Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial in 1994, Defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of two bloody towels that testimony suggested Defendants had used to clean themselves after stabbing the victim. In 2008, Defendants filed separate motions for a new trial based on DNA testing performed after their convictions on a previously tested towel by an independent laboratory. The testing revealed that the blood on the towel did not belong to either Defendant or the victim but to an unidentified male. The motion judge denied the motions. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the judgments of conviction, holding that there was a substantial risk that, had the newly available testing excluding the victim and the defendants as possible sources of the blood on the towel been available at the time of the trial, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Cowels" on Justia Law

Defendants were indicted on charges of murder, among other charges. The jury foreman initially announced not guilty verdicts as to each of the murder indictments but later amended the previously announced not guilty verdicts to find Defendants guilty of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convictions for reasons not relevant to this appeal and remanded for a new trial. Defendants were retried and again convicted. The Supreme Court affirmed. Following various proceedings, Defendants filed a third motion for a new trial arguing that the jury had actually acquitted them of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation in the first trial, and therefore, the retrial on that same theory in the second trial violated their double jeopardy rights. A superior court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the jury’s initial verdict did not have the double jeopardy consequence of barring retrial on a theory of premeditated murder. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2012, the probate and family court appointed Mother’s grandmother (“Great-Grandmother”) as the permanent guardian of Mother’s minor child. Mother subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), alleging that the judgment was void for lack of due process because she was not appointed by counsel in the guardianship proceeding. The probate and family court denied the motion. While Mother’s appeal from that denial was pending, the court granted Mother’s petition for removal of the guardian and vacated the guardianship. The child was returned to Mother’s custody. The Court dismissed Mother’s appeal as moot but exercised its discretion to address the issue of whether Mother was entitled to counsel. The Court held that a parent whose minor child is the subject of a guardianship proceeding and who cannot afford counsel has a right to have counsel appointed and to be so informed. View "In re Guardianship of V.V." on Justia Law

Respondent, an attorney licensed to practice in both Maine and Massachusetts, was suspended from the practice of law in Maine based on a finding of incapacity by reason of mental infirmity or addiction to drugs or intoxicants. After entry of the Maine order, bar counsel in Massachusetts petitioned for an order transferring Respondent to disability inactive status in Massachusetts pursuant to the reciprocal provisions of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 13(1). After a hearing, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court placed Respondent on disability inactive status in Massachusetts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Respondent’s suspension in Maine based on a finding of incapacity was the practical equivalent of a transfer to “disability inactive status” for purposes of the reciprocal disability provision of Rule 4:01, 13(1), and the single justice correctly concluded that Respondent was not entitled to a separate hearing in Massachusetts to evaluate her incapacity before transferring her to disability inactive status. View "In re Dwyer-Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped and arrested by law enforcement officers at the same time and in the same location as another man, Edwin Ramos, from whose person the officers recovered a packet of cocaine. Ramos was charged with possession of cocaine, and Defendant was charged with unlawful distribution of that same cocaine. A superior court judge allowed Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant was entitled to assert standing to challenge the search and seizure of cocaine from Ramos under a theory of “target standing.” The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the facts of this case did not support Defendant’s claim of target standing. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Santiago" on Justia Law

In 2009, the City of Somerville unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired employees’ health insurance premiums. Neither the city nor the school committee of Somerville, the collective bargaining agent of the city for the purpose of dealing with school employees, engaged in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees. The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board determined that the city and the school committee violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 10(a)(5) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 10(a)(1) by unilaterally reducing contributions for retired employees’ health insurance premiums. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the city and the school committee did not violate these statutory provisions when the city unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired employees’ health insurance premiums without engaging in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees. View "City of Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted by general court martial of three specifications in violation of art. 134, 10 U.S.C. 934, the “general” provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the article 134 charge and to each of the underlying specifications. After Plaintiff was released from confinement, the Sex Offender Registry Board notified him of his duty to register as a level two sex offender. Following Plaintiff’s appeal, the board upheld the classification, determining that the specifications underlying Plaintiff’s conviction were each a “like violation” to sex offenses under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 178C. The Board later successfully sought reclassification of Plaintiff as a level three sex offender. Plaintiff appealed that decision. The superior court reversed, determining that the Board lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff because his conviction under article 134 was not a “like violation” to a Massachusetts sex offense. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that article 134, although general in scope, assimilates the elements of underlying offenses, and, under the circumstances of this case, the article 134 conviction was a sex offense under chapter 6, section 178C. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

Joseph Doktor and Dorothy Doktor were divorced by a judgment nisi entered in January 1992. The judgment incorporated a separation agreement that obligated Joseph to pay alimony to Dorothy until the death or remarriage of Dorothy. The alimony provision merged with the judgment. In 2013, Joseph filed a complaint for modification seeking termination of the alimony obligation under the retirement provision of the Alimony Reform Act, which provides that “general term alimony orders shall terminate upon the payor attaining the full retirement age.” A probate and family court judge dismissed the complaint for modification, concluding that the retirement provision applies prospectively, and therefore, Joseph was required to establish that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting modification and that Joseph had not met this burden. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the retirement provision of the Act was not applicable to modification of the alimony judgment in this case; and (2) the judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that the parties’ circumstances did not warrant modification of the alimony judgment. View "Doktor v. Doktor" on Justia Law

George Rodman and Roberta Rodman were divorced in 2008. The parties entered into a separation agreement that was incorporated into and merged with a judgment of divorce nisi. The separation agreement obligated George to pay Roberta alimony in the amount of $1,539 per week until the death of either party or Roberta’s remarriage. In 2013, George filed a complaint for modification seeking to terminate his obligations to pay alimony to Roberta on the ground that he had reached “full retirement age” as defined by the Alimony Reform Act, which became effective March 1, 2012. A probate and family court judge denied the motion, concluding that the Act was not to be applied retroactively to judgments entered before March 1, 2012. George appealed, arguing that, because his agreement merged with the judgment, it was always subject to modification based on his having reached the age of retirement, and therefore, his complaint for modification did not conflict with the proscription against retroactive application set forth in the Act. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the retirement provision of the Act does not apply retroactively to alimony orders in divorce judgments that entered before March 1, 2012. View "Rodman v. Rodman" on Justia Law

Chester Chin and Edith Merriot were divorced in 2011. Pursuant to a merged provision of the parties’ separation agreement, Chin was obligated to pay alimony until the death of either party or Edith’s remarriage. In 2013, Chin filed a complaint for modification seeking to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that, as changed circumstances, he had reached full retirement age and Merriot had been cohabiting with another person. A probate and family court judge dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) neither the retirement or cohabitation provision of the Alimony Reform Act applied retrospectively to divorce judgments ordering general term alimony that were in existence prior to the effective date of the Act on March 1, 2012; and (2) under the change of circumstances standard in effect before March 1, 2012, Chin was not entitled to modification of the alimony order. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) with respect to the alimony obligation, the retirement and cohabitation provisions of the Act apply prospectively and therefore afford no basis upon which to terminate the alimony order; and (2) there was no abuse of discretion in the judge’s findings that there were no changed circumstances that would require an adjustment to the amount of alimony Chin had been ordered to pay. View "Chin v. Merriot" on Justia Law