Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court judge granting summary judgment in favor of BSC Companies, Inc., BSC Group, Inc., and the companies' president (collectively, BSC) in this action brought by BSC's former employees alleging claims under the Prevailing Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 26-27H, holding that the contracts at issue were not governed by the Act, and BSC was not required to pay its employees a prevailing wage pursuant to the contracts.At issue were two professional engineering services contracts awarded by the Department of Transportation (MassDOT) to BSC. The contracts were not competitively bid and were not awarded to the lowest bidder, unlike contracts for public works construction projects governed by the Act. Further, the contracts did not specify that BSC's employees would be paid at least a prevailing wage determined by the Department of Labor Standards. The superior court judge granted summary judgment to BSC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a prevailing wage for their work under the professional services contracts. View "Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this negligence action brought by Plaintiff seeking damages for wrongful death and loss of consortium, holding that summary judgment was appropriately granted in favor of Defendant.Drake Scott, Jr. was shot and killed outside the exit door of a nightclub leasing space in a commercial property. Plaintiff, Scott's mother, filed this negligence action against the owner of the property, alleging that Defendant knew or should have known about potential dangers and threat of violence on the property and that Defendant breached this duty, resulting in Scott's death. The trial judge allowed Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the shooting was not foreseeable, and therefore, Defendant owed no duty to protect Scott. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding the the shooting that occurred in this case was not reasonably foreseeable to Defendant, and therefore, Defendant had no legal duty to prevent it. View "Hill-Junious v. UTP Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's action alleging that defendant Massachusetts Coastal Railroad LLC (MCR) paid him less than the prevailing wage on State public works projects, holding that the trial court did not err.In their motion to dismiss, MCR and its managing officer (together, Defendants), argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 10501 preempted the Prevailing Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 26-27H, and therefore, the Commonwealth was precluded from enforcing the Act. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Defendants failed to show that the Prevailing Wage Act was preempted; and (2) Plaintiff's allegations plausibly suggested a right to relief under the Act. View "Marsh v. Mass. Coastal Railroad LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the second degree and assault and battery by discharge of a firearm but vacated his convictions for carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a loaded firearm without a license, holding that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that the Commonwealth was required to prove an absence of a valid license created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.At trial, Defendant sought to introduce Adjutant evidence or evidence of specific incidents of violence allegedly initiated by the victim. The trial judge allowed Defendant to introduce limited evidence of violent incidents initiated by the victim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions in part, holding (1) the judge's ruling excluding additional testimony about the violent instances initiated by the victim exceeded the cope and purpose of Adjutant evidence, but there was no prejudice from its exclusion; (2) the trial judge did not err in the instruction regarding the jury's consideration of Adjutant evidence; and (3) pursuant to this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666 (2023), Defendant's firearm convictions must be vacated because the judge's failure to properly instruct the jury that Defendant did not have a license to carry a firearm was not harmless. View "Commonwealth v. Souza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder on a theory of joint venture and other crimes, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for change of venue, and Defendant failed to show any actual juror prejudice from the denial or that she was tried by anything but a fair and impartial jury; (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove Defendant's guilt as a joint venturer of murder in the first degree of the first victim; (3) there was also sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction of the first victim on the basis of felony murder; and (4) there was ample evidence to prove Defendant's guilt as a joint venturer of murder in the first degree on the basis of deliberate premeditation of the second victim. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, holding that portions of the victim's then-girlfriend's grand jury testimony were properly admitted in accordance with the hearsay exemption for prior inconsistent statements.Prior to trial, the victim's then-girlfriend Shyla Bizarro identified Defendant as the victim's attacker from surveillance video footage and testified to her identification before the grand jury. Prior to her testimony, however, Bizarro revealed that she wished to recant her statements to police and her grand jury testimony. The trial judge admitted substantively the recanted portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony, including her prior statements of identification. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony were properly admitted as prior inconsistent statements; (2) portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony identifying Defendant in the video independently satisfied the hearsay exemption for statements of identification; and (3) there was no merit to Defendant's remaining arguments. View "Commonwealth v. Brum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's firearm-related convictions but affirmed his convictions for murder in the first degree based on a theory of felony-murder, home invasion and armed assault with intent to rob, holding that the firearm-related convictions must be vacated in light of Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666 (2023).Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce certain categories of telephone calls; (2) there was no error in the denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial; (3) Defendant's convictions of unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm must be vacated in light of this Court's precedent decision in Guardado; and (4) there was no reason for this Court to exercise its extraordinary authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant Defendant a new trial or reduce the murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Gibson" on Justia Law

In this action arising from litigation between Petitioner and the mothers of his children the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice treating the underlying petition seeking relief in the nature of certiorari as a petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and denying the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that extraordinary relief was not warranted.In his petition, Petitioner sought correction of alleged errors in judicial proceedings, including rulings that he characterized as "gatekeeper" orders, claiming that he was precluded from seeking review of the orders because one or more of them was not timely entered on the docket of the probate and family court. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that adequate alternative remedies were not available to him. View "Kifor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petitions filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and associated motions, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary relief to correct errors that may be reviewed in the ordinary process of trial and appeal.Petitioner, who was indicted for rape and other charges and found incompetent to stand trial, was later determined to be competent to stand trial, and the proceedings were ongoing. In the petitions at issue, Petitioner made very general claims. The single justice declined to reach the merits of the petitions and denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the single justice did not err in denying the petitions; and (2) because this is the third time Petitioner sought extraordinary relief arising from the same criminal proceedings, Petitioner was on notice that further attempts to obtain such relief may result in the imposition of sanctions. View "Ardaneh v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the probate and family court dismissing a petition for formal probate seeking appointment as personal representative, holding that the position of voluntary personal representative charged with administering a small estate pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 3-1201 constitutes a "prior appointment" within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 3-108's exception to the three-year limit.Petitioner, the voluntary personal representative of the decedent's estate pursuant to section 3-1201, filed a petition for formal probate seeking an appointment as personal representative under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 120B, 3-402. After receiving briefing on the issue of whether the position of voluntary personal representative under section 3-1201 constitutes a prior appointment under section 3-108 such that a subsequent formal petition for appointment under section 3-402 could be filed more than three years after the decedent's death, a probate and family court judge dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Petitioner's petition for formal appointment was timely. View "In re Estate of Slavin" on Justia Law