Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery and assault and battery. On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court’s admission of expert opinion that the DNA profile generated from a known saliva sample of Defendant matched a DNA profile obtained from a swab taken from eyeglasses that were left at the scene of the robbery. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) an expert opinion regarding the results of DNA testing is not admissible unless the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the reliability of the underlying data produced by the DNA testing; and (2) in this case, the analysts who generated the DNA profiles did not testify at trial, and the expert witness who offered the opinion of a match had no affiliation with the laboratory that tested the crime scene sample, and therefore, Defendant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity for such cross-examination. Remanded for a new trial.View "Commonwealth v. Tassone " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendant were neighbors. Because of false police reports filed by Defendant, Defendant was granted a harassment prevention order against Plaintiffs, which was later vacated. Defendant also filed several criminal complaints against Plaintiffs, each of which was dismissed. Additionally, Defendant installed several video cameras in his house, which were pointed at Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. The superior court allowed Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to all claims. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs made out a plausible claim for invasion of privacy; and (2) there was no error in the judge’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.View "Polay v. McMahon" on Justia Law

A ten-year-old boy was in a kayak fishing with his father when Defendant, who was piloting a motorboat, struck the kayak, killing the boy and seriously injuring the father. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor homicide by vessel and misleading a police officer. Defendant challenged the validity of both convictions on appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) reversed Defendant’s conviction for misleading a police officer, holding that there was insufficient evidence that Defendant had the specific intent necessary to prove a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, 13B; and (2) affirmed Defendant’s homicide conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant was operating while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, which diminished his capacity to operate the vessel safely. View "Commonwealth v. Morse" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were granted relief an action filed against Marion Haddad and the Holy Annunciation Monastery Church of the Golden Hills. Plaintiffs sought to satisfy the judgment, which represented the proceeds from a sale of property. The court ordered Holy Annunciation and Haddad to hold the proceeds of the sale in escrow, but Haddad deposited $40,000 of the proceeds in her retirement account with the State Board of Retirement. When Plaintiffs received no payment for the judgment, they brought this case in part to name the Board as trustee for the $40,000. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Haddad’s retirement account was exempt from attachment and that the Commonwealth was immune from suit. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Haddad did not have rights in the $40,000 she deposited with the Board, and therefore, those funds were not statutorily prohibited from being subject to attachment; and (2) the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiffs from summoning the Board as trustee with respect to those funds.View "Randall v. Haddad" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a new vehicle from Dealer that was subject to Manufacturer’s limited warranty. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against Manufacturer and Dealer (together, Defendants), alleging that the vehicle was defective and that Defendants failed to repair or remedy the defects under the warranty. Dealer demanded that Manufacturer reimburse Dealer for the attorney’s fees it incurred in defending against Plaintiff’s claims and indemnification for and liability incurred. Plaintiffs claims against Defendants were disposed of through summary judgment and voluntary dismissal. The judge also found that Dealer was not entitled to indemnificationt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff’s allegations alleged the fault or negligence of both Manufacturer and Dealer, Manufacturer did not have a duty to defend under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B, 8(a).View "Ferreira v. Chrysler Group LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a crime and sentenced to a period of imprisonment followed by community parole supervision for life (CPSL). While serving his CPSL sentence, Petitioner tested positive for opiates. During the CPSL revocation proceedings that followed, Petitioner was confined pursuant to parole board regulations pursuant to parole board regulations. While Petitioner was confined, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the superior court alleging that Petitioner was a sexually dangerous person (SDP). The parole board found a CPSL violation, and Petitioner’s confinement continued as a sanction for the CPSL violation. Petitioner was civilly committed pending the outcome of the SDP petition. While temporarily committed, Petitioner filed this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking a declaration that his due process rights were violated in the CPSL revocation proceeding and that his CPSL sentence was unconstitutional under separation of powers principles. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Petitioner’s CPSL sentence and his incarceration were unlawful, and therefore, Petitioner was not a “prisoner” for purposes of the SDP statute when the Commonwealth filed its SDP petition.View "Gangi v. Mass. Parole Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant was classified as a level two sex offender and was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant later pleaded guilty to failing to provide notice of a change of address. The district court sentenced him to six months of supervised probation and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct his sentence, claiming that the sentence was unconstitutional. Specifically, Defendant argued that CPSL violated the separation of powers doctrine by improperly delegating to the parole board the exercise of the judicial power to impose sentences. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Defendant and vacated his sentence, holding that CPSL violates article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by granting to the parole board, an entity of the executive branch, a quintessential judicial power, the power to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to additional terms of imprisonment.View "Commonwealth v. Cole" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, probation, and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his CPSL sentence was unconstitutional. Pursuant to the Supreme Judicial Court’s holding today in Commonwealth v. Cole, which held that CPSL violates separation of powers principles by delegating to the parole board, an agency of the executive branch, the distinctly judicial power to impose sentences, the Court vacated Defendant’s CPSL sentence and remanded for resentencing.View "Commonwealth v. Parrillo " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was granted a temporary abuse prevention order against Defendant and later sought to have the abuse prevention order extended for one year. The district court extended certain portions of the abuse prevention order for three months. Plaintiff appealed. While the appeals were pending, the underlying orders were succeeded by other orders, to which Plaintiff did not object. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeals as moot. However, the Court exercised its discretion to comment on some of the issues presented in this opinion.View "Singh v. Capuano" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of committing assault and battery on a person protected by an abuse and prevention order and of violating an abuse preventing order. The Appeals Court affirmed. Defendant filed an application for further appellate review, contending that the two offenses for which he was convicted were duplicative, and therefore, his convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) violation of an abuse prevention order is not a lesser included offense of assault and battery on a person protected by an abuse preventing order, and therefore, conviction of both offenses does not violate double jeopardy principles; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction of assault and battery on a person protected by an abuse prevention order.View "Commonwealth v. Torres" on Justia Law