 1989 and 2007. In 2007, George was convicted of federal conspiracy and tax evasion charges. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Revenue issued the Schussels a notice of failure to file Massachusetts income tax returns for the years 1993 to 1995. The Schussels filed tax returns for those years, but the Commissioner determined that the returns were “false or fraudulent” or to have been filed with an intent to evade taxes. Consequently, the Commissioner imposed a “double assessment” against the Schussels. The Commission denied the Schussels request for abatement of the double assessment. The Appellate Tax Board and the Appeals Court affirmed the Commissioner’s decisions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Schussels’ claim that they were entitled to relief from the double assessment under an amnesty program established by the Commissioner in 2009 was not properly before the Court. View "Schussel v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with one count of assault and battery on a family member. Prior to Defendant’s release upon arraignment, the Commonwealth submitted a preliminary written statement pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 56A, alleging that domestic abuse occurred immediately prior to or in conjunction with Defendant’s charged offense. The judge declined to rule that domestic abuse was alleged in connection with the charged offense and reported the case to the Appeals Court, opining that section 56A in part violated Defendant’s constitutional guarantee of due process and separation of powers by interfering with the judicial function. The case was entered in the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted Defendant’s application for direct appellate review. The Supreme Judicial Court responded to the judge’s report by holding that section 56A requires that before a judge makes a “written ruling that abuse is alleged in connection with the charged offense,” the judge must inquire into and be satisfied that there is an adequate factual basis for the abuse allegations made by the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Dossantos" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A Massachusetts grand jury issued indictments against Defendants, Nickoyan Wallace and Timi Wallace, accusing them of murder. Defendants were in federal custody from 2000 until 2009. Not until 2009 did prosecutors initiate the necessary steps to gain custody of Defendants from federal prison authorities under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Defendants were subsequently arraigned in superior court. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, alleging that the Commonwealth’s delay in obtaining custody of them from federal prison authorities impermissibility affected their right to a speedy trial. A superior court judge found that Timi’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated but that of Nickoyan had. The Appeals Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the Commonwealth had not violated the speedy trial right of either defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny Timi’s motion and to allow Nickoyan’s motion, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Nickoyan’s right to a speedy trial was violated under the circumstances of this case but that Timi’s was not. View "Commonwealth v. Wallace" on Justia Law

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Defendant was indicted on four counts of forcible rape of a child and four counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police officers during the course of two interviews, the first being prearrest and the second following his arrest. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights at the beginning of both interviews, but those rights were not accurately explained. The district court suppressed both statements. The Supreme Court reversed the suppression of the prearrest statement but affirmed the suppression of the postarrest statement, holding (1) the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that Defendant’s prearrest statements were voluntary; and (2) the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving that Defendant waived his right to consult with counsel prior to giving his postarrest statements. View "Commonwealth v. Libby" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of mayhem and resisting arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the judge abused her discretion in denying Defendant’s requested cross-racial and cross-ethnic eyewitness identification jury instruction where two of the three eyewitnesses were Caucasian and Defendant was a “dark-skinned Hispanic of Dominican decent.” This case was tried before the Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in Commonwealth v. Gomes, where the Court prospectively required that a jury instruction on cross-racial eyewitness identification be given in these circumstances. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to give Defendant’s requested cross-racial and cross-ethnic instruction; (2) in criminal trials that commence after the issuance of this opinion, a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification; (3) the admission of the three in-court eyewitness identifications in this case did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) although the judge erred in instructing the jury regarding consciousness of guilt, the error was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Bastaldo" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant was convicted of assault and battery for spanking his daughter, who was then almost three years old. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction in light of the parental privilege to use force in disciplining a minor child. The appeals court affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s conduct fell outside of the parental privilege defense. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) a parent or guardian may not be subjected to criminal liability for the use of force against a minor child provided that the force used is reasonable, the force is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, and the force does not create a substantial risk of causing physical harm or severe mental distress; and (2) the evidence adduced at Defendant’s trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction of assault and battery. View "Commonwealth v. Dorvil" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiff broke her leg after slipping and falling on a wet dance floor at a nightclub owned by Defendant. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff failed as a matter of law to carry her burden under the “traditional” approach to premises liability because she did not show that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the “mode of operation” approach to premises liability, which alleviates the plaintiff’s burden of proving notice, provided the proper legal standard. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) on the facts presented by the case, the mode of operation approach applied; and (2) summary judgment was improperly granted because Defendant had notice of the inherent risks associated with its chosen mode of operating its dance floor. Remanded. View "Sarkisian v. Concept Restaurants, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed. While his appeal was pending, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. The judge granted Defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully investigate, present, and argue evidence of Defendant’s mental condition. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the judge erred in ruling that counsel’s strategic choice to forgo further investigation of Defendant’s mental condition and to present only an intoxication defense was manifestly unreasonable. View "Commonwealth v. Kolenovic" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of mayhem and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury. The Appeals Court affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s convictions were not duplicative. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) while Defendant cannot be convicted of both mayhem and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury unless the convictions rest on separate and distinct acts, Defendants actions here did not form but one act; and (2) therefore, Defendant’s convictions were not duplicative. View "Commonwealth v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Christopher Kostka’s twin brother, Timothy Kostka, was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree and armed home invasion. The Commonwealth filed a motion to compel Christopher to provide a saliva sample from which it may obtain Christopher’s DNA, arguing that the DNA sample was necessary in order to determine whether Christopher was the identical or fraternal twin of Timothy. The trial judge allowed the motion, concluding that the DNA sample was relevant to establishing whether the DNA found under the victim’s fingernails matched Christopher’s and that a sample of Christopher’s DNA would “probably” provide evidence relevant to the question of Timothy’s guilt. Christopher refused to comply with the order to compel, and a judgment of contempt was entered against him. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Christopher’s DNA was not shown to be sufficiently relevant or important to the question of Timothy’s guilt or innocence so as to outweigh the constitutional rights of Christopher, an uncharged third party in the criminal proceeding. View "Commonwealth v. Kostka" on Justia Law