Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After electrical outages arising from Tropical Storm Irene on August 28, 2011 and a snowstorm two months later, the Department of Public Utilities entered orders against three utility companies - National Grid, NSTAR Electric Company (NSTAR), and Western Massachusetts Electric Company (WMEC) - that imposed monetary penalties for the utilities’ failure to restore service to their customers “in a safe and reasonably prompt manner.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Department applied the appropriate reasonableness standard in finding that the utilities violated their duty to restore service in a safe and reasonably prompt manner; (2) the Department’s findings regarding National Grid and WMEC were supported by substantial evidence, but its finding that NSTAR failed timely to respond to priority two and three wires-down calls was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) with two exceptions, the Department made the necessary findings and did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of monetary penalties. Remanded. View "Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation, arson of a dwelling house, and attempted murder of thirteen persons arising from Defendant’s act of setting fire to a curtain in the first-floor apartment of a three-story house. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding that the trial judge erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress certain statements she made to police during two interviews, and the error was not harmless with respect to the convictions of murder in the first degree and attempted murder but was harmless with respect to the conviction of arson of a dwelling house. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Thomas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree. A panels of the Appeals Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 because Defendant acquiesced in certain delays, failed to object to every continuance sought by the Commonwealth, did not press a motion to compel the production of mandatory discovery, and otherwise engaged in ordinary motion practice; and (2) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument, but the remarks did not constitute reversible error. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to several offenses, including the dissemination of visual material depicting a child in a state of nudity or sexual conduct, one of the sex offenses involving a child enumerated in Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 265, 47 that requires a defendant convicted of such an offense to be subject to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of any term of probation. The sentencing judge in this case declined to require that Defendant wear a GPS device as a condition of probation. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the failure to include GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s probation was error, where (1) a sentencing judge has no discretion whether to impose GPS monitoring on a defendant sentenced to a probationary term for an enumerated offense; and (2) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47 does not violate Defendant’s due process rights. View "Commonwealth v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to eleven counts of possessing child pornography, one of the sex offenses enumerated in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47 that requires a defendant convicted of such an offense to be subject to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of any term of probation. Such monitoring was not imposed as part of Defendant’s sentence. Almost one year after Defendant was sentenced, the Commonwealth sought correction of Defendant’s sentence by the addition of GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s sentence. The sentencing judge allowed the Commonwealth’s motion. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to vacate the modified sentence, arguing, among other things, that the delayed imposition of GPS monitoring violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Defendant’s motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order imposing GPS monitoring on Defendant, holding (1) Defendant’s initial sentence was illegal insofar as it did not include GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s probation; but (2) under the circumstances of this case, the belated correction of Defendant’s sentence contravened Defendant’s legitimate expectation of finality in the terms of his initial sentence in violation of principles of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Selavka" on Justia Law

A homeless man died after being stabbed in the alcove of a storefront. Two young women identified Defendant as the perpetrator. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in permitting the introduction of state of mind evidence where the judge provided numerous limiting instructions; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress identifications and his motion for a required finding of not guilty; (3) Defendant was not denied timely access to footage of surveillance videotapes in a way that prejudiced the preparation of his defense; (4) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Defendant’s request to recall the two percipient witnesses; and (5) Defendant’s claim that the Commonwealth knowingly procured false testimony was without merit. View "Commonwealth v. Forte" on Justia Law

Nautical Tours, Inc. filed a petition with the Department of Public Utilities concerning its proposed operation of amphibious motor vehicles for sightseeing and charter purposes over certain public ways in Boston. Nautical asked the Department to exercise its licensing authority to issue a municipal street license under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159A, 1. The Department dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Nautical Tours was required to obtain a sightseeing license, which the Boston police commissioner had the exclusive authority to issue pursuant to St. 1931, c. 399. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the Department’s position that Nautical Tours needed to obtain a sightseeing license pursuant to St. 1931, c. 399, and the Department did not have any licensing authority in this regard pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159A, 1. View "Nautical Tours, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. After various proceedings, Defendant filed his fifth motion for a new trial, arguing that newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party culprit evidence warranted a new trial. The superior court denied the motion as well as Defendant’s motions for reconsideration. Defendant appealed the denial of his fifth motion for a new trial pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the appeal to proceed. The Supreme Judicial Court then affirmed the order denying Defendant’s fifth motion for a new trial, holding that the new evidence did not cast real doubt on the justice of Defendant’s conviction because there was no a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had this evidence been admitted at trial. View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony murder. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that in litigating his motions to suppress, he should have been afforded “target standing” to challenge the violation of his alleged coventurers’ constitutional rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) even assuming the availability of target standing, Defendant was properly denied target standing to challenge the violations of his coventurers’ constitutional rights; (2) the witness immunity statute was constitutional as applied to Defendant; (3) certain identification testimony was improperly admitted into evidence, but the improper testimony was not prejudicial; and (4) the trial judge erred in failing to give an instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Vacher" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree of a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed, raising five allegations of error. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the first four of Defendant’s claims but agreed with the fifth, holding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that they may consider Defendant’s consumption of alcohol in determining whether Defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner in causing the victim’s death, and the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law