Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted kidnapping and of accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex. The Appeals Court reversed the judgment on the indictment charging accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex, concluding that because the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s conduct involved “sexually explicit language or acts,” the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving that Defendant’s conduct was “offensive.” The Supreme Judicial affirmed the judgment of conviction on the indictment charging accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex, holding (1) the jury properly could have found the elements of accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Defendant’s counsel provided effective assistance pertaining to his conviction of accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex. View "Commonwealth v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery, and related offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor’s several references to his initial invocation of his right to remain silent violated his constitutional due process rights. The Appeals Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s references to Defendant’s invocation of his rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona at trial constituted error; but (2) under the circumstances of this case, the improper references did not raise a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Letkowski" on Justia Law

Kenneth Wynne and Allison Wynne owned and operated Wynne Fine Art, which accepted art works from creditor artists. After the Wynnes filed for bankruptcy, the trustee of the bankruptcy estates moved to sell the art works. The creditor artists commenced an adversary proceeding against the bankruptcy estate seeking a declaration that the art works were held in trust under the Massachusetts fine art consignment statute, Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 104A, 2(b), and therefore were not the property of the bankruptcy estates. The trustee counterclaimed seeking a declaration that chapter 104A was inapplicable because when the creditor artists delivered their work to the gallery they did not provide a written statement describing the art work as required by chapter 104A, section 2(b). The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts certified a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court concerning the effect of a consignor’s failure to deliver a written statement pursuant to chapter 104A, section 2(b). The Supreme Judicial Court answered that a written statement of delivery is not a prerequisite for the formation of a consignment under chapter 104A. View "Plumb v. Casey" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a performance bond issued by Stanley Black and Decker, Inc. to secure the obligation of an environmental consulting company to perform environmental remediation of contaminated property, a portion of which was owned by Stanley. A.J. Properties, LLC commenced the underlying action against Stanley alleging that it had been assigned the right to recover all funds paid to Stanley under the performance bond. Specifically, A.J. Properties argued that Stanley had assigned the rights to payment when it assigned a mortgage on the property to the Wyman-Gordon Company, which assigned the mortgage to A.J. Properties. A federal district court judge determined that A.J. Properties was entitled to the amounts paid to Stanley under the rule of Quaranto v. Silverman. Stanley appealed, and the court of appeals recommended certification of a question of law to the First Circuit. The First Circuit answered the question as follows: “Where a mortgage and a surety agreement secured an obligation, and both the mortgagor and the surety committed a breach of that obligation prior to a written assignment of the mortgage, the assignee does not necessarily acquire the right against the surety’s receiver for the surety’s breach of its obligation.” View "A.J. Props., LLC v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc." on Justia Law

After electrical outages arising from Tropical Storm Irene on August 28, 2011 and a snowstorm two months later, the Department of Public Utilities entered orders against three utility companies - National Grid, NSTAR Electric Company (NSTAR), and Western Massachusetts Electric Company (WMEC) - that imposed monetary penalties for the utilities’ failure to restore service to their customers “in a safe and reasonably prompt manner.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Department applied the appropriate reasonableness standard in finding that the utilities violated their duty to restore service in a safe and reasonably prompt manner; (2) the Department’s findings regarding National Grid and WMEC were supported by substantial evidence, but its finding that NSTAR failed timely to respond to priority two and three wires-down calls was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) with two exceptions, the Department made the necessary findings and did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of monetary penalties. Remanded. View "Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation, arson of a dwelling house, and attempted murder of thirteen persons arising from Defendant’s act of setting fire to a curtain in the first-floor apartment of a three-story house. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding that the trial judge erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress certain statements she made to police during two interviews, and the error was not harmless with respect to the convictions of murder in the first degree and attempted murder but was harmless with respect to the conviction of arson of a dwelling house. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Thomas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree. A panels of the Appeals Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 because Defendant acquiesced in certain delays, failed to object to every continuance sought by the Commonwealth, did not press a motion to compel the production of mandatory discovery, and otherwise engaged in ordinary motion practice; and (2) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument, but the remarks did not constitute reversible error. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to several offenses, including the dissemination of visual material depicting a child in a state of nudity or sexual conduct, one of the sex offenses involving a child enumerated in Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 265, 47 that requires a defendant convicted of such an offense to be subject to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of any term of probation. The sentencing judge in this case declined to require that Defendant wear a GPS device as a condition of probation. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the failure to include GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s probation was error, where (1) a sentencing judge has no discretion whether to impose GPS monitoring on a defendant sentenced to a probationary term for an enumerated offense; and (2) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47 does not violate Defendant’s due process rights. View "Commonwealth v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to eleven counts of possessing child pornography, one of the sex offenses enumerated in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47 that requires a defendant convicted of such an offense to be subject to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of any term of probation. Such monitoring was not imposed as part of Defendant’s sentence. Almost one year after Defendant was sentenced, the Commonwealth sought correction of Defendant’s sentence by the addition of GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s sentence. The sentencing judge allowed the Commonwealth’s motion. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to vacate the modified sentence, arguing, among other things, that the delayed imposition of GPS monitoring violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Defendant’s motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order imposing GPS monitoring on Defendant, holding (1) Defendant’s initial sentence was illegal insofar as it did not include GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s probation; but (2) under the circumstances of this case, the belated correction of Defendant’s sentence contravened Defendant’s legitimate expectation of finality in the terms of his initial sentence in violation of principles of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Selavka" on Justia Law

A homeless man died after being stabbed in the alcove of a storefront. Two young women identified Defendant as the perpetrator. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in permitting the introduction of state of mind evidence where the judge provided numerous limiting instructions; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress identifications and his motion for a required finding of not guilty; (3) Defendant was not denied timely access to footage of surveillance videotapes in a way that prejudiced the preparation of his defense; (4) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Defendant’s request to recall the two percipient witnesses; and (5) Defendant’s claim that the Commonwealth knowingly procured false testimony was without merit. View "Commonwealth v. Forte" on Justia Law