Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a surreptitiously recorded oral conversation between him and a police informant, that evidence of the conversation should have been excluded at trial, and therefore, that his conviction must be reversed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the one-party consent exception to the statutory prohibition against the secret recording or oral communications applied in this case. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding that the recorded conversation did not fit within the exception, that the conversation should not have been admitted in evidence at trial, and that the error was not harmless. View "Commonwealth v. Burgos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against his former employer, the Attleboro Housing Authority (AHA), for alleged violations of the Wage Act, claiming (1) the AHA intentionally misclassified his position, thereby failing to pay him the wages to which he was entitled; and (2) the AHA terminated him in retaliation for complaining about the nonpayment of earned wages. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on both claims and awarded damages against the AHA. The parties then filed numerous posttrial motions, to no avail. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Wage Act; (2) reinstatement to employment is not an available remedy for violations of the Wage Act; and (3) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on damages or, in the alternative, for additur. View "Fernandes v. Attleboro Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of distributing cocaine and doing so in a school zone. Defendant appealed. While the appeal was pending, the school zone statute was amended to reduce the radius of the school zone. The appeals court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, concluding that the amendment did not have retroactive effect. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Legislature did not intend to grant new trials to defendants who already had been convicted after the effective date of the amendment, and therefore, the amendment did not entitle Defendant to a new trial on his conviction of a school zone violation. View "Commonwealth v. Thompson" on Justia Law

John Doe, who was thirty-one years old, pleaded guilty to several sex offenses that he committed when he was a juvenile. Seven years later, Doe was classified as a level one sex offender. The classification was upheld by a judge of the superior court. Doe appealed, arguing that he should not be required to register as a sex offender in light of scientific research showing that adolescent brains are different from adult brains and in light of the long period of time that had elapsed since his last offense. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court judge’s decision upholding the hearing examiner’s classification determination, holding that the hearing examiner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberately premeditated murder and possession of a class B substance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) there was no error in the denial of Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty, as the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of deliberately premeditated murder; (2) the trial court did not err in Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, as amended, for the alleged denial of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (3) there was no error in the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss for belated discovery disclosure; (4) the trial judge did not err in failing to declare, sua sponte, a mistrial based on alleged jury tampering; and (5) there was no error in the judge’s instruction concerning the manner in which the jury should consider the testimony of a cooperating witness. View "Commonwealth v. Roman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of six counts of possessing child pornography. Each count was premised on one or two distinct photographs culled at the same time from a single cache on Defendant’s computer. Defendant appealed, arguing that his convictions were duplicative. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) where offending photographs come from a single cache and the defendant is charged with possessing them at the same point in time, the proper unit of prosecution for the possession of child pornography is only a single unit of prosecution; and (2) accordingly, the entry of six separate convictions and sentences constituted multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the guaranty against double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Rollins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twelve residential and business customers of Defendant Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company who lost power during a major ice storm, filed suit on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, asserting claims of gross negligence and violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class, and the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ chapter 93A claims. In their motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs sought issue preclusive effect of findings made by the Department of Public Utilities (DPU) in two previous administrative adjudications related to Defendant’s conduct during the storm. The superior court judge (1) denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification; and (2) primarily denied the motions for summary judgment after applying offensive issue preclusion to factual findings made by the DPU. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to certify a class and in applying issue preclusion to facts found after evidentiary hearings at the DPU. View "Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder, based on the underlying felonies of home invasion and armed or assaultive burglary, and five related offenses. The jury did not specify whether they found Defendant guilty of the offenses as a principal or as a joint venturer. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant shared the intent required to support his convictions; (2) there was no abuse of discretion in the manner in which the judge limited the scope of the cross-examination and the redirect examination of one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s request for an instruction on murder in the second degree based on an uncharged offense or an instruction on intervening cause; and (4) counsel was not ineffective for failing to object when the judge instructed that accident was not a defense to the killing. View "Commonwealth v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The trustees of the Hollis W. Plimpton, Jr. Family Trust filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the trust as drafted correctly expressed the intent to the settlor that his estate be eligible to obtain the optimal benefit of allowable federal and state estate tax marital deductions. Alternatively, the trustees sought an order rewording a portion of the trust to ensure that it accomplished the settlor’s intent. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that a judgment enter in the county court declaring that this was not a suitable occasion for the type of relief sought and dismissing the complaint, as the apparent objective of the parties - to insure by declaration or reformation that no person in the future misconstrues the document - is not something that justifies judicial involvement. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Babcock" on Justia Law

George C. Houser established the George C. Houser Trust, which established two trusts for the benefit of Mary R. Houser during her lifetime and gave her a power of appointment over one of the trusts (the marital trust). Upon Mary’s death in 1993, the principal remaining in the George C. Houser Trust was divided into two share trusts, one for each of the Housers’ sons. After George’s death in 1983, Mary established the Mary R. Houser Trust - 1991 and exercised her power of appointment over the marital trust property by appointing it to the trustees of the Mary Houser Trust. The trustees filed a complaint seeking reformation the trust established under Article Fourth of the Mary R. Houser Trust - 1991 to correct a drafting error that they contended frustrated the intent of Mary and George to provide for their descendants in an efficient and tax-advantageous manner. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that the family trust be reformed by correcting the mistake in drafting, which inadvertently frustrated Mary’s estate planning objectives. View "Connell v. Houser" on Justia Law