Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Commonwealth’s theory at trial was that Defendant, who was in the midst of a contentious divorce from the victim, had engaged in a murder-for-hire scheme with Steven Stewart, who stabbed the victim, and their mutual friend, Richard Grebauski, the alleged middleman. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting a number of out-of-court statements introduced through Stewart’s testimony under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Defendant said he wanted his son killed and admitting testimony concerning a lumber theft by Stewart and Grebauski, but the errors did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) the trial judge erred in deciding not to admit testimony concerning purportedly exculpatory statements made by Grebauski, but the error did not result in prejudice to Defendant; and (4) there was no prejudicial error in certain remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument. View "Commonwealth v. Carriere" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Carolyn Faulk and Stanley Howard, commenced an action against Faulk’s former employer, CVS Caremark Corporation, and two of her former supervisors (collectively, Respondents), alleging that Respondents wrongfully terminated Faulk’s employment and discriminated against her on the basis of age and gender. The complaint further alleged that Howard had provided financial support to Faulk after her employment was terminated and that Howard sought damages from CVS on that basis. The trial court dismissed Howard’s claims for lack of standing and ultimately dismissed the entire complaint. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 challenging the trial court’s denial of Faulk’s request for counsel and the dismissal of Howard’s claims. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ claim regarding Faulk’s request for the appointed of counsel was moot; and (2) Howard had an adequate alternative remedy to challenge the dismissal of his claims by way of direct appeal. View "Faulk v. CVS Caremark Corp." on Justia Law

After the Town of Athol unilaterally increased copayment amounts that members of the Professional Firefighters of Athol, Local 1751, I.A.F.F. (Union) pay for medical services under their health insurance plans, the Union filed a grievance under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). An arbitrator determined that the Town violated the CBA by making the changes unilaterally. The Town filed a complaint in the superior court seeking to vacate the award and other relief. The superior court confirmed the portion of the award compelling the parties to collectively bargain over changes to copayment rates and vacated two remedial aspects of the award. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding that the superior court judge erred in vacating any portion of the award. Remanded for entry of a judgment confirming the award in its entirety. View "Town of Athol v. Prof’l Firefighters of Athol, Local 1751, I.A.F.F." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, kidnapping, and related crimes. In his third motion for a new trial, Defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a court room closure during jury empanelment. The motion judge denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant sought reconsideration of the denial of his motion, arguing that prejudice under the second prong of the standard regarding ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Commonwealth v. Saferian must be presumed due to the structural nature of the right to a public trial. The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where a defendant has procedurally waived a Sixth Amendment public trial claim by not raising it at trial and later raises the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from trial counsel’s deficient performance, and the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply. View "Commonwealth v. LaChance" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for a required finding of not guilty because the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant was at the scene of the crime during the period when the victim was robbed and killed; (2) the trial judge did not err in allowing the admission of expert testimony concerning the potential absence of blood on the victim’s killer; and (3) an error in the prosecutor’s closing argument did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Evans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued its Insurer, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory relief, after the Insurer refused to defend or indemnify Plaintiff in connection with an environmental dispute. A superior court allowed Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Insurer’s duty to defend. Plaintiff then amended its complaint to assert a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 11 arising out of the Insurer’s duty to defend. Thereafter, Plaintiff subsequently accepted reimbursement from the Insurer for its expenses in litigating and resolving the environmental matter. Insurer then sought summary judgment on the chapter 93A claim, arguing that its reimbursement of Plaintiff’s expenses precluded a finding that Plaintiff had suffered a loss of money or property, as required to establish a violation of chapter 93A section 11. The trial court denied summary judgment on the chapter 93A claim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) chapter 93A does not require a showing of uncompensated loss or a prior judgment establishing the amount of damages as a prerequisite to recovery; and (2) therefore, neither Plaintiff’s acceptance of full reimbursement of its expenses nor the absence of a judgment establishing contract damages precluded Plaintiff from pursuing a claim under chapter 93A. View "Auto Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an unpaid party who has brought an action for breach of contract against an automobile insurer and thereafter refused the insurer’s tender of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits due and payable, made prior to the entry of judgment, may proceed with the suit and obtain a judgment for those amounts, as well as its costs and attorney’s fees. Plaintiff here provided chiropractic services to a patient, who was injured while driving a vehicle insured by Defendant. Plaintiff sought payment from Defendant for its treatment of the patient, but Defendant determined it was liable for only a portion of Plaintiff’s submitted fees. Plaintiff then filed a complaint seeking, among other things, payment of the disputed amount plus costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 34M. Before trial, Defendant sent Plaintiff a check for the disputed amount, but Plaintiff rejected the offer. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that an insurer’s late tender of PIP benefits, made after a claimant has filed suit and which the claimant denies to accept, does not entitle an insurer to summary judgment. View "Barron Chiropractic & Rehab., P.C. v. Norfolk & Dedham Group" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements made during two police interviews and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and declined to exercise its power to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as Defendant’s statements were made voluntarily and after an effective waiver of Defendant’s Miranda rights, and there was no evidence the police coerced Defendant; and (2) counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a claim in Defendant’s motion for a new trial that Defendant’s right to prompt arraignment had been violated. View "Commonwealth v. Vincent" on Justia Law

Mark Sheehan, a nonimmunized witness in a criminal trial, refused to answer questions posed by the prosecutor concerning his use of illegal drugs by invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. The judge ruled that the invocation of the privilege was not valid because Sheehan had not shown that the Commonwealth had the intention of pursuing such a prosecution. The judge then found Sheehan in summary criminal contempt and imposed a sentence of ninety days’ incarceration. Sheehan intervened in the criminal proceeding and appealed the judgment of contempt. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of contempt, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Sheehan validly invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, and Sheehan’s compelled responses to such questioning did not constitute a waiver of the privilege. View "Commonwealth v. LeClair" on Justia Law

Steven Glovsky sought to solicit signatures for his nomination to the second district seat on the Governor’s Council on the sidewalk immediately outside the entrance to a supermarket owned by Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. Despite believing he had a right under article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to solicit signatures on the property, Glovsky left the property after a store manager informed him Roche Bros. prohibited this activity. Glovsky filed suit, requesting relief under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act for a violation of his rights “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” The superior court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the portion of the judgment dismissing Glovsky’s request for declaratory relief under article 9 and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, holding (1) Glovsky adequately alleged a right to solicit nominating signatures outside the supermarket, but (2) Roche Bros. did not violate this right by threats, intimidation or coercion. Remanded for entry of a judgment dismissing the request for declaratory relief as moot. View "Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law