Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the parties in this case separated, a California court entered a judgment establishing monthly child and spousal support payments payable by Father to Mother. Father subsequently moved to Massachusetts, and the California support order was registered in the probate and family court. Thereafter, the child support division of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue initiated contempt proceedings against Father. A probate and family court judge issued multiple orders that sought to enforce the California support order. The orders incorporated the parties’ stipulated agreements regarding issues that had not been included in the order of the California court. Several years later, the probate and family court found Father in contempt for having failed to make certain payments. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) to the extent the probate and family court orders modified the California support order, they were void, as the stipulated agreements did not extend the jurisdiction of the probate and family court to modify the California support order; and (2) the probate and family court had authority to hold Father in contempt for failing to comply with the probate and family court’s orders that sought to enforce the California support order. View "Cohen v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were two companies subject to the five percent excise tax on video programming delivered by direct broadcast satellite. Plaintiffs brought a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the tax violates the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution because it disfavors satellite companies as compared with those companies that provide video programming via cable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, the Department of Revenue. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the cable and satellite companies are not similarly situated, and therefore, Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of establishing that the excise tax statute was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. View "DIRECTV, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on two counts of confining or putting any person in fear for the purpose of stealing from a building, bank, safe, vault or other depository of money in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 21. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the facts supported a finding that Defendant, who together with another man intimidated victims into withdrawing funds from an ATM machine and handing those funds over to Defendant and his coventurer, had the purpose required by section 21; but (2) the trial judge erred by failing to conduct further inquiry into credible information that one of the jurors had slept through a significant portion of the trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. McGhee" on Justia Law

A juvenile was charged with possession of a class D substance with the intent to distribute marijuana after a street encounter during which a police officer arrested the juvenile. A judge in the juvenile court allowed the juvenile’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the juvenile court’s order of dismissal, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the complaint application in this case did not allege facts sufficient to establish probable cause as to each element of the offense charged. View "Commonwealth v. Ilya I." on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1994, Defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of two bloody towels that testimony suggested Defendants had used to clean themselves after stabbing the victim. In 2008, Defendants filed separate motions for a new trial based on DNA testing performed after their convictions on a previously tested towel by an independent laboratory. The testing revealed that the blood on the towel did not belong to either Defendant or the victim but to an unidentified male. The motion judge denied the motions. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the judgments of conviction, holding that there was a substantial risk that, had the newly available testing excluding the victim and the defendants as possible sources of the blood on the towel been available at the time of the trial, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Cowels" on Justia Law

Defendants were indicted on charges of murder, among other charges. The jury foreman initially announced not guilty verdicts as to each of the murder indictments but later amended the previously announced not guilty verdicts to find Defendants guilty of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convictions for reasons not relevant to this appeal and remanded for a new trial. Defendants were retried and again convicted. The Supreme Court affirmed. Following various proceedings, Defendants filed a third motion for a new trial arguing that the jury had actually acquitted them of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation in the first trial, and therefore, the retrial on that same theory in the second trial violated their double jeopardy rights. A superior court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the jury’s initial verdict did not have the double jeopardy consequence of barring retrial on a theory of premeditated murder. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2012, the probate and family court appointed Mother’s grandmother (“Great-Grandmother”) as the permanent guardian of Mother’s minor child. Mother subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), alleging that the judgment was void for lack of due process because she was not appointed by counsel in the guardianship proceeding. The probate and family court denied the motion. While Mother’s appeal from that denial was pending, the court granted Mother’s petition for removal of the guardian and vacated the guardianship. The child was returned to Mother’s custody. The Court dismissed Mother’s appeal as moot but exercised its discretion to address the issue of whether Mother was entitled to counsel. The Court held that a parent whose minor child is the subject of a guardianship proceeding and who cannot afford counsel has a right to have counsel appointed and to be so informed. View "In re Guardianship of V.V." on Justia Law

Respondent, an attorney licensed to practice in both Maine and Massachusetts, was suspended from the practice of law in Maine based on a finding of incapacity by reason of mental infirmity or addiction to drugs or intoxicants. After entry of the Maine order, bar counsel in Massachusetts petitioned for an order transferring Respondent to disability inactive status in Massachusetts pursuant to the reciprocal provisions of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 13(1). After a hearing, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court placed Respondent on disability inactive status in Massachusetts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Respondent’s suspension in Maine based on a finding of incapacity was the practical equivalent of a transfer to “disability inactive status” for purposes of the reciprocal disability provision of Rule 4:01, 13(1), and the single justice correctly concluded that Respondent was not entitled to a separate hearing in Massachusetts to evaluate her incapacity before transferring her to disability inactive status. View "In re Dwyer-Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped and arrested by law enforcement officers at the same time and in the same location as another man, Edwin Ramos, from whose person the officers recovered a packet of cocaine. Ramos was charged with possession of cocaine, and Defendant was charged with unlawful distribution of that same cocaine. A superior court judge allowed Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant was entitled to assert standing to challenge the search and seizure of cocaine from Ramos under a theory of “target standing.” The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the facts of this case did not support Defendant’s claim of target standing. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Santiago" on Justia Law

In 2009, the City of Somerville unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired employees’ health insurance premiums. Neither the city nor the school committee of Somerville, the collective bargaining agent of the city for the purpose of dealing with school employees, engaged in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees. The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board determined that the city and the school committee violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 10(a)(5) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 10(a)(1) by unilaterally reducing contributions for retired employees’ health insurance premiums. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the city and the school committee did not violate these statutory provisions when the city unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired employees’ health insurance premiums without engaging in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees. View "City of Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law