Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Steven Fitzgerald pleaded guilty to certain criminal offenses. Fitzgerald subsequently filed a petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking to vacate his pleas, arguing that he was forcibly medicated when he tendered his pleas and that he has not been able to obtain a copy of a court file of an earlier proceeding which resulted in an order that he be involuntarily committed and treated with antipsychotic medications before he pleaded guilty. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied extraordinary relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Fitzgerald was not entitled to extraordinary relief under the circumstances of this case. View "Fitzgerald v. Dist. Court Dep’t of the Trial Court" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was indicted on a charge of violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32E(b)(2) for trafficking in cocaine with a total weight of 28.14 grams. In 2012, St. 2012, ch. 192 (Crime Bill) was enacted, which amended section 32E(b)(2), along with section 32E(b)(1), to redefine the minimum and maximum trafficking weights. The Crime Bill also reduced the mandatory minimum sentence required for a violation of both section 32(e)(b)(1) and (2). Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to apply all the Crime Bill’s amendments to section 32E(b)(1) and (2) to his case. The judge allowed Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Galvin, (1) the Crime Bill’s reduction of the mandatory minimum sentence required for a violation of section 32(b)(2) applies retroactively to Defendant; but (2) the reconfigured drug trafficking weights provided in sections 32E(b)(1) and (2), as amended by the the Crime Bill, do not apply retroactively to Defendant. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Didas" on Justia Law

The chief of police of the city of Worcester determined that Appellant was not a “suitable person” under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 140, 131(d) and (f) to hold a license to carry firearms. The chief first suspended Appellant’s license then revoked the license and finally denied Appellant’s application for a new license to carry. Appellant filed a complaint for judicial review of the chief’s decisions. The district court litigation was consolidated and resolved largely in favor of Appellant. The chief sought certiorari review in the superior court, and the superior court granted the chief’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the “suitable person” standard does not violate the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied; (2) the statutory scheme as to the suspension and revocation of licenses and the denial of license applications does not violate procedural due process; (3) the “suitable person” standard is not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant; and (4) the decisions of the chief were supported by substantial evidence. View "Chief of Police v. Holden" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for murder. Defendant moved to suppress certain evidence that the Commonwealth had obtained without a warrant. The superior court allowed Defendant’s motion. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence and remanded to give the Commonwealth an opportunity to demonstrate probable cause for a warrant. Defendant subsequently filed a Mass. R. Crim. P. 15(d) motion seeking attorney’s fees for counsel he engaged to replace his court-appointed counsel for the defense of the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court denied Defendant’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees, holding that Defendant was not entitled to the payment of fees where he was indigent and his new counsel agreed not to charge him any fees for their services. View "Commonwealth v. Augustine" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a respondent in a try title action may test the substantive merits of a petition’s claims in the first step of such an action, where the first step requires that the petition satisfy the jurisdictional elements of the statute. Petitioner in this case filed a petition to try title in the Land Court asserting that a purported assignment of a mortgage was invalid, thereby challenging a foreclosure by a Bank as trustee. Respondents filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim because, at the time of filing, the Bank as the assignee of the mortgage had already foreclosed on Petitioner’s mortgage. The Land Court allowed the motion, concluding that Petitioner’s petition failed to sufficiently allege effective record title, which in turn resulted in a lack of standing, because none of the allegations established any ground on which the assignment could be found invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a petitioner claiming defect in the legal title of a purported mortgagee may only meet the jurisdictional element of an “adverse claim” after that mortgagee has foreclosed; and (2) the judge correctly considered the merits of Petitioner’s claims as a necessary step in determining the absence of his record title, and therefore, dismissal with prejudice was proper. View "Abate v. Fremont Inv. & Loan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and assault and battery. Defendant appealed, arguing that the motion judge erred in denying a motion to suppress the victim’s out-of-court eyewitness identification, and (2) DNA evidence identifying the victim as the source of blood found on Defendant’s shirt should have been suppressed because the DNA analysis constituted a search that required a warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the victim had told the police that the assailant wore a gray shirt and Defendant was the only person shown wearing a gray shirt in the photographic array, the victim did not select the photograph on that basis, and therefore, the judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) where, as in this case, DNA analysis is limited to the creation of a DNA profile from lawfully seized evidence of a crime and the profile is used only to identify its unknown source, the DNA analysis is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, no search warrant was required to conduct the DNA analysis of the bloodstain from Defendant’s clothing in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Arzola" on Justia Law

The owner of a tract of land divided the land into three lots, such that a single dwelling would stand on each lot, in conformance with the the subdivision control law’s existing structures exemption, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, 81L. The new lot at 87 Main Street did not conform to the town’s zoning bylaws and rendered the dwelling located thereon nonconforming. The zoning board of appeals granted a variance to make the lot and dwelling lawful. Plaintiff later acquired 87 Main Street and sought a permit to tear down the existing dwelling and construct a new dwelling. The zoning board denied the permit on zoning grounds. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the lot was entitled to grandfather protection under the Zoning Act because the dwelling predated the town’s zoning bylaw and the lot was created pursuant to section 81L. The Land Court determined that Plaintiff was required to obtain a variance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the new nonconformities arising from the creation of 87 Main Street were rendered lawful by the original variance, the proposed reconstruction of the dwelling, which would have expanded those nonconformities, required a new or amended variance from the town’s zoning bylaw. View "Palitz v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

The personal injury protection (PIP) statute provides that an injured person claiming PIP benefits shall submit to physical examinations by “physicians” selected by the insurer as required to assist in determining amounts due. Plaintiff was injured in an accident while riding in a vehicle insured by Progressive Insurance Company (Progressive). Progressive engaged Examworks, Inc. to arrange an independent medical examination (IME) of Plaintiff. A licensed physical therapist, but not a licensed medical doctor under the Commonwealth’s physician statute, examined Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed this action against Examworks on behalf of himself and similarly situated persons, alleging invasion of privacy and unfair or deceptive practices. The district judge dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the word “physicians” in the PIP statute refers to both licensed medical doctors and also other appropriate licensed or registered health care practitioners; (2) the invasions of privacy associated with the examination in this case were justified; and (3) Defendant’s claim that Examworks engaged in deception by leading him to believe that the physical therapist was a licensed medical doctor as the PIP statute required failed because the PIP statute does not require an IME to be performed by a licensed medical doctor. View "Ortiz v. Examworks, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant pleaded guilty to certain offenses in the superior court in Norfolk County. In 2008, Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of unarmed robbery in the superior court in Plymouth County. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, concurrent with the sentence in the Norfolk County case, which he was then serving. In 2013, Defendant moved to correct the mittimus as to the Plymouth County case, requesting credit for the time he was detained while awaiting trial. The superior court denied the motion on the ground that the time at issue had already been credited against Defendant’s sentence in the Norfolk County case and that Defendant had benefited from the concurrent sentences. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the motion judge was not obligated to grant Defendant’s request. View "Commonwealth v. Ridge" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of a stun gun in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 131J, which bans the possession of an electrical weapon with some exceptions. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that a stun gun is an “arm” for purposes of the Second Amendment, and therefore, her possession of the stun gun was constitutionally protected. The motion was denied, and the trial judge found Defendant guilty of possession of the stun gun. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that chapter 140 section 131J does not violate the Second Amendment right to bear arms, as a stun gun is not the type of weapon that is eligible for Second Amendment protection. View "Commonwealth v. Caetano" on Justia Law