Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2000, John Buonomo retired from his position as a Somerville alderman and began receiving pension benefits from the retirement board of Somerville (“Board”). Buonomo was subsequently elected register of probate of Middlesex County. In 2009, Buonomo was convicted of several offenses, including breaking into a depository and embezzlement by a public officer, which crimes were committed while Buonomo was register of probate. In light of Buonomo’s criminal convictions, the Board voted to forfeit Buonomo’s pension under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15. The district court reversed the Board’s decision, determining that because the crimes for which Buonomo was convicted did not arise from his work as a Somerville alderman, for which he was receiving the retirement allowance, the Board lacked a basis for revoking Buonomo’s pension. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) there is no requirement in section 15 that the public office to which a board of alderman for the city of Somerville member’s criminal convictions relate be the same as the public office from which that member is receiving a retirement allowance; and (2) because Buonomo violated the laws applicable to a position of public trust, Buonomo forfeited his entitlement to a retirement allowance from the Board.View "Ret. Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo " on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing or concealing stolen paintings. The victim of the theft (Plaintiff) filed a civil suit against Defendant for, among other claims, violations of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) due to Defendant’s transfers of assets to his family members following the discovery of his identity as the holder of the stolen paintings. Plaintiff also brought claims for relief under the UFTA against Defendant’s family members alleged to have received the fraudulent transfers. A jury found Defendant had made seven fraudulent transfers within the meaning of the UFTA, entering judgment against Defendant for more than $4.3 million. Additionally, the judge ordered equitable remedies against the relief defendants for the purposes of identifying specific assets that had been fraudulently conveyed and could be subject to reconveyance in satisfaction of the judgment against Defendant. Lastly, the judge dismissed the claim against one of the relief defendants concerning assets in a shared trust because the funds in the trust had been dissipated. Defendant appealed, arguing that money judgments should have been ordered against the relief defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment except in respect to a savings account and the shared trust. Remanded.View "Bakwin v. Mardirosian" on Justia Law

In 2006, Wife filed a complaint for divorce against Husband. The judge ordered Husband to pay temporary alimony pending final adjudication of the divorce, which entered in 2008. In 2011, Wife filed a complaint for modification. The judge modified the duration of alimony and did not subtract the time period in which temporary alimony was paid from Wife’s calculation of the maximum presumptive duration of general term alimony. Husband filed a motion for relief from the judgment, arguing that the term of alimony should have been calculated from the service of the divorce complaint rather than the judgment of divorce. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the duration of temporary alimony is not included in calculating the maximum presumptive duration of general term alimony; and (2) where temporary alimony has been paid for an unusually long period of time or the recipient spouse has unfairly delayed final resolution of the case in an attempt to prolong the payment of alimony, a judge may consider the duration of temporary alimony in determining the duration of general term alimony.View "Holmes v. Holmes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. Defendant’s appeal centered on his argument that the victim, an undocumented immigrant, characterized her consensual sex with Defendant as rape in her report to police to obtain immigration benefits. Specifically, Defendant claimed (1) he was denied the right to impeach the victim with evidence of a prior incident of sexual assault, after which she received a temporary work authorization; and (2) he should have been allowed to access Boston Area Rape Crisis Center (BARCC) records concerning the victim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge properly determined that the probative value of any testimony concerning the prior incident of sexual assault would be outweighed by its prejudicial impact; and (2) Defendant did not make the necessary threshold showing that he was entitled to production of BARCC records.View "Commonwealth v. Sealy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two motor vehicle dealers and an organization that represents the interests of new automobile and truck franchised dealerships in the state, filed this action against Tesla Motors, Inc., an automobile manufacturer, and Tesla Motors MA, Inc., its Massachusetts subsidiary, alleging violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B and conspiracy to violate chapter 93B. The superior court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action because they were not affiliated dealers of Tesla or Tesla MA. At issue before the Supreme Judicial Court was whether the 2002 amendments to chapter 93B broadened the scope of standing under the statute since the Court’s 1985 decision in Beard Motors, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Distribs., Inc. such that Massachusetts motor vehicle dealers now have standing to maintain an action for an alleged violation of the statute against unaffiliated motor vehicle manufacturers or distributors. The Court affirmed, holding that chapter 93B does not confer standing on a motor vehicle dealer to maintain an action for violation of the statute against a manufacturer with which the dealer is not affiliated. View "Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc." on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the divorced parents of four minor children. Each of the parties filed contempt complaints alleging that the other had violated various terms of the divorce judgment. The judge issued an order requiring a parent coordinator to hear the parties’ disputes regarding custody and visitation before the parties could file any action regarding those disputes in court. The order also granted the parent coordinator authority to make binding decisions on matters of custody and visitation. Mother appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order appointing the parent coordinator, holding (1) the judge exceeded the bounds of of inherent judicial authority in appointing, without all parties’ approval, the parent coordinator under the facts of this case; and (2) the breadth of authority vested in the parent coordinator constituted an impermissible delegation of judicial decision-making authority. View "Bower v. Bournay-Bower" on Justia Law

In 1997, Defendant pleaded guilty to a drug-related offense. Defendant was released in 1999 after completing his sentence on that conviction. In 2003, Defendant pleaded guilty to firearm-related offenses. In 2005, while he was incarcerated for his 2003 convictions, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea for the 1997 offense. The motion was allowed, and the 1997 offense was eventually vacated. In 2011, while still incarcerated. Defendant filed a motion seeking credit for the time he had served on the vacated 1997 conviction against the sentences that he was serving on the 2003 convictions. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, but the Appeals Court granted reversed and granted relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for credit, holding (1) credit for time served on a vacated conviction cannot be applied against time to be served on new and unrelated sentences; and (2) moreover, allowing credit in this fashion implicates the prohibition against banking time. View "Commonwealth v. Holmes" on Justia Law

A school librarian having professional teacher status was suspended for conduct deemed to be unbecoming a teacher. An arbitrator considered the merits of the suspension. Applying a “just cause” standard, the arbitrator overturned the suspension, concluding that the school district failed to meet its burden of proof. A superior court judge confirmed the arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by reviewing the merits of the librarian’s twenty-day suspension and concluding that the school district had not met its burden of proving the alleged just cause for the suspension. View "Superintendent-Dir. of Assabet Valley Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Speicher" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on one indictment alleging forcible rape of a child under sixteen years of age and two indictments alleging indecent assault and battery of a child under fourteen years of age. The appeals court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the judge erred in allowing the prosecutor on cross-examination to elicit expert testimony that both explicitly and implicitly vouched for the credibility of the victim witness regarding her allegations of sexual abuse. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly admitted testimony during cross-examination of the victim’s therapist that implicitly vouched for the credibility of the victim, and the error was prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant’s defense was that a third party killed the victim while Defendant was unconscious due to severe intoxication. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) any prejudice in the admission into evidence of recorded telephone calls made on the day of the murder between Defendant and his girlfriend was cured by the judge; (2) the admission of a medical record showing that Defendant tested negative for any drugs was error, but Defendant suffered no risk of a miscarriage of justice; (3) counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (4) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that there is no “legal limit” of intoxication for any purposes other than determining whether one is guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; and (5) Defendant’s claim that his right to a public trial during jury empaneled was violated was waived. View "Commonwealth v. Wall" on Justia Law