Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Samantha Reckis was seven years old, she developed toxic epidermal necrolysis, a life-threatening skin disorder, after receiving multiple doses of Children’s Motrin, an over-the-counter medication with ibuprofen as its active ingredient. Plaintiffs, Samantha and her parents, sued the manufacturer and marketer of Children’s Motrin and its parent company, alleging that Samantha developed TEN as a result of being exposed to ibuprofen in the Children’s Motrin and that the warning label on the medication’s bottle rendered the product defective because it failed to warn consumers about the serious risk of developing a life-threatening disease from it. A jury found in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded Samantha a total of $50 million in compensatory damages and each of Samantha’s parents $6.5 million for loss of consortium. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claim of failure to warn was not preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; (2) a pharmacologist who offered the causation evidence essential to Plaintiffs’ case was qualified to testify as to specific medical causation, and the testimony was reliable and admissible; and (3) the damages awarded to each of the plaintiffs were not grossly excessive or unsupported by the record. View "Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, the unlawful possession of a firearm, and the unlawful possession of ammunition. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for the murder conviction. Defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other claims, that the trial judge erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on duress. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) juveniles, along with adults, are generally barred from using a duress defense for intentional murder; (2) Defendant procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial during the jury empanelment, and therefore, his right to a public trial was not violated when the courtroom was closed for a period of sixty to ninety minutes during jury empanelment; and (3) Defendant was not prejudiced by a noncitizen juror deciding his case. View "Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a 2006 amendment to the “obsolete mortgage” statute, under which a mortgage becomes unenforceable after a certain number of years. A mortgage in which the term or maturity date is stated becomes unenforceable five years after the expiration of the term, and a mortgage in which the term or maturity date is not stated becomes unenforceable thirty-five years after recording. Here, Defendant conducted a foreclosure auction purporting to sell certain property that secured two mortgages held by Defendant. At the time, both mortgages would be unenforceable under the amended obsolete mortgage statute if the five-year statute of limitations was applicable. Plaintiff sought a declaration that the mortgages were discharged under the obsolete mortgage statute and that the foreclosure auction was null and void. A land court judge granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that a reference in the mortgages to the term of the underlying debt was sufficient to state the “term or maturity date of the mortgage.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the two mortgages were subject to the five-year period and thus were discharged under the obsolete mortgage statute; and (2) the application of the statute in this case did not violate due process and contracts clause protections. View "Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, and armed robbery. The motion judge dismissed the armed robbery conviction as duplicative. Defendant appealed, arguing that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his room in a “sober house” pursuant to a search warrant, alleging that there was no probable cause that he was the perpetrator. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to reduce the verdict of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or to grant a new trial, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as there was probable cause to issue a search warrant; (2) because Defendant was convicted of murder on theories of both premeditation and felony murder and because the Court affirmed on both theories, the conviction of armed robbery was not duplicative and should not have been dismissed; and (3) there was no reason to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Foster" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and possessing a firearm without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial judge (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to police following his arrest, as Defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and his statements were voluntary; and (2) did not deprive Defendant of a defense by declining to instruct the jury on the uncharged offense of accessory after the fact where the judge’s instructions clearly indicated that Defendant could not be convicted of murder if the jury concluded that Defendant’s role was indeed limited to aiding in the shooter’s escape from the police. View "Commonwealth v. Newson" on Justia Law

A franchisee janitorial worker, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals, filed a complaint against System4 LLC, a master franchisor, and NECCS, Inc., a regional subfranchisor, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract, misclassification as independent contractors in their franchise agreements, and rescission of the franchise agreements. The franchise agreements, signed only by Plaintiffs and NEECS, required the franchisees to arbitrate virtually all disputes. Defendants, citing the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement, moved to stay the court proceedings pending arbitration. The judge concluded that because System4 was not a nonsignatory to the agreements, Plaintiffs could proceed to litigate their claims against System4 in court. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that, by reason of equitable estoppel, System4 could compel Plaintiffs to arbitrate their substantive claims in accordance with the arbitration provision in Plaintiffs’ franchise agreements. Remanded. View "Machado v. System4 LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in heroin and cocaine and of unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his apartment by police officers during the execution of an “anticipatory search warrant,” claiming that the officers had executed the search before the “triggering events” stated in the affidavit had occurred. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting convictions, holding (1) where, as in this case, the Commonwealth applies for an anticipatory search warrant and the judicial authorization to execute the search is conditioned on the occurrence of a specific future event, the search is authorized by the warrant where there is equivalent compliance with that condition precedent; and (2) in this case, there was both equivalent compliance with the warrant’s triggering conditions, and compliance with those conditions provided probable cause to search Defendant’s residence. View "Commonwealth v. Colondres" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a person sixty years of age or older. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err by not explicitly instructing the jury that when considering whether to accept Defendant’s statements to law enforcement under the human practice rule, they were entitled to evaluate the validity of his Miranda waiver as a factor; (2) the judge’s instructions regarding Defendant’s defense of mental impairment did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) Defendant’s convictions and sentences were not duplicative; and (4) the trial judge’s action of designating a sleeping juror as an alternate did not amount to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees at Dunkin’ Donuts stores, brought suit against Defendants, a Dunkin’ Donuts franchisee and the entity that performed management functions for those stores, alleging that Defendants had implemented a no-tipping policy at some of their stores in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 152A (the Tips Act). The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the no-tipping policy was not a violation of the Tips Act. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Tips Act allows an employer to maintain a no-tipping policy; (2) an employer may be liable under the Tips Act if the employer fails clearly to communicate the no-tipping policy to customers, who subsequently leave tips that are retained by the employer; and (3) an employer may not be held liable if the employer clearly communicates the no-tipping policy to customers, who nonetheless leave tips that are retained by the employer. View "Meshna v. Scrivanos" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for the shooting of a fourteen-year-old. Defendant was seventeen years and five months old at the time of his arrest for the shooting. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress incriminating statements that he made to the police after waiving his Miranda rights, arguing that their introduction at trial was error given the common-law rule that, ordinarily, a juvenile must be given a meaningful opportunity to consult with an interested adult before waiving his Miranda rights, an opportunity he did not have. Several years after Defendant was convicted, the Legislature enacted St. 2013, ch. 2013 (2013 act), which amended various statutory provisions to treat seventeen year olds as juveniles. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the 2013 act did not affect this case because it is prospective in its application and does not modify the interested adult rule; but (2) the interest adult rule is now extended, on a prospective basis, to seventeen year old defendants. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law