Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A Massachusetts regulation requires that each “entrance” to a public building or facility be accessible persons with disabilities. J.M. Hollister, LLC (Hollister) operated a retail store in Kingston with three doorways. At issue in this case was whether the three doorways constituted separate entrances or a single integrated entrance. Hollister applied for a variance from its obligation to make all public entrances to the store handicapped accessible. The board ultimately denied the variance and ordered Hollister to bring the store into compliance. The superior court affirmed the board’s decision that the doorways constituted separate entrances and found that there was substantial evidence to support the denial of a variance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the board reasonably could conclude from the evidence that the three doorways were not integrated but rather constituted separate access points into the store in both form and function; and (2) the board’s denial of the variance was based on substantial evidence. View "J.M. Hollister, LLC v. Architectural Access Bd." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion and did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights in questioning members of the jury venire concerning the effect of the absence of eyewitness testimony to the murder in the Commonwealth’s case; (2) the prosecutor’s redirect examination of an immunized witness did not invade the province of the jury to determine the witness’s credibility and did not allow the Commonwealth to vouch for the witness’s credibility; and (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by making certain remarks closing argument. View "Commonwealth v. Andrade" on Justia Law

Defendant, an attorney, was charged with multiple counts of, inter alia, forgery of a document and uttering a forged instrument. The charges stemmed from allegations that Defendant, through his use of computers, orchestrated a sophisticated scheme to divert to himself funds that were intended to be used to pay off large home mortgage loans. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion to compel Defendant to enter his password into encryption software he placed on various digital media storage devices that were in the custody of the Commonwealth. Following a hearing, a judge denied the Commonwealth’s motion to compel decryption but reported a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court reversed the denial of the Commonwealth’s motion, concluding that Defendant could be compelled to provide his key to seized encrypted digital evidence provided that the compelled decryption would not communicate facts of a testimonial nature to the Commonwealth beyond what Defendant had already admitted to investigators. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, ten Massachusetts voters, submitted for certification an initiative petition that sought to prohibit casino and slots gambling that had been made legal under the Expanded Gaming Act of 2011 and to abolish parimutuel wagering on simulcast greyhound races. The Attorney General declined to certify the petition for inclusion on the November Statewide election ballot, concluding that it did not meet the requirements set forth in article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. Plaintiffs filed a complaint “for relief in the nature of mandamus” seeking an order compelling the Attorney General to certify the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the requested relief, holding that the Attorney General erred in declining the certify the initiative petition, as it satisfied the requirements of article 48. View "Abdow v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Patricia Campatelli, the Register of Probate and Insolvency for Suffolk County, was suspended with pay pending further investigation of allegations of inappropriate conduct and mismanagement in the performance of her duties. Campatelli filed a complaint in the county court seeking a judgment declaring that the three court officials who placed her on administrative leave did not possess the authority to suspend her pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 4. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department, the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, and the Court Administrator possessed the authority to suspend Campatelli with pay. View "Campatelli v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a telephone call recorded by the police between Defendant and a cooperating witness where the cooperating witness was instructed by law enforcement to elicit information regarding a “designated offense” but instead elicited information about an unrelated crime that was not a designated offense. The Commonwealth did not seek a warrant under the Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute, which requires the Commonwealth to obtain a warrant before it may conduct an “interception,” unless the communication is recorded “in the course of an investigation of a designated offense.” After the telephone call was recorded, Defendant was indicted for murder and several other offenses. A superior court judge suppressed the conversation, concluding that the recording was not made in the course of an investigation of a designated offense. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that where a law enforcement officer, acting in good faith, instructs a cooperating witness to attempt to elicit information regarding a designated offense, regardless of whether the cooperating witness actually follows the officer’s instructions, the recorded conversation is not an interception and therefore does not require a warrant under the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements made to the police, as the statements were made voluntarily; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for required findings of not guilty, as the evidence presented at trial supported the conviction; (3) the admission of expert rebuttal testimony was proper and did not violate Defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct during closing arguments. View "Commonwealth v. Harris" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, the predicate felony being attempted robbery, and of carrying a firearm without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined the request to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that the trial judge (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that was based on observations made during an earlier warrantless entry of a college dormitory room where Defendant had been staying; (2) did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior bad act; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; and (4) did not err by failing to instruct the jury that they could not convict Defendant of felony-murder in the first degree based on the firearms conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Copney" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were amendments to the Sex Offender Registry Law that the Governor signed into law on July 12, 2013, including amendments that would require the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) to publish on the Internet information contained in the sex offender registry regarding individuals given a level two or three classification. On July 5, 2013, Plaintiffs, as putative representatives of a class of persons presently and prospectively classified as level two sex offenders, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking an injunction barring SORB from publishing registry information on the Internet of the class of level two offenders. The Supreme Judicial Court declared unconstitutional the retroactive application of the amendments to the extent they would require the Internet publication of the registry information of individuals who were finally classified as level two sex offenders on or before July 12, 2013 but noted that SORB was allowed to publish on the Internet the registry information of any individual who was given a final classification as a level two sex offender after July 12, 2013. View "Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the town of Hanover, filed suit against Defendant, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters, alleging that Defendant engaged in abuse of process in prior legal proceedings by maintaining the litigation, providing legal counsel, and controlling the plaintiffs’ interests, despite not being named a plaintiff in the suit. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the “anti-SLAPP” statute, asserting that the town’s claims against it were solely based on Defendant’s constitutionally protected right to petition. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that Defendant did not have standing to bring its motion under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant showed that the suit against it was based on protected petitioning activity; (2) the town did not meet its burden of showing that Defendant’s exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s special motion to dismiss should be allowed. View "Town of Hanover v. New England Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law