Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested in connection with the shooting death of Jonathan Nieves. While awaiting his initial appearance in the district court and after being held for approximately nine hours in the police station, Defendant was interrogated by police. Defendant moved to suppress the inculpatory statements he made during the interrogation, arguing that the statements were inadmissible under Commonwealth v. Rosario because they were made more than six hours after arrest and before being brought to court for arraignment. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining the Commonwealth’s request to revisit the Roasrio rule, as the rule “continues to serve as an important and practical protection of the constitutional and common-law rights of persons arrested for violations of the criminal laws.”View "Commonwealth v. Powell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were retired public employees who received a retirement allowances from the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System (MTRS) and the Plymouth County Retirement System pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32. Plaintiffs filed an action against the Town of Middleborough, arguing that the board of selectmen did not have the authority to raise the health maintenance organization (HMO) premium contribution percentage for retired public employees from ten percent to twenty percent. The trial judge allowed Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32B, 16, the town’s board of selectmen has the authority to establish the percentage of the total monthly premium for HMO coverage that is to be paid by the town’s retired employees. View "Twomey v. Town of Middleborough" on Justia Law

Defendants and Plaintiff executed a purchase and sale agreement under which Defendants agreed to sell real property to Plaintiff. Later, Defendants’ attorney (“Attorney”) falsely told Plaintiffs that Defendants had received a higher offer for the property and to calculate its liquidated damages. Later, due to Attorney’s withholding of information before the closing, the parties were unable to close the sale. Plaintiff filed suit for specific performance. The superior court judge concluded that Defendants anticipatorily repudiated the agreement and that Attorney’s attempt to “scuttle the deal” at closing constituted an actual breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As a result, the court allowed Plaintiff to choose either compensatory damages, as provided by the agreement, or specific performance. Plaintiff elected to receive compensatory damages. Defendants appealed, contending that they did not commit an actual breach, and therefore, monetary damages were not available. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not err finding of an actual breach by Defendants, and therefore, the judge’s decision offering Plaintiff a choice of remedy was proper.View "K.G.M. Custom Homes, Inc. v. Prosky" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and burglary arising out of events that occurred in 1990. Defendant filed two motions for a new trial, which were denied. Defendant subsequently obtained evidence suggesting that the Commonwealth promised its key witness something in exchange for his testimony. In 2009, Defendant filed a third motion for a new trial, arguing that the evidence constituted newly discovered evidence that warranted a new trial. The superior court judge denied Defendant’s third motion for a new trial without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the “newly discovered” evidence was cumulative of other evidence Defendant used to impeach the witness at trial and that, after decades of investigation and discovery, there was no evidence of any agreement between the Commonwealth and the witness.View "Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of possession of a firearm without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting evidence of bullet shell casings and live ammunition found hours after the shooting; (2) the trial court did not abuse his discretion in admitting admitting a recording of a jailhouse telephone call made by Defendant in which he used street jargon and offensive language; (3) jail officials did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by monitoring and recording Defendant's telephone calls from jail and by sending law enforcement information derived from the calls; (4) there was sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of murder under a joint venture theory; and (5) trial judge properly did not give the jury a special verdict slip and special jury instruction requiring the jury to determine separate whether Defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree as a principal or as an accomplice. View "Commonwealth v. Rosa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this eminent domain action seeking damages from the Commonwealth on account of land takings that the Commonwealth made in connection with the Sagamore Bridge Flyover Project in Bourne that eliminated a traffic rotary north of the bridge. Plaintiff owned parcels of land near the former rotary and operated a gas station on one of the parcels. After a jury trial, Plaintiff was awarded almost $3 million in damages. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) because the flyover project was not laid over a public way that directly abutted Plaintiff’s property, Plaintiff was not entitled to damages under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 81, 7C as a matter of law; and (2) because Plaintiff retained reasonable and appropriate access to and from the gas station parcel, Plaintiff was not entitled to impairment of access damages under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 79, 12. View "Sorenti Bros., Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant, a noncitizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and received a sentence of probation. Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving without a license and taken into custody by immigration authorities. Contending that his defense counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. A superior court allowed the motion, concluding that Defendant’s counsel gave Defendant constitutionally deficient advice when he told Defendant he would be “eligible for deportation” if he pleaded guilty to the drug possession charges. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the conviction of a noncitizen with intent to distribute cocaine makes deportation or removal from the United States presumptively mandatory, counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient in that it did not convey what is clearly stated in federal law.View "Commonwealth v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant appealed, raising five claims of error. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the trial judge erred in furnishing the jury with an instruction in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriquez and Commonwealth v. Tuey, as a reasonable jury listening to this instruction would have understood that, if they were unable to reach a verdict with respect to murder in the first degree, a mistrial would be declared, and the case would need to be retried; and (2) the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice with respect to the jury’s decision to convict Defendant of murder in the first degree rather than murder in the second degree. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to strike a portion of the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) because counsel did not move to strike the expert witness’s nonresponsive answer, the Commonwealth was provided with the proof it needed to survive a motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the element of intent to distribute; and (2) a new trial was required for the Commonwealth to present the testimony of a witness whose statements were allegedly relied upon by the Commonwealth’s expert. View "Commonwealth v. Sepheus" on Justia Law

New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. (NEFF) was a nonprofit corporation organized under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 180 and the record owner of a parcel of forest land in the town of Hawley. The Board of Assessors for Hawley denied NEFF’s application for a charitable tax exemption on the parcel. The Appellate Tax Board (Board) also denied the application on the grounds that NEFF did not show that it occupied the land for a charitable purpose within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 59, 5, Third (Clause Third). The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Board’s opinion, holding that the Board erred in concluding that NEFF did not meet its burden to show that it occupied the property within the meaning of Clause Third.View "New England Forestry Found., Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors of Hawley" on Justia Law