Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to eleven counts of possessing child pornography, one of the sex offenses enumerated in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47 that requires a defendant convicted of such an offense to be subject to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of any term of probation. Such monitoring was not imposed as part of Defendant’s sentence. Almost one year after Defendant was sentenced, the Commonwealth sought correction of Defendant’s sentence by the addition of GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s sentence. The sentencing judge allowed the Commonwealth’s motion. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to vacate the modified sentence, arguing, among other things, that the delayed imposition of GPS monitoring violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Defendant’s motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order imposing GPS monitoring on Defendant, holding (1) Defendant’s initial sentence was illegal insofar as it did not include GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s probation; but (2) under the circumstances of this case, the belated correction of Defendant’s sentence contravened Defendant’s legitimate expectation of finality in the terms of his initial sentence in violation of principles of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Selavka" on Justia Law

A homeless man died after being stabbed in the alcove of a storefront. Two young women identified Defendant as the perpetrator. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in permitting the introduction of state of mind evidence where the judge provided numerous limiting instructions; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress identifications and his motion for a required finding of not guilty; (3) Defendant was not denied timely access to footage of surveillance videotapes in a way that prejudiced the preparation of his defense; (4) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Defendant’s request to recall the two percipient witnesses; and (5) Defendant’s claim that the Commonwealth knowingly procured false testimony was without merit. View "Commonwealth v. Forte" on Justia Law

Nautical Tours, Inc. filed a petition with the Department of Public Utilities concerning its proposed operation of amphibious motor vehicles for sightseeing and charter purposes over certain public ways in Boston. Nautical asked the Department to exercise its licensing authority to issue a municipal street license under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159A, 1. The Department dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Nautical Tours was required to obtain a sightseeing license, which the Boston police commissioner had the exclusive authority to issue pursuant to St. 1931, c. 399. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the Department’s position that Nautical Tours needed to obtain a sightseeing license pursuant to St. 1931, c. 399, and the Department did not have any licensing authority in this regard pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159A, 1. View "Nautical Tours, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. After various proceedings, Defendant filed his fifth motion for a new trial, arguing that newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party culprit evidence warranted a new trial. The superior court denied the motion as well as Defendant’s motions for reconsideration. Defendant appealed the denial of his fifth motion for a new trial pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the appeal to proceed. The Supreme Judicial Court then affirmed the order denying Defendant’s fifth motion for a new trial, holding that the new evidence did not cast real doubt on the justice of Defendant’s conviction because there was no a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had this evidence been admitted at trial. View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony murder. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that in litigating his motions to suppress, he should have been afforded “target standing” to challenge the violation of his alleged coventurers’ constitutional rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) even assuming the availability of target standing, Defendant was properly denied target standing to challenge the violations of his coventurers’ constitutional rights; (2) the witness immunity statute was constitutional as applied to Defendant; (3) certain identification testimony was improperly admitted into evidence, but the improper testimony was not prejudicial; and (4) the trial judge erred in failing to give an instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Vacher" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree of a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed, raising five allegations of error. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the first four of Defendant’s claims but agreed with the fifth, holding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that they may consider Defendant’s consumption of alcohol in determining whether Defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner in causing the victim’s death, and the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

For over twenty years, Plaintiff worked as a ninth grade science teacher. In 2004, Plaintiff was arrested for the purchase and possession of child pornography. In 2006, Plaintiff resigned his position. In 2007, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to eleven counts of purchasing and possessing child pornography. After his arrest but prior to his plea and sentencing, Plaintiff filed a retirement application with the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System (MTRS). Plaintiff received retirement benefits until 2009, at which time the MTRS Board concluded that Plaintiff’s pension was forfeited by operation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(4) due to his convictions. The superior court vacated the decision of the Board on the basis that there was not a direct link between Plaintiff’s criminal offenses and his position as a teacher. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that forfeiture of Plaintiff’s retirement benefits under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 51(4) was not warranted because Plaintiff’s offenses neither directly involved Plaintiff’s position as a teacher nor contravened a particular law applicable to that position. View "Garney v. Mass. Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, asserting multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and requested an evidentiary hearing. The trial judge denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial; and (3) there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in the trial judge’s failure to make written findings. View "Commonwealth v. Torres" on Justia Law

Trenea Figgs was a participant in the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Section 8 program, which was administered by the Boston Housing Authority. After the discovery by police officers of marijuana and a loaded firearm in Figgs’s apartment, the BHA notified Figgs of its intent to terminate her participation in the Section 8 program due to violations of her lease. A hearing officer concluded that termination of Figgs’s Section 8 housing subsidy was proper in light of her serious lease violation. The Housing Court reversed and ordered the BHA to reinstate Figgs’s Section 8 housing subsidy. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the Housing Court, holding that, notwithstanding the enactment of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32L, which decriminalized the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, the hearing officer properly concluded that Figgs violated her lease based on evidence of other criminal activity in Figgs’s rental premises, and the violation warranted Figgs’s termination from the Section 8 program. View "Figgs v. Boston Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Soon after beginning work for the City of Springfield, Joseph McDowell achieved the status of a permanent, tenured civil service employee. McDowell was later provisionally promoted. McDowell worked in the second of his provisional positions for several years until the City terminated his employment. While McDowell’s appeal from his termination was pending before the Civil Service Commission, McDowell pleaded guilty to filing false tax returns. The Commission concluded (1) McDowell was entitled to appeal his termination pursuant to the relevant provisions of the civil service statute; and (2) the City was entitled to suspend McDowell upon his indictment and thereafter entitled to discharge him upon his conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded, holding (1) McDowell, who held a tenured civil service position but then accepted a provisional promotion, was entitled to appeal his termination to the Commission; and (2) under the particular circumstances of this case, the Commission was permitted to take the criminal proceeding against McDowell and its disposition into account, but McDowell’s indictment for filing false tax returns did not qualify as an indictment for misconduct in his employment within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, 25, and thus a suspension based on the indictment would not have been valid. View "City of Springfield v. Civil Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law