Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of enticement of a child and four counts of attempting to commit certain offenses, including rape of a child, indecent assault and battery on a child, and disseminating matter harmful to a minor. The appeals court affirmed the convictions of enticement of a child, attempted rape, and attempted indecent assault and battery and vacated the convictions of disseminating matter harmful to a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of enticement of a child and reversed the convictions of attempt, holding (1) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions of attempted rape, attempted indecent assault and battery, and dissemination of matter harmful to a minor; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of enticement of a child, the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the introduction of certain photographs notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s prior stipulation not to introduce the photographs, and the police did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by searching his computer for evidence.View "Commonwealth v. Buswell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on ice on the walkway of a public school. The walkway was owned and operated by the City of Haverhill, and Plaintiff was on the premises to attend a scheduled parent-teacher conference. Plaintiff sued the City for negligence. The superior court allowed the City’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21, 17C, which bars claims of ordinary negligence against a landowner, including a governmental entity, that has opened its land to the public for recreational, educational, or other enumerated purposes, without charging a fee. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the limitation on liability provided by the statute extends solely to land open to the general public; and (2) when Plaintiff was injured, the school was open only to a discrete group and not to the general publicView "Wilkins v. City of Haverhill" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an action alleging that the practice by which the Nation’s pledge of allegiance is recited each morning in Defendants’ public schools violated (1) Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights under the Massachusetts Constitution because the pledge included the words “under God,” and (2) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 76, 5, which prohibits discrimination in Massachusetts public school education. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the intervenors. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the recitation of the pledge, which no student is required to recite, does not violate the Constitution or the statute.View "Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioners Ronald Watts and Kevin Aguirre were charged by way of complaints issued in district court with criminal offenses that Petitioners allegedly committed when they were each seventeen years old. The Governor subsequently signed St. 2013 ch. 84 (Act), which extended the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to persons who were seventeen years old at the time of committing an offense. Petitioners moved to dismiss the district court charges against them pursuant to the Act, claiming that the district courts lacked jurisdiction over them because they were seventeen at the time the alleged offenses occurred and when the criminal proceedings had begun. The Supreme Judicial Court denied Petitioners’ motions, holding that the Act does not apply retroactively to cases involving juveniles who were seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense and whose criminal cases in the superior court or district court were begun prior to, and were pending on, the effective date of the Act.View "Watts v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, unarmed robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. During trial, the State presented evidence indicating that Defendant’s DNA profile matched that of sperm found on the victim’s underwear worn on the day of the offense. For the next several years, Defendant sought, unsuccessfully, to have the sperm sample analyzed with newer and more sophisticated techniques for DNA testing. After the Legislature enacted Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, Defendant filed a motion and renewed motion pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, 3 seeking more sophisticated DNA testing. The superior court denied the motions on the grounds that DNA testing already had been conducted and the evidence against Defendant was overwhelming. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s motions were properly denied where the motions did not provide information demonstrating that the requested analysis had not been developed at the time of Defendant’s conviction.View "Commonwealth v. Donald" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge’s handling of witness testimony given pursuant to grants of immunity and plea agreements did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (2) the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument did not amount to improper vouching. View "Commonwealth v. Webb" on Justia Law

Defendant and the victim in this case were intellectually disabled adults who lived together in a State-licensed residential facility. After Defendant pushed the victim into a bathroom, causing injuries to the victim, Plaintiff filed an application for an abuse prevention order on behalf of the victim. A district court judge granted an abuse prevention order pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, determining that, because Defendant and the victim lived “in the same household,” the district court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order against Defendant, concluding that individuals who share a common diagnosis or status, rather than marriage, blood, or other relationships enumerated in chapter 209A, and who live together in a facilities run by the State, do not qualify as “household members” within the meaning of chapter 209A. View "Silva v. Carmel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from the prosecutor’s use of a rhetorical question during closing arguments; (2) the trial judge did not err in refusing, over Defendant’s objection, to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on reasonable provocation; and (3) in response to a jury question, the judge did not err in reinstructing the jury of their duty to find Defendant guilty of the most serious offense that the Commonwealth had proved beyond a reasonable doubt.View "Commonwealth v. Nelson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the murder of his four-year-old daughter, who died from intoxication due to sedating drugs found in her system, or from pneumonia, or from a combination of both intoxication and pneumonia. Defendant appealed his conviction and the denial of his motions for a new trial and for funds to retain a toxicologist. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and the orders denying Defendant’s motions, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in handling the issue of toxicological evidence at trial, and trial counsel did not otherwise render ineffective assistance; (2) the evidence of malice was sufficient to support the conviction; (3) the prosecutor properly used and commented on evidence of acts Defendant committed after the charged offense to show intent or state of mind at the time of the charged offense; and (4) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing and in denying Defendant’s posttrial motion for funds to retain a forensic toxicologist.View "Commonwealth v. Riley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home in a mortgage loan transaction with Summit Mortgage. The mortgage was later assigned to Defendant, SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. Facing foreclosure, Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding against SunTrust in the pending bankruptcy case, seeking rescission of the loan transaction and damages. SunTrust filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs filed their adversary complaint more than four years after the mortgage loan transaction, the defensive rescission-by-way-of-recoupment claim was barred by section 10(f) of the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (“MCCCDA”). In response, Plaintiffs asserted that the four-year statute of limitations did apply to their action because section 10(i)(3) of the MCCCDA allows for recoupment claims at any time. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts certified a question of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which answered by holding that a borrower who grants a mortgage in a consumer credit transaction may not rescind the transaction under the MCCCDA defensively by way of common law recoupment after the expiration of the statute of limitations set forth in section 10(f) of the MCCCDA.View "May v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law