Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge’s handling of witness testimony given pursuant to grants of immunity and plea agreements did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (2) the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument did not amount to improper vouching. View "Commonwealth v. Webb" on Justia Law

Defendant and the victim in this case were intellectually disabled adults who lived together in a State-licensed residential facility. After Defendant pushed the victim into a bathroom, causing injuries to the victim, Plaintiff filed an application for an abuse prevention order on behalf of the victim. A district court judge granted an abuse prevention order pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, determining that, because Defendant and the victim lived “in the same household,” the district court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order against Defendant, concluding that individuals who share a common diagnosis or status, rather than marriage, blood, or other relationships enumerated in chapter 209A, and who live together in a facilities run by the State, do not qualify as “household members” within the meaning of chapter 209A. View "Silva v. Carmel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from the prosecutor’s use of a rhetorical question during closing arguments; (2) the trial judge did not err in refusing, over Defendant’s objection, to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on reasonable provocation; and (3) in response to a jury question, the judge did not err in reinstructing the jury of their duty to find Defendant guilty of the most serious offense that the Commonwealth had proved beyond a reasonable doubt.View "Commonwealth v. Nelson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the murder of his four-year-old daughter, who died from intoxication due to sedating drugs found in her system, or from pneumonia, or from a combination of both intoxication and pneumonia. Defendant appealed his conviction and the denial of his motions for a new trial and for funds to retain a toxicologist. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and the orders denying Defendant’s motions, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in handling the issue of toxicological evidence at trial, and trial counsel did not otherwise render ineffective assistance; (2) the evidence of malice was sufficient to support the conviction; (3) the prosecutor properly used and commented on evidence of acts Defendant committed after the charged offense to show intent or state of mind at the time of the charged offense; and (4) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing and in denying Defendant’s posttrial motion for funds to retain a forensic toxicologist.View "Commonwealth v. Riley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home in a mortgage loan transaction with Summit Mortgage. The mortgage was later assigned to Defendant, SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. Facing foreclosure, Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding against SunTrust in the pending bankruptcy case, seeking rescission of the loan transaction and damages. SunTrust filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs filed their adversary complaint more than four years after the mortgage loan transaction, the defensive rescission-by-way-of-recoupment claim was barred by section 10(f) of the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (“MCCCDA”). In response, Plaintiffs asserted that the four-year statute of limitations did apply to their action because section 10(i)(3) of the MCCCDA allows for recoupment claims at any time. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts certified a question of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which answered by holding that a borrower who grants a mortgage in a consumer credit transaction may not rescind the transaction under the MCCCDA defensively by way of common law recoupment after the expiration of the statute of limitations set forth in section 10(f) of the MCCCDA.View "May v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Public Utilities imposed on Petitioners, electric companies, monetary assessments for the Storm Trust Fund (“assessment”) pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 12P, 18, which specifically prohibited Petitioners from seeking recovery of the assessment in any rate proceeding. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the recovery prohibition, both as required by the statute and impose by the Department’s order, claiming it was an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Department’s order, holding (1) the mere obligation to pay the assessment, regardless of whether recovery was permitted or precluded, did not rise to the level of a compensable per se taking; (2) Petitioner’s claim that the assessment constituted a taking by way of a confiscatory rate was inadequate on the facts as presented to the Court; and (3) the Department’s order imposing the assessment and articulating the recovery prohibition did not constitute a regulatory taking because the order simply required Petitioners to pay an assessment that served a legitimate public purpose and did not interfere with Petitioners’ overall property rights.View "Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of violating a protection order issued by a judge in New Hampshire in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, 7. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury regarding the intent required for a finding of a violation of the protection order. Specifically, Defendant argued that had she violated the protection order in New Hampshire, she could not be convicted of violating the order unless a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that she had “knowingly” violated the order, as defined under New Hampshire law, and the same standard should apply where the alleged violation occurred in Massachusetts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where an out-of-state abuse protection order is allegedly violated in Massachusetts and prosecuted under chapter 209A, the violation is governed by Massachusetts law and the jury should be instructed in accordance with Massachusetts law, and therefore, the judge in this case did not err by instructing the jury regarding the requirements of proof under Massachusetts law; and (2) no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice arose with regard to the judge’s further instructions to the jury.View "Commonwealth v. Shea" on Justia Law

After receiving a telephone call from Defendant’s neighbor, police entered Defendant’s front yard without a warrant and seized three dogs, two of which appeared to be dead, that had been left outside in severely inclement winter weather. Defendant was subsequently charged with three counts of animal cruelty. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search. The superior court granted the motion but reported the question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court of whether the ‘pure emergency’ exception to the warrant requirement extends to animals. The Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement extends to police action undertaken to render emergency assistance to animals. Remanded.View "Commonwealth v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented an apartment from Defendants, the owner and manager of the property. While ascending an exterior staircase leading to an outer door on the second floor landing, Plaintiff leaned against the staircase guardrail, which broke, causing Plaintiff to fall to the pavement below. Plaintiff sued Defendants. A jury found both parties negligent and concluded that, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 143, 51, Defendants were strictly liable for Plaintiff’s injuries because the injuries were caused by violations of the State building code. Defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that section 51 did not apply to the circumstances. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the part of the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as related to the section 51 claim, holding (1) section 51 applies to all violations of the State building code, not just those concerning fire safety; and (2) the term “building” as used in the statute does not encompass within its ambit of strict liability of a small-scale residential structure like that occupied by Plaintiff, notwithstanding that the structure had some commercial characteristics. View "Sheehan v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and the two defendants in this case were Roman Catholic priests. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendants published, in the parish where Defendant was serving, a false and defamatory stalking accusation against Plaintiff. Plaintiff knew that Defendants published the stalking accusation in 2005, but Defendant did not discover until 2007 that Defendants had fabricated the defamatory accusation. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the three-year statute of limitations barred Plaintiff’s claim and that the discovery rule did not toll the limitations period. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations should be tolled because, until 2007, Plaintiff reasonably could have believed that Defendants were permitted or privileged to repeat the defamatory statement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment dismissing the complaint, holding (1) under the discovery rule, knowledge of the identity of the defendant is necessary for a cause of action to accrue; and (2) because Plaintiff knew in 2005 that Defendants were the publishers of the defamatory stalking accusation, Plaintiff’s complaint was not timely filed.View "Harrington v. Costello" on Justia Law