Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants and Plaintiff executed a purchase and sale agreement under which Defendants agreed to sell real property to Plaintiff. Later, Defendants’ attorney (“Attorney”) falsely told Plaintiffs that Defendants had received a higher offer for the property and to calculate its liquidated damages. Later, due to Attorney’s withholding of information before the closing, the parties were unable to close the sale. Plaintiff filed suit for specific performance. The superior court judge concluded that Defendants anticipatorily repudiated the agreement and that Attorney’s attempt to “scuttle the deal” at closing constituted an actual breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As a result, the court allowed Plaintiff to choose either compensatory damages, as provided by the agreement, or specific performance. Plaintiff elected to receive compensatory damages. Defendants appealed, contending that they did not commit an actual breach, and therefore, monetary damages were not available. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not err finding of an actual breach by Defendants, and therefore, the judge’s decision offering Plaintiff a choice of remedy was proper.View "K.G.M. Custom Homes, Inc. v. Prosky" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and burglary arising out of events that occurred in 1990. Defendant filed two motions for a new trial, which were denied. Defendant subsequently obtained evidence suggesting that the Commonwealth promised its key witness something in exchange for his testimony. In 2009, Defendant filed a third motion for a new trial, arguing that the evidence constituted newly discovered evidence that warranted a new trial. The superior court judge denied Defendant’s third motion for a new trial without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the “newly discovered” evidence was cumulative of other evidence Defendant used to impeach the witness at trial and that, after decades of investigation and discovery, there was no evidence of any agreement between the Commonwealth and the witness.View "Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of possession of a firearm without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting evidence of bullet shell casings and live ammunition found hours after the shooting; (2) the trial court did not abuse his discretion in admitting admitting a recording of a jailhouse telephone call made by Defendant in which he used street jargon and offensive language; (3) jail officials did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by monitoring and recording Defendant's telephone calls from jail and by sending law enforcement information derived from the calls; (4) there was sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of murder under a joint venture theory; and (5) trial judge properly did not give the jury a special verdict slip and special jury instruction requiring the jury to determine separate whether Defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree as a principal or as an accomplice. View "Commonwealth v. Rosa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this eminent domain action seeking damages from the Commonwealth on account of land takings that the Commonwealth made in connection with the Sagamore Bridge Flyover Project in Bourne that eliminated a traffic rotary north of the bridge. Plaintiff owned parcels of land near the former rotary and operated a gas station on one of the parcels. After a jury trial, Plaintiff was awarded almost $3 million in damages. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) because the flyover project was not laid over a public way that directly abutted Plaintiff’s property, Plaintiff was not entitled to damages under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 81, 7C as a matter of law; and (2) because Plaintiff retained reasonable and appropriate access to and from the gas station parcel, Plaintiff was not entitled to impairment of access damages under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 79, 12. View "Sorenti Bros., Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant, a noncitizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and received a sentence of probation. Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving without a license and taken into custody by immigration authorities. Contending that his defense counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. A superior court allowed the motion, concluding that Defendant’s counsel gave Defendant constitutionally deficient advice when he told Defendant he would be “eligible for deportation” if he pleaded guilty to the drug possession charges. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the conviction of a noncitizen with intent to distribute cocaine makes deportation or removal from the United States presumptively mandatory, counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient in that it did not convey what is clearly stated in federal law.View "Commonwealth v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant appealed, raising five claims of error. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the trial judge erred in furnishing the jury with an instruction in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriquez and Commonwealth v. Tuey, as a reasonable jury listening to this instruction would have understood that, if they were unable to reach a verdict with respect to murder in the first degree, a mistrial would be declared, and the case would need to be retried; and (2) the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice with respect to the jury’s decision to convict Defendant of murder in the first degree rather than murder in the second degree. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to strike a portion of the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) because counsel did not move to strike the expert witness’s nonresponsive answer, the Commonwealth was provided with the proof it needed to survive a motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the element of intent to distribute; and (2) a new trial was required for the Commonwealth to present the testimony of a witness whose statements were allegedly relied upon by the Commonwealth’s expert. View "Commonwealth v. Sepheus" on Justia Law

New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. (NEFF) was a nonprofit corporation organized under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 180 and the record owner of a parcel of forest land in the town of Hawley. The Board of Assessors for Hawley denied NEFF’s application for a charitable tax exemption on the parcel. The Appellate Tax Board (Board) also denied the application on the grounds that NEFF did not show that it occupied the land for a charitable purpose within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 59, 5, Third (Clause Third). The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Board’s opinion, holding that the Board erred in concluding that NEFF did not meet its burden to show that it occupied the property within the meaning of Clause Third.View "New England Forestry Found., Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors of Hawley" on Justia Law

The Estate of Steven Gavin filed a wrongful death action against the Commonwealth and Tewksbury State Hospital under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, alleging that Gavin’s death was caused by the negligence of hospital staff members. The presentment of the claim was made by the Estate, through its attorney, and not by the executor or administrator of the Estate. The superior court allowed Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the statutory requirements for presentment of a claim under the Act were not met in this case. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the presentment made by the Estate, before the appointment of an executor or administrator, was proper. Remanded.View "Estate of Gavin v. Tewksbury State Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-insurance company filed suit against Defendant-manufacturer, alleging various theories of products liability. Defendant raised the defense of a lack of personal jurisdiction in its answer but did not file a motion to dismiss the case on that basis. Twelve months after filing its answer to the complaint, during which time Defendant pursued litigation on the merits, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of a lack of personal jurisdiction. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant, but Defendant waived this defense by litigating the merits of the case and thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the court; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed as to the merits, which precluded the entry of summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) where a party raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in a responsive pleading, the party’s subsequent conduct may, in some circumstances, result in a forfeiture of that defense; and (2) the superior court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this case.View "Am Int’l Ins. Co. v. Robert Seuffer GmbH & Co. KG" on Justia Law